Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution
| Data(s) |
01/01/2011
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom. <br /> |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Springer-Verlag |
| Relação |
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30036871/anbarci-weakestcollective-2011.pdf http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30036871/anbarci-weakestcollective-evidence-2011.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y |
| Direitos |
2010, Springer-Verlag |
| Tipo |
Journal Article |
