Cylindrically symmetric models of gravitational collapse to black holes: a short review

We survey results about exact cylindrically symmetric models of gravitational collapse in General Relativity. We focus on models which result from the matching of two spacetimes having collapsing interiors which develop trapped surfaces and vacuum exteriors containing gravitational waves. We collect some theorems from the literature which help to decide a priori about eventual spacetime matchings. We revise, in more detail, some toy models which include some of the main mathematical and physical issues that arise in this context, and compute the gravitational energy flux through the matching boundary of a particular collapsing region. Along the way, we point out several interesting open problems.

BiYacc: Roll your parser and reflective printer into one

In: A. Cunha, E. Kindler (eds.): Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Bidirectional Transformations (Bx 2015), L’Aquila, Italy, July 24, 2015, published at http://ceur-ws.org

Development of an intelligent earthwork optimization system

Tese de Doutoramento em Engenharia Civil.

A eficácia da Mediação Familiar no contexto das Responsabilidades Parentais

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito das Crianças, Família e Sucessões

O sexo e a Cidade e as marcas: análise dos efeitos do product placement nos jovens portugueses

Dissertação de Mestrado em Comunicação Social

Flow and transport in electrochromatography

Analyte retention, analyte transport, axial dispersion, adsorption, charge-selectivity, concentration polarization, confocal laser scanning microscopy, donnan-exclusion, electrical double layer; electrochromatography; electrohydrodynamics, electrokinetic instability, electroosmosis; electroosmotic flow; electroosmotic mobility, electroosmotic perfusion, electrophoresis, hierarchical porous media, hydrodynamic flow, induced-charge electroosmosis, ion-permselectivity, ion-permselective transport, monolith, nonequilibrium electrical double layer, nonequilibrium electrokinetic effects, nonlinear electroosmosis, plate height, plate number, porous media, pore-scale dispersion, refractive index matching, space charge effects, sphere packing, quantitative imaging, wall effect, zeta-potential

Employment by lotto revisited

We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s conjectures concerning employment by lotto for general matching markets.

Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

It is well-known that couples that look jointly for jobs in the same centralized labor market may cause instabilities. We demonstrate that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of responsive preferences, the existence of stable matchings can easily be established. However, a small deviation from responsiveness in one couple's preference relation that models the wish of a couple to be closer together may already cause instability. This demonstrates that the nonexistence of stable matchings in couples markets is not a singular theoretical irregularity. Our nonexistence result persists even when a weaker stability notion is used that excludes myopic blocking. Moreover, we show that even if preferences are responsive there are problems that do not arise for singles markets. Even though for couples markets with responsive preferences the set of stable matchings is nonempty, the lattice structure that this set has for singles markets does not carry over. Furthermore we demonstrate that the new algorithm adopted by the National Resident Matching Program to fill positions for physicians in the United States may cycle, while in fact a stable matchings does exist, and be prone to strategic manipulation if the members of a couple pretend to be single.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.

The relevance of post-match LTC: why has the Spanish labor market become as volatile as the US one?

We present a Search and Matching model with heterogeneous workers (entrants and incumbents) that replicates the stylized facts characterizing the US and the Spanish labor markets. Under this benchmark, we find the Post-Match Labor Turnover Costs (PMLTC) to be the centerpiece to explain why the Spanish labor market is as volatile as the US one. The two driving forces governing this volatility are the gaps between entrants and incumbents in terms of separation costs and productivity. We use the model to analyze the cyclical implications of changes in labor market institutions affecting these two gaps. The scenario with a low degree of workers’ heterogeneity illustrates its suitability to understand why the Spanish labor market has become as volatile as the US one.

Evaluating active labor markets in Romania

We evaluate the presence of effects from joining one of four active labour market programs in Romania in the late 1990s compared to the no-program state. Using rich follow-up survey data and propensity score matching, we find that three programs (training and retraining, self-employment assistance, and employment and relocation services) had success in improving participants' economic outcomes and were cost-beneficial from society's perspective. In contrast, public employment was found detrimental for the employment prospects of its participants.

Smith and Rawls share a room

We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ``lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems.

What works best for getting the unemployed back to work: employment services or small-business assistance programs? evidence from Romania

Recent empirical evidence has found that employment services and small-business assistance programmes are often successful at getting the unemployed back to work. Â One important concern of policy makers is to decide which of these two programmes is more effective and for whom. Â Using unusually rich (for transition economies) survey data and matching methods, I evaluate the relative effectiveness of these two programmes in Romania. Â While I find that employment services (ES) are, on average, more successful than a small-business assistance programme (SBA), estimation of heterogeneity effects reveals that, compared to non-participation, ES are effective for workers with little access to informal search channels, and SBA works for less-qualified workers and those living in rural areas. Â When comparing ES to SBA, I find that ES tend to be more efficient than SBA for workers without a high-school degree, and that the opposite holds for the more educated workers.

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.