Bibliography of engineering Research Institute.

Mode of access: Internet.

Artificial neural networks approach to predict principal ground motion parameters for quick post-earthquake damage assessment of bridges

Peer reviewed

H-house

The author's approach to the problems associated with building in bushfire prone landscapes comes from 12 years of study of the biophysical and cultural landscapes in the Great Southern Region of Western Australia - research which resulted in the design and construction of the H-house at Bremer Bay. The house was developed using a 'ground up' approach whereby Dr Weir conducted topographical surveys and worked with a local botanist and a bushfire risk consultant to ascertain the level of threat that fire presented to this particular site. The intention from the outset however, was not to design a bushfire resistant house per se, but to develop a design which would place the owners in close proximity to the highly biodiverse heath vegetation of their site. The research aim was to find ways - through architectural design-to link the patterns of usage of the house with other site specific conditions related to the prevailing winds, solar orientation and seasonal change. The H-house has a number of features which increase the level of bushfire safety. These include: Fire rated roller shutters (tested by the CSIRO for ember attack and radiant heat), Fire resistant double glazing (on windows not protected by the shutters), Fibre-cement sheet cladding of the underside of the elevated timber floor structure, Manually operated high pressure sprinkler system on exposed timber decks, A fire refuge (an enlarged laundry, shower area) within the house with a dedicated cabinet for fire fighting equipment) and A low pressure solar powered domestic water supply system.

Bushfire responsive architecture : strategies for reconciling bushfire and biodiversity with daily life

My perspective on the problems associated with building in bushfire prone landscapes comes from 12 years of study of the biophysical and cultural landscapes in the Great Southern Region of WA which resulted in the design and construction of the ‘Hhouse’ at Bremer Bay. The house was developed using a ‘ground up’ approach whereby I conducted a topographical survey and worked with a local botanist and a bushfire risk consultant to ascertain the level of threat that fire presented to this particular site. My intention from the outset however, was not to design a bushfire resistant house per se, but to develop a design which would place the owners in close proximity to the highly biodiverse heath vegetation of the site. I was also seeking a means—through architectural design—of linking the patterns of usage of the house with other site specific conditions related to the prevailing winds, solar orientation and seasonal change.

Using decision trees in economizer repair decision making

The economiser is a critical component for efficient operation of coal-fired power stations. It consists of a large system of water-filled tubes which extract heat from the exhaust gases. When it fails, usually due to erosion causing a leak, the entire power station must be shut down to effect repairs. Not only are such repairs highly expensive, but the overall repair costs are significantly affected by fluctuations in electricity market prices, due to revenue lost during the outage. As a result, decisions about when to repair an economiser can alter the repair costs by millions of dollars. Therefore, economiser repair decisions are critical and must be optimised. However, making optimal repair decisions is difficult because economiser leaks are a type of interactive failure. If left unfixed, a leak in a tube can cause additional leaks in adjacent tubes which will need more time to repair. In addition, when choosing repair times, one also needs to consider a number of other uncertain inputs such as future electricity market prices and demands. Although many different decision models and methodologies have been developed, an effective decision-making method specifically for economiser repairs has yet to be defined. In this paper, we describe a Decision Tree based method to meet this need. An industrial case study is presented to demonstrate the application of our method.

Seismic mitigation of building structural systems using passive dampers

This paper treats the seismic mitigation of medium rise frame-shear wall structures and building facade systems using passive damping devices. The frame shear wall structures have embedded viscoelastic and friction dampers in different configurations and placed in various locations in the structure. Influence of damper type, configuration and location are investigated. Results for tip deflections which provide an overall evaluation of the seismic response of the structure, are determined. Seismic mitigation of building facade systems in which visco-elastic dampers are fitted at the horizontal connections between the facades and the frame, instead of the traditional rigid connections, are also treated. Finite element techniques are used to model and analyse the two structural systems under different earthquake loadings, scaled to the same peak ground acceleration for meaningful comparison of responses. Results demonstrate the feasibility of these techniques for seismic mitigation.

Definition of an airworthiness certification framework for civil unmanned aircraft systems

The development of effective safety regulations for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is an issue of paramount concern for industry. The development of this framework is a prerequisite for greater UAS access to civil airspace and, subsequently, the continued growth of the UAS industry. The direct use of the existing conventionally piloted aircraft (CPA) airworthiness certification framework for the regulation of UAS has a number of limitations. The objective of this paper is to present one possible approach for the structuring of airworthiness regulations for civilian UAS. The proposed approach facilitates a more systematic, objective and justifiable method for managing the spectrum of risk associated with the diversity of UAS and their potential operations. A risk matrix is used to guide the development of an airworthiness certification matrix (ACM). The ACM provides a structured categorisation that facilitates the future tailoring of regulations proportionate to the levels of risk associated with the operation of the UAS. As a result, an objective and traceable link may be established between mandated regulations and the overarching objective for an equivalent level of safety to CPA. The ACM also facilitates the systematic consideration of a range of technical and operational mitigation strategies. For these reasons, the ACM is proposed as a suitable method for the structuring of an airworthiness certification framework for civil or commercially operated UAS (i.e., the UAS equivalent in function to the Part 21 regulations for civil CPA) and for the further structuring of requirements on the operation of UAS in un-segregated airspace.

