The structure of the debate on EU integration issues. A comparative analysis of party communication in the EP 2014 elections

The results of Eurosceptic parties in the recent European parliament election provide further evidence that the “permissive consensus” on European integration blurred. This paper focuses on the structure of the debate on EU integration issues. Which EU integration issues and positions do parties put forward? Can the debate on EU integration issues be subsumed in one or several dimensions? Do they reflect national political conflicts such as the left-right and the ‘new politics’/cultural divide? Or do they form one unique or several EU-specific dimensions, e.g. national sovereignty versus integration? In order to address these questions, this paper departs from the assumption that debate on European integration is multidimensional in its nature and therefore entails a multitude of issue areas. In other words, it does not look at how socio-economic and cultural issues are related to European integration but focuses on its components, i.e. particular EU-specific policies such as EU-wide employment, environment, immigration and monetary policy. The paper departs from the cleavage theory on political di-visions and different approaches transferring them to EU politics. Two points should be noted; first, this paper does not compare the debate on European integration issues between the national level and the EU level, but whether domestic divisions are reflected at the EU level. Second, it is not concerned with the general ideo-logical profile of political parties on EU integration issues, but on EU issues that parties communicated through press releases. By doing this, the paper is concerned with the salient EU issues that parties touch upon.

Perceptual Training in Beach Volleyball Defence: Different Effects of Gaze-Path Cueing on Gaze and Decision-Making

For perceptual-cognitive skill training, a variety of intervention methods has been proposed, including the so-called “color-cueing method” which aims on superior gaze-path learning by applying visual markers. However, recent findings challenge this method, especially, with regards to its actual effects on gaze behavior. Consequently, after a preparatory study on the identification of appropriate visual cues for life-size displays, a perceptual-training experiment on decision-making in beach volleyball was conducted, contrasting two cueing interventions (functional vs. dysfunctional gaze path) with a conservative control condition (anticipation-related instructions). Gaze analyses revealed learning effects for the dysfunctional group only. Regarding decision-making, all groups showed enhanced performance with largest improvements for the control group followed by the functional and the dysfunctional group. Hence, the results confirm cueing effects on gaze behavior, but they also question its benefit for enhancing decision-making. However, before completely denying the method’s value, optimisations should be checked regarding, for instance, cueing-pattern characteristics and gaze-related feedback.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Conversaciones sustantivas en el aula

En este ensayo se procura conceptualizar acerca de cómo los niños, niñas y docentes construyen interpretaciones compartidas en el aula. Desde el análisis dialógico (Bajtin), entendemos el aprendizaje de los alumnos desde sus “respuestas" en relación con las voces de los maestros, textos y pares. Distinguimos el tratamiento unívoco del lenguaje, propio del recitado; de su tratamiento como instrumento de pensamiento, en el intercambio dialógico y en el discurso interactivo. Se analiza como se guía a un grupo de escolares en una institución pública de educación especial; centrando la mirada en las interacciones conversacionales del debate y preguntándonos qué patrones contribuyen más eficazmente a sus aprendizajes. El diseño supone la búsqueda de lo cualitativo, lo irrepetible y lo singular; incorporando el paradigma “indiciario" (Guinzburg). En la sistematización registramos, que las preguntas auténticas indican que el maestro otorga prioridad al razonamiento por sobre la memorización. Se caracteriza la interacción cercana al debate, como apuntes colaborativos. Esta construcción dialógica de sentido promueve el aprendizaje, porque genera respuestas con argumentación y facilita el diálogo entre lo nuevo y lo ya conocido. Así, el modo en que los alumnos piensan y lo que pueden aprender está relacionado a la modalidad que los docentes desarrollan para responder a sus preguntas.

Los enigmas en El libro de los cuentos de Rafael Boira

El libro de los cuentos, de Rafael Boira, fue uno de los muchos que se publicaron como esparcimiento en el siglo xix. Es una recopilación de composiciones jocosas menores, en prosa, salvo algunas en verso; entre éstas hay más de un centenar de enigmas o adivinanzas en quintillas cuya autoría no nos reveló. El autor de las adivinanzas es Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera (1618). Aunque como autor generalmente es original, copia o imita algunas adivinanzas preexistentes en la tradición oral o culta. Boira copió de manera literal muchas adivinanzas de este autor, aunque escribió otras con alteraciones, mayores o menores, quizás por recordarlas de memoria. "Las enigmas", de Pérez de Herrera, fueron muy divulgados anónimamente: pasaron a la tradición escrita pero también se recogieron, y aún es así hoy en día, de modo oral. Lo cierto es que también están ya presentes en la tradición oral algunas versiones tal como Boira las alteró. Incuestionablemente, los enigmas cultos han pasado a la tradición oral en el ámbito de la cultura hispana. Herrera y Boira son dos marcas en este camino de popularización

Consideraciones críticas sobre el modelo de Alexander V. Chayanov

Este trabajo presenta un estado de la cuestión sobre la obra del economista ruso Alexander Chayanov y su crítica. El objetivo es analizar La organización de la unidad económica campesina (1924) desde una perspectiva que contemple tanto las intenciones del autor y la arquitectura de su obra como la crítica pasada y presente de sus lectores. Comenzando por los aspectos metodológicos, se propone revisar el modelo teórico básico y su funcionamiento real. Se entiende que el aislamiento del campesinado de su medio social más amplio es el método utilizado por el autor para construir un modelo conceptual de tipo puro. Sin embargo, su obra no se reduce a este objetivo. Al tratarse de una teoría práctica, Chayanov busca probar el funcionamiento real del modelo dejando caer los supuestos iniciales para insertar a los campesinos en el marco más amplio de la economía de mercado, introduciendo elementos ausentes en la simplificación inicial: la situación de mercado, los salarios y las inversiones de capital. El análisis conduce a sostener que la operación metodológica que el autor realiza para construir la teoría socava su capacidad explicativa. Se reflexiona, finalmente, sobre las virtudes y limitaciones de la obra desde una perspectiva histórica

Espacio teatral y espacio sagrado : Bacantes de Eurípides

En el verso 815 de Bacantes, Dioniso trata de persuadir a Penteo para que vaya a observar algunos aspectos del culto dionisíaco de las ménades tebanas sobre el monte. Al hacerlo, el dios pone a los espectadores de la tragedia como testigos de la presencia, en Penteo, de un sentimiento que ejemplifica lo que se ha denominado la paradoja trágica: el hecho de que el espectador encuentre placer en la contemplación del sufrimiento. En este caso, será Penteo, el espectador del drama humano que las ménades representarán sobre el monte, quien encuentre placer ante este espectáculo. Los sentimientos que manifiesta Penteo ante la contemplación de esta representación espejarán los sentimientos que se esperan en los auténticos espectadores de la representación teatral completa. Intentaremos demostrar que, en los últimos años de su carrera teatral, