Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Inflationary bias and state owned financial institutions

This article explains why the existence of state owned financial institutions makes it more difficult for a country to balance its budget. We show that states can use their financiaI institutions to transfer their deficits to the federal govemment. As a result, there is a bias towards Iarge deficits and high inflation rates. Our model also predicts that state owned financiaI institutions should underperform the market, mainly because they concentrate their portfolios on non-performing loans to their own shareholders, that is, the states. Brazil and Argentina are two countries with a history of high inflation that confirm our predictions .

How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state a§ect the aggregated level of individuals and small businessesí loans. Higher levels of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to Öle for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credit. On the other hand, lower levels of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. ConÖrming the theoretical claims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuals and small businesses, where the optimal level of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in U.S. do not apply the optimal level, an intervention that brings the exemption level closer to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.

Should educational policies be regressive?

In this paper, we show that when the government is able to transfer wealth between generations, regressive policies are no longer optimal. The optimal educational policy can be decentralized through appropriate Pigouvian taxes and credit provision, is not regressive, and provides equality of opportunities in education (in the sense of irrelevance of parental income for the amount of education). Moreover, in the presence of default, the optimal policy can be implemented through income-contingent payments.

Inflation and debt indexation : the equivalence of two alternative schemes for the case of periodic payments

The presence of inflation has induced the financial institutions to implement procedures devised to protect the real values of theirs loans. Two of such procedurcs, the floaaing rale scheme and the monetary correction mechanism, tend to lead to very different streams of payments. However, whenever the floating rate scheme follows the rule of Strict adhercnce to lhe Fisher equation, lhe two procedures are financially equivalent.

Why foreign savings fail to cause growth

Este artigo é uma formalização da crítica à estratégia do crescimento com poupança externa que um de seus autores vem sendo fazendo nos últimos anos. Apesar dos países de renda média serem pobres de capital, os déficits em conta corrente (poupança externa), financiado seja por empréstimos ou por investimentos externos diretos, não irá aumentar a taxa de acumulação de capital ou terá pouco impacto sobre ela, uma vez que os déficits de conta corrente estarão associados taxas de câmbio apreciadas, ordenados e salários aumentados artificialmente e altos níveis de consumo. Consequentemente, a taxa de substituição da poupança externa pela interna será relativamente alta, e o país será obrigado não a investir e crescer, mas a consumir. Apenas quando há grandes oportunidades de investimento, estimuladas por uma ampla diferença entre a taxa de lucro esperada e a taxa de juros de longo prazo, a propensão marginal ao consumo diminuirá suficientemente, a ponto de o lucro adicional originário do fluxo de capital estrangeiro ser usado para investimento, ao invés de para consumo. Neste caso especial, a taxa de substituição de poupança externa pela interna tenderá a ser menor e a poupança interna contribuirá positivamente para o crescimento

Crítica do crescimento com poupança externa

O presente artigo é uma formalização da crítica à estratégia do crescimento com poupança externa. Apesar dos países de renda média serem pobres em capital, os déficits em conta corrente (poupança externa), financiados por empréstimos ou investimentos diretos externos, não necessariamente farão aumentar a taxa de acumulação de capital ou, mesmo, terão pouco impacto sobre ela, de forma que os déficits em conta serão associados a taxas de câmbio apreciadas, altos salários e ordenados reais e altos níveis de consumo. Conseqüentemente, o país se endividará para consumir, e não para investir e crescer. Apenas quando há grandes oportunidades de investimento, estimulados por uma diferença considerável entre a taxa de lucro esperada e a taxa de juros a longo prazo, o lucro adicional produzido pelo fluxo de capital estrangeiro será usado para investimento, e este trade-off entre a redução da poupança externa e interna não ocorrerá

O Impacto da Política Monetária sobre os juros e crédito bancário

In the last years, credit market has shown strong growth since interest rates and bank spreads have followed a declined route. This dissertation analyzes the impact of the monetary policy on the bank margins and interest rates of some type of credit operations and tests the relation between interest rates, loans and GDP. The cointegration test results can not reject the hypothesis that Selic rate could be affecting the bank margins and interest rates and also that there is a long term relation between interest rates, loans and GDP.

Ajuste macroeconômico e empréstimos externos no Brasil, 1995-2004

O presente estudo analisa a o impacto das restrições macroeconômicas, que emergiram no bojo da crise cambial de 1999, sobre a contratação de empréstimos externos pelo governo brasileiro junto às agências multilaterais de crédito, entre 1995-2004. A idéia básica é que a estratégia de equacionamento da crise externa teve reflexos diretos sobre o comportamento dos empréstimos contratados junto aos Multilateral Development Banks. Mais especificamente, o conjunto de políticas adotadas pelo governo brasileiro acabou promovendo tanto uma mudança na natureza como uma substancial redução na contratação de empréstimos principalmente junto ao Banco Mundial e ao Banco Inter americano de Desenvolvimento. Em decorrência, a estratégia de ajuste adotada, apesar do seu mérito, acabou privando o governo brasileiro de uma fonte barata de recursos e comprometendo o investimento do setor público.

Ajustamento da taxa de câmbio após a crise cambial

O trabalho investiga o ajustamento da taxa de câmbio na transição de um regime de câmbio fixo com taxa de câmbio real apreciada para um regime flutuante. Pretendemos argumentar, teórica e empiricamente, que a depreciação da taxa de câmbio, bem acima da apreciação acumulada no período, que se observou nos diversos países que passaram por esta mudança de regime, é esperada e não se confunde com a análise de overshooting de Dornbusch. Em linhas bastante gerais nosso argumento é que esta depreciação excessiva pode ser o mecanismo de correção do crescimento da dívida externa, que durante o período de apreciação cambial esteve acima de sua taxa de estado estacionário. A intensidade e duração deste ajuste depende, entre outras coisas, da possibilidade de novos empréstimos, da taxa de juros paga sobre os mesmos e da resposta da balança comercial à taxa de câmbio.

Alternativas ao Crédito Rural Tradicional

The subject of the current work was to analyze the subject of the adequacy of Brazilian's agricultural activity financing model, as an alternative for the traditional agriculture credit. The main basis for this research is the evidence that the official resources for new loans, wherein it is analyzed a period within 30 years, had their highest peak in the final 70's decade and beginning of the80¿s had experimented a consistent trajectory of decline, returning to the initial levels of the final decades of the 60¿s. In parallel with the situation above, it is evidenced the increase of the Brazilian agriculture production by the official data, mainly grain plowing, followed by diverse problems like high levels of default in and continuously debt roll over, indicating depauperation from the traditional model which was institutionalized in 1965, under the Law n. 4829. A survey of official data regarding those loans, their default and field research with banks that deal with agriculture loans, from a broad Bibliographical research, ,was made in order to verify their managing strategy and willingness to use new financing mechanisms. The main proposed alternatives were: a) Cédula de Produto Rural (Rural Product Bill) b) Cédula de Produto Rural, financial modality c) Bolsa de Mercadorias e de Futuro¿s proposal d) Agricultural Receivable on Security e) Model based on Local Credit Agencies The best instrument for leveling resources were the first four alternatives, analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal. The creation of a system based on local branches for credit had not shown to be viable as for the difficulties for implementation and functioning. The work also points out a need to review the segmentation concerning rural clients. The traditional format for segmentation distinguishes 2 groups of producers: commercial agriculture and familiar agriculture. A third group is in eminence, which is the survival agriculture, with needs and distinct characteristics, indicating that the requirements for their needs must not have to be made by credit forms, but as aid programs, education and social welfare.

Mercado de crédito no Brasil: características e respostas a choques

Verifica-se a existência de forte componente auto-regressivo ao se decompor o impacto dos principais componentes na determinação do volume de crédito no Brasil. Tal fato é indicativo de que a política bancária é muito relevante para determinação do volume de crédito no Brasil. Variáveis controladas pelo governo - como taxa básica de juros e depósitos compulsórios - não mostraram grande impacto no total de crédito. A grande proporção de créditos direcionados na economia brasileira, com a contrapartida de ser positiva na formulação de políticas públicas, traz conseqüências negativas como: (i) maior taxa de juros nos empréstimos livre; (ii) dificuldade de construir mercado de empréstimos para prazos mais longos, especialmente para empresas; e (iii) maior inércia à política monetária.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

Endogenous collateral: arbitrage and equilibrium without bounded short sales

We study the implications of the absence of arbitrage in an two period economy where default is allowed and assets are secured by collateral choosen by the borrowers. We show that non arbitrage sale prices of assets are submartingales, whereas non arbitrage purchase prices of the derivatives (secured by the pool of collaterals) are supermartingales. We use these non arbitrage conditions to establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents. Our results are particularly relevant for the collateralized mortgage obligations(CMO) markets.

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.