Evolving from inferences to decisions in the interpretation of scientific evidence

Le travail d'un(e) expert(e) en science forensique exige que ce dernier (cette dernière) prenne une série de décisions. Ces décisions sont difficiles parce qu'elles doivent être prises dans l'inévitable présence d'incertitude, dans le contexte unique des circonstances qui entourent la décision, et, parfois, parce qu'elles sont complexes suite à de nombreuse variables aléatoires et dépendantes les unes des autres. Etant donné que ces décisions peuvent aboutir à des conséquences sérieuses dans l'administration de la justice, la prise de décisions en science forensique devrait être soutenue par un cadre robuste qui fait des inférences en présence d'incertitudes et des décisions sur la base de ces inférences. L'objectif de cette thèse est de répondre à ce besoin en présentant un cadre théorique pour faire des choix rationnels dans des problèmes de décisions rencontrés par les experts dans un laboratoire de science forensique. L'inférence et la théorie de la décision bayésienne satisfont les conditions nécessaires pour un tel cadre théorique. Pour atteindre son objectif, cette thèse consiste de trois propositions, recommandant l'utilisation (1) de la théorie de la décision, (2) des réseaux bayésiens, et (3) des réseaux bayésiens de décision pour gérer des problèmes d'inférence et de décision forensiques. Les résultats présentent un cadre uniforme et cohérent pour faire des inférences et des décisions en science forensique qui utilise les concepts théoriques ci-dessus. Ils décrivent comment organiser chaque type de problème en le décomposant dans ses différents éléments, et comment trouver le meilleur plan d'action en faisant la distinction entre des problèmes de décision en une étape et des problèmes de décision en deux étapes et en y appliquant le principe de la maximisation de l'utilité espérée. Pour illustrer l'application de ce cadre à des problèmes rencontrés par les experts dans un laboratoire de science forensique, des études de cas théoriques appliquent la théorie de la décision, les réseaux bayésiens et les réseaux bayésiens de décision à une sélection de différents types de problèmes d'inférence et de décision impliquant différentes catégories de traces. Deux études du problème des deux traces illustrent comment la construction de réseaux bayésiens permet de gérer des problèmes d'inférence complexes, et ainsi surmonter l'obstacle de la complexité qui peut être présent dans des problèmes de décision. Trois études-une sur ce qu'il faut conclure d'une recherche dans une banque de données qui fournit exactement une correspondance, une sur quel génotype il faut rechercher dans une banque de données sur la base des observations faites sur des résultats de profilage d'ADN, et une sur s'il faut soumettre une trace digitale à un processus qui compare la trace avec des empreintes de sources potentielles-expliquent l'application de la théorie de la décision et des réseaux bayésiens de décision à chacune de ces décisions. Les résultats des études des cas théoriques soutiennent les trois propositions avancées dans cette thèse. Ainsi, cette thèse présente un cadre uniforme pour organiser et trouver le plan d'action le plus rationnel dans des problèmes de décisions rencontrés par les experts dans un laboratoire de science forensique. Le cadre proposé est un outil interactif et exploratoire qui permet de mieux comprendre un problème de décision afin que cette compréhension puisse aboutir à des choix qui sont mieux informés. - Forensic science casework involves making a sériés of choices. The difficulty in making these choices lies in the inévitable presence of uncertainty, the unique context of circumstances surrounding each décision and, in some cases, the complexity due to numerous, interrelated random variables. Given that these décisions can lead to serious conséquences in the admin-istration of justice, forensic décision making should be supported by a robust framework that makes inferences under uncertainty and décisions based on these inferences. The objective of this thesis is to respond to this need by presenting a framework for making rational choices in décision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories. Bayesian inference and décision theory meets the requirements for such a framework. To attain its objective, this thesis consists of three propositions, advocating the use of (1) décision theory, (2) Bayesian networks, and (3) influence diagrams for handling forensic inference and décision problems. The results present a uniform and coherent framework for making inferences and décisions in forensic science using the above theoretical concepts. They describe how to organize each type of problem by breaking it down into its différent elements, and how to find the most rational course of action by distinguishing between one-stage and two-stage décision problems and applying the principle of expected utility maximization. To illustrate the framework's application to the problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories, theoretical case studies apply décision theory, Bayesian net-works and influence diagrams to a selection of différent types of inference and décision problems dealing with différent catégories of trace evidence. Two studies of the two-trace problem illustrate how the construction of Bayesian networks can handle complex inference problems, and thus overcome the hurdle of complexity that can be present in décision prob-lems. Three studies-one on what to conclude when a database search provides exactly one hit, one on what genotype to search for in a database based on the observations made on DNA typing results, and one on whether to submit a fingermark to the process of comparing it with prints of its potential sources-explain the application of décision theory and influ¬ence diagrams to each of these décisions. The results of the theoretical case studies support the thesis's three propositions. Hence, this thesis présents a uniform framework for organizing and finding the most rational course of action in décision problems encountered by scientists in forensic science laboratories. The proposed framework is an interactive and exploratory tool for better understanding a décision problem so that this understanding may lead to better informed choices.

