The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

La Participació del psicomotricista en el joc de l'infant

This study presents a research about the participation of psicomotricist in the play with children to find out what kind of conditions improve the development of their capacitys of relathionship. The research has four parts: 1) A teoretical revision about the terms of game, social participation and relathionship; 2) A case study based on different interviews with experts, psicomotricists and the observed psicomotricist and 4 deep observations 3) The categories of analysis from the triangulation of teoretical and case study sources of information; 4) Discussion and conclusions about general actuations of the psicomotricist, about specifical actuations with the children and about psicomotricist’s believes.

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

A Computable general equilibrium approach to hypothetical extractions and missing links

Identifying key sectors or key locations in an interconnected economy is of paramount importance for improving policy planning and directing economic strategy. Hence the relevance of categorizing them and hence the corresponding need of evaluating their potential synergies in terms of their global economic thrust. We explain in this paper that standard measures based on gross outputs do not and cannot capture the relevant impact due to self- imposed modeling limitations. In fact, common gross output measures will be systematically downward biased. We argue that an economy wide Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach provides a modeling platform that overcomes these limitations since it provides (i) a more comprehensive measure of linkages and (ii) an alternate way of accounting for links' relevance that is in consonance with standard macromagnitudes in the National Income and Product Accounts.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Competitive interactions between species of freshwater snails: I. Laboratory: Ia. General methodology

For the development of laboratory experiments on the competitive interacitons between freshwater snail populations, special snail rooms were set up in the main building of the Research Center "Aggeu Magalhães". In the current paper, the first of a series on this subject, the general methodology of the laboratory work is described in detail. Using indoor cement channels in which a uniform seminatural environment was created, interactions of freshwater snail populations can be studied with minimal interference of the usual variables. Controlled indoor environmental techniques, as described in the current paper, may also be utilized in different types of experiments in malacology, and represent a substantial technical advance in malacological work.

Convergence of singular integrals with general measures

We show that L2-bounded singular integrals in metric spaces with respect to general measures and kernels converge weakly. This implies a kind of average convergence almost everywhere. For measures with zero density we prove the almost everywhere existence of principal values.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Exercice physique et athérosclérose : quels sont les mécanismes physiologiques et moléculaires de l'exercice qui préviennent et protègent de l'athérosclérose? : approche chez un modèle expérimental d'athérosclérose : la souris génétiquement dépourvue en apolipoprotéine E (apoE-/-)

RESUME : L'athérosclérose, pathologie inflammatoire artérielle chronique, est à l'origine de la plupart des maladies cardiovasculaires qui constituent l'une des premières causes de morbidité et mortalité en France. Les études observationnelles et expérimentales montrent que l'exercice physique prévient la mortalité cardiovasculaire. Cependant, les mécanismes précisant les bénéfices cliniques de l'exercice sur l'athérosclérose sont encore largement inconnus. Le but général de ce travail a donc été d'explorer, en utilisant un modèle expérimental d'athérosclérose, la souris hypercholestérolémique génétiquement dépourvue en apolipoprotéine E (apoE-/-), les mécanismes athéroprotecteurs de l'exercice. La dysfonction endothéliale, généralement associée aux facteurs de risque cardiovasculaire, serait l'une des étapes précoces majeures de l'athérogenèse. Elle est caractérisée par une diminution de la biodisponibilité en monoxyde d'azote (NO) avec la perte de ses propriétés vasculo-protectrices, ce qui favorise un climat pro-athérogène (stress oxydatif, adhésion et infiltration des cellules inflammatoires dans la paroi artérielle...) conduisant à la formation de la plaque athéromateuse. L'objectif de notre premier travail a donc été d'explorer les effets de l'exercice d'une part, sur le développement des plaques athéromateuses et d'autre part, sur la fonction endothéliale de la souris apoE-/-. Nos résultats montrent que l'exercice réduit significativement l'extension de l'athérosclérose et prévient la dysfonction endothéliale. L'explication pharmacologique montre que l'exercice stimule la fonction endothéliale via, notamment, une plus grande sensibilité des récepteurs endothéliaux muscariniques, ce qui active les événements signalétiques cellulaires récepteurs-dépendants à l'origine d'une bioactivité accrue de NO. Les complications cliniques graves de l'athérosclérose sont induites par la rupture de la plaque instable provoquant la formation d'un thrombus occlusif et l'ischémie du territoire tissulaire en aval. L'objectif de notre deuxième travail a été d'examiner l'effet de l'exercice sur la qualité/stabilité de la plaque. Nos résultats indiquent que l'exercice de longue durée stabilise la plaque en augmentant le nombre de cellules musculaires lisses et en diminuant le nombre de macrophages intra-plaques. Nos résultats montrent aussi que la phosphorylation de la eNOS (NO Synthase endothéliale) Akt-dépendante n'est pas le mécanisme moléculaire majeur à l'origine de ce bénéfice. Enfin, dans notre troisième travail, nous avons investigué l'effet de l'exercice sur le développement de la plaque vulnérable. Nos résultats montrent, chez un modèle murin de plaque instable (modèle d'hypertension rénovasculaire à rénine et angiotensine II élevés) que l'exercice prévient l'apparition de la plaque vulnérable indépendamment d'un effet hémodynamique. Ce bénéfice serait associé à une diminution de l'expression vasculaire des récepteurs AT1 de l'Angiotensine II. Nos résultats justifient l'importance de l'exercice comme outil préventif des maladies cardiovasculaires. ABSTRACT : Atherosclerosis, a chronic inflammatory disease, is one of the main causes of morbidity and mortality in France. Observational and experimental data indicate that regular physical exercise has a positive impact on cardiovascular mortality. However, the mechanisms by which exercise exerts clinical benefits on atherosclerosis are still unknown. The general aim of this work was to elucidate the anti-atherosclerotic effects of exercise, using a mouse model of atherosclerosis: the apolipoprotein E-deficient mice (apoE-/- mice). Endothelial dysfunction, generally associated with cardiovascular risk factors, has been recognized to be a major and early step in atherogenesis. Endothelial dysfunction is characterized by Nitric Oxide (NO) biodisponibility reduction with loss of NO-mediated vasculoprotective actions. This leads to vascular effects such as increased oxidative stress and increased adhesion of inflammatory cells into arterial wall thus playing a role in atherosclerotic plaque development. Therefore, one of the objective of our study was to explore the effects of exercise on atherosclerotic plaque extension and on endothelial function in apoE-/- mice. Results show that exercise significantly reduces plaque progression and prevents endothelial dysfunction. Pharmacological explanation indicates that exercise stimulates endothelial function by increasing muscarinic receptors sensitivity which in turn activates intracellular signalling receptor-dependent events leading to increased NO bioactivity. The clinical manifestations of atherosclerosis are the consequences of unstable plaque rupture with thrombus formation leading to tissue ischemia. The second aim of our work was to determine the effect of exercise on plaque stability. We demonstrate that long-term exercise stabilizes atherosclerotic plaques as shown by decreased macrophage and increased Smooth Muscle Cells plaque content. Our results also suggest that the Akt-dependent eNOS phosphorylation pathway is not the primary molecular mechanism mediating these beneficial effects. Finally, we assessed a putative beneficial effect of exercise on vulnerable plaque development. In a mouse model of Angiotensine II (Ang II)-mediated vulnerable atherosclerotic plaques, we provide fist evidence that exercise prevents atherosclerosis progression and plaque vulnerability. The beneficial effect of swimming was associated with decreased aortic Ang II AT1 receptor expression independently from any hemodynamic change. These findings suggest clinical benefit of exercise in terms of cardiovascular event protection.