User-friendly parallel computations with econometric examples

This paper shows how a high level matrix programming language may be used to perform Monte Carlo simulation, bootstrapping, estimation by maximum likelihood and GMM, and kernel regression in parallel on symmetric multiprocessor computers or clusters of workstations. The implementation of parallelization is done in a way such that an investigator may use the programs without any knowledge of parallel programming. A bootable CD that allows rapid creation of a cluster for parallel computing is introduced. Examples show that parallelization can lead to important reductions in computational time. Detailed discussion of how the Monte Carlo problem was parallelized is included as an example for learning to write parallel programs for Octave.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Is bundling anticompetitive?

I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. Using a model of imperfect competition with product differentiation, I identify the incentives to bundle for two types of demand functions and study how they change with the size of the bundle. With an inelastic demand, bundling creates an advantage over uncoordinated rivals who cannot improve by bundling. I show that this no longer holds with an elastic demand. The incentives to bundle are stronger and the market outcome is symmetric bundling, the most competitive one. Profits are lowest and consumer surplus is maximized.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Infinite index subgroups and finiteness properties of intersections of geometrically finite groups

We explore which types of finiteness properties are possible for intersections of geometrically finite groups of isometries in negatively curved symmetric rank one spaces. Our main tool is a twist construction which takes as input a geometrically finite group containing a normal subgroup of infinite index with given finiteness properties and infinite Abelian quotient, and produces a pair of geometrically finite groups whose intersection is isomorphic to the normal subgroup.

Galois extension of CP-Graded ring extensions

In this paper, we investigate galois theory of CP-graded ring extensions. In particular, we generalize some galois results given in [1, 2] and, without restriction to nor graded fields nor torsion free of the grade groups, we show that some results of graded field extensions given in [3] hold.

Petits points et conjecture de Bogomolov

This paper is devoted to the statement known as the Bogomolov conjecture on small points. We present the outline of Zhang’s proof of the generalized version of the conjecture. An explicit bound for the height of a non-torsion variety of an abelian variety is obtained in the frame of Arakelov theory. Some further developments are mentioned.

On the injectivity of the Kudla-Millson lift and surjectivity of the Borcherds lift

We consider the Kudla-Millson lift from elliptic modular forms of weight (p+q)/2 to closed q-forms on locally symmetric spaces corresponding to the orthogonal group O(p,q). We study the L²-norm of the lift following the Rallis inner product formula. We compute the contribution at the Archimedian place. For locally symmetric spaces associated to even unimodular lattices, we obtain an explicit formula for the L²-norm of the lift, which often implies that the lift is injective. For O(p,2) we discuss how such injectivity results imply the surjectivity of the Borcherds lift.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

On the asymptotic expansion of the colored Jones polynomial for torus knots

In the asymptotic expansion of the hyperbolic specification of the colored Jones polynomial of torus knots, we identify different geometric contributions, in particular Chern-Simons invariant and Reidemeister torsion.

Strongly non-degenerate Lie algebras

Let A be a semiprime 2 and 3-torsion free non-commutative associative algebra. We show that the Lie algebra Der(A) of(associative) derivations of A is strongly non-degenerate, which is a strong form of semiprimeness for Lie algebras, under some additional restrictions on the center of A. This result follows from a description of the quadratic annihilator of a general Lie algebra inside appropriate Lie overalgebras. Similar results are obtained for an associative algebra A with involution and the Lie algebra SDer(A) of involution preserving derivations of A