Utility System Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2005

State University Audit Report

The Big Band Theory : català col·loquial i humor científic. Proposta de traducció del capítol pilot

Aquest treball elabora una proposta de traducció per al doblatge del capítol pilot de The Big Bang Theory, que combina llenguatge col•loquial i llenguatge científic.L’objectiu és doble: elaborar un llenguatge col•loquial creïble però a la vegada genuí i emprar els equivalents catalans adequats per als termes científics originals.

Utility Cut Repair Techniques— Investigation of Improved Cut Repair Techniques to Reduce Settlement in Repaired Areas, December 2005

Pavement settlement occurring in and around utility cuts is a common problem, resulting in uneven pavement surfaces, annoyance to drivers, and ultimately, further maintenance. A survey of municipal authorities and field and laboratory investigations were conducted to identify the factors contributing to the settlement of utility cut restorations in pavement sections. Survey responses were received from seven cities across Iowa and indicate that utility cut restorations often last less than two years. Observations made during site inspections showed that backfill material varies from one city to another, backfill lift thickness often exceeds 12 inches, and the backfill material is often placed at bulking moisture contents with no Quality control/Quality Assurance. Laboratory investigation of the backfill materials indicate that at the field moisture contents encountered, the backfill materials have collapse potentials up to 35%. Falling Weight Deflectometer (FWD) deflection data and elevation shots indicate that the maximum deflection in the pavement occurs in the area around the utility cut restoration. The FWD data indicate a zone of influence around the perimeter of the restoration extending two to three feet beyond the trench perimeter. The research team proposes moisture control, the use of 65% relative density in a granular fill, and removing and compacting the native material near the ground surface around the trench. Test sections with geogrid reinforcement were also incorporated. The performance of inspected and proposed utility cuts needs to be monitored for at least two more years.

Capital, Wages, and Growth: Theory and Evidence

Returns to scale to capital and the strength of capital externalities play a key role for the empirical predictions and policy implications of different growth theories. We show that both can be identified with individual wage data and implement our approach at the city-level using US Census data on individuals in 173 cities for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Estimation takes into account fixed effects, endogeneity of capital accumulation, and measurement error. We find no evidence for human or physical capital externalities and decreasing aggregate returns to capital. Returns to scale to physical and human capital are around 80 percent. We also find strong complementarities between human capital and labor and substantial total employment externalities.

Measurement with Some Theory: a New Approach to Evaluate Business Cycle Models

We propose a method to evaluate cyclical models which does not require knowledge of the DGP and the exact empirical specification of the aggregate decision rules. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use some to identify structural shocks and others to evaluate the model or contrast sub-models. The approach has good size and excellent power properties, even in small samples. We show how to examine the validity of a class of models, sort out the relevance of certain frictions, evaluate the importance of an added feature, and indirectly estimate structural parameters.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Utility System Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report

A One-Shot Prisoners Dilemma with Procedural Utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.