The safety risk management of unmanned aircraft systems

The safety risk management process describes the systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context, and identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk. This process is undertaken to provide assurances that the risks of a particular unmanned aircraft system activity have been managed to an acceptable level. The safety risk management process and its outcomes form part of the documented safety case necessary to obtain approvals for unmanned aircraft system operations. It also guides the development of an organisation’s operations manual and is a primary component of an organisation’s safety management system. The aim of this chapter is to provide existing risk practitioners with a high level introduction to some of the unique issues and challenges in the application of the safety risk management process to unmanned aircraft systems. The scope is limited to safety risks associated with the operation of unmanned aircraft in the civil airspace system and over inhabited areas. The structure of the chapter is based on the safety risk management process as defined by the international risk management standard ISO 31000:2009 and draws on aviation safety resources provided by International Civil Aviation Organization, the Federal Aviation Administration and U.S. Department of Defense. References to relevant aviation safety regulations, programs of research and fielded systems are also provided.

Adoption of low-cost rail level crossing warning devices : an Australian case study

The objective of this chapter is to provide rail practitioners with a practical approach for determining safety requirements of low-cost level crossing warning devices (LCLCWDs) on an Australian railway by way of a case study. LCLCWDs, in theory, allow railway operators to improve the safety of passively controlled crossing by upgrading a larger number of level crossings with the same budget that would otherwise be used to upgrade these using the conventional active level crossing control technologies, e.g. track circuit initiated flashing light systems. The chapter discusses the experience and obstacles of adopting LCLCWDs in Australia, and demonstrates how the risk-based approach may be used to make the case for LCLCWDs.

A review of system safety failure probability objectives for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are one of a number of emerging aviation sectors. Such new aviation concepts present a significant challenge to National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) charged with ensuring the safety of their operation within the existing airspace system. There is significant heritage in the existing body of aviation safety regulations for Conventionally Piloted Aircraft (CPA). It can be argued that the promulgation of these regulations has delivered a level of safety tolerable to society, thus justifying the “default position” of applying these same standards, regulations and regulatory structures to emerging aviation concepts such as UAS. An example of this is the proposed “1309” regulation for UAS, which is based on the 1309 regulation for CPA. However, the absence of a pilot on-board an unmanned aircraft creates a fundamentally different risk paradigm to that of CPA. An appreciation of these differences is essential to the justification of the “default position” and in turn, to ensure the development of effective safety standards and regulations for UAS. This paper explores the suitability of the proposed “1309” regulation for UAS. A detailed review of the proposed regulation is provided and a number of key assumptions are identified and discussed. A high-level model characterising the expected number of third party fatalities on the ground is then used to determine the impact of these assumptions. The results clearly show that the “one size fits all” approach to the definition of 1309 regulations for UAS, which mandates equipment design and installation requirements independent of where the UAS is to be operated, will not lead to an effective management of the risks.

The development of ground impact models for the analysis of the risks associated with Unmanned Aircraft Operations over inhabited areas

With the emergence of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) there is a growing need for safety standards and regulatory frameworks to manage the risks associated with their operations. The primary driver for airworthiness regulations (i.e., those governing the design, manufacture, maintenance and operation of UAS) are the risks presented to people in the regions overflown by the aircraft. Models characterising the nature of these risks are needed to inform the development of airworthiness regulations. The output from these models should include measures of the collective, individual and societal risk. A brief review of these measures is provided. Based on the review, it was determined that the model of the operation of an UAS over inhabited areas must be capable of describing the distribution of possible impact locations, given a failure at a particular point in the flight plan. Existing models either do not take the impact distribution into consideration, or propose complex and computationally expensive methods for its calculation. A computationally efficient approach for estimating the boundary (and in turn area) of the impact distribution for fixed wing unmanned aircraft is proposed. A series of geometric templates that approximate the impact distributions are derived using an empirical analysis of the results obtained from a 6-Degree of Freedom (6DoF) simulation. The impact distributions can be aggregated to provide impact footprint distributions for a range of generic phases of flight and missions. The maximum impact footprint areas obtained from the geometric template are shown to have a relative error of typically less than 1% compared to the areas calculated using the computationally more expensive 6DoF simulation. Computation times for the geometric models are on the order of one second or less, using a standard desktop computer. Future work includes characterising the distribution of impact locations within the footprint boundaries.

How safe is safe enough? : a socio-technical view of low-cost level crossing safety

Low-cost level crossings are often criticized as being unsafe. Does a SIL (safety integrity level) rating make the railway crossing any safer? This paper discusses how a supporting argument might be made for low-cost level crossing warning devices with lower levels of safety integrity and issues such as risk tolerability and derivation of tolerable hazard rates for system-level hazards. As part of the design of such systems according to fail-safe principles, the paper considers the assumptions around the pre-defined safe states of existing warning devices and how human factors issues around such states can give rise to additional hazards.