Oxidation of silicon: further tests for the interfacial silicon emission model

The classical description of Si oxidation given by Deal and Grove has well-known limitations for thin oxides (below 200 Ã). Among the large number of alternative models published so far, the interfacial emission model has shown the greatest ability to fit the experimental oxidation curves. It relies on the assumption that during oxidation Si interstitials are emitted to the oxide to release strain and that the accumulation of these interstitials near the interface reduces the reaction rate there. The resulting set of differential equations makes it possible to model diverse oxidation experiments. In this paper, we have compared its predictions with two sets of experiments: (1) the pressure dependence for subatmospheric oxygen pressure and (2) the enhancement of the oxidation rate after annealing in inert atmosphere. The result is not satisfactory and raises serious doubts about the model’s correctness

Urbanismo sostenible y participación en el diseño de áreas industriales.

[ES]En este Trabajo Fin de Grado, primeramente, se realiza un análisis de los factores principales que se han de considerar en el diseño de un urbanismo sostenible. Tras conocer dichos factores, se analizará cómo extrapolar estos principios al diseño de áreas industriales, generando una sencilla guía con los pasos fundamentales a tener en cuenta a la hora de realizar un diseño sostenible.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

An agenda for the European Council: feasible steps to bring the eurozone back from the precipice. CEPS Policy Brief No. 274, 20 June 2012

In the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June, Stefano Micossi outlines in this Policy Brief the main elements of a realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered public opinion. It is more than Germany has been willing to accept so far but much less than many of the demands it will confront at the Council meeting. More importantly, it only requires a minimum of additional disbursements by the member states, while strengthening risk-sharing for sovereign and banking risks.

Further characterization of muscarinic agonist-induced epileptiform bursting activity in immature rat piriform cortex, in vitro

The characteristics of muscarinic acetylcholine receptor agonist-induced epileptiform bursting seen in immature rat piriform cortex slices in vitro were further investigated using intracellular recording, with particular focus on its postnatal age-dependence (P+14-P+30), pharmacology, site(s) of origin and the likely contribution of the muscarinic acetylcholine receptor agonist-induced post-stimulus slow afterdepolarization and gap junction functionality toward its generation. The muscarinic agonist, oxotremorine-M (10 microM), induced rhythmic bursting only in immature piriform cortex slices; however, paroxysmal depolarizing shift amplitude, burst duration and burst incidence were inversely related to postnatal age. No significant age-dependent changes in neuronal membrane properties or postsynaptic muscarinic responsiveness accounted for this decline. Burst incidence was higher when recorded in anterior and posterior regions of the immature piriform cortex. In adult and immature neurones, oxotremorine-M effects were abolished by M1-, but not M2-muscarinic acetylcholine receptor-selective antagonists. Rostrocaudal lesions, between piriform cortex layers I and II, or layer III and endopiriform nucleus in adult or immature slices did not influence oxotremorine-M effects; however, the slow afterdepolarization in adult (but not immature) lesioned slices was abolished. Gap junction blockers (carbenoxolone or octanol) disrupted muscarinic bursting and diminished the slow afterdepolarization in immature slices, suggesting that gap junction connectivity was important for bursting. Our data show that neural networks within layers II-III function as primary oscillatory circuits for burst initiation in immature rat piriform cortex during persistent muscarinic receptor activation. Furthermore, we propose that muscarinic slow afterdepolarization induction and gap junction communication could contribute towards the increased epileptiform susceptibility of this brain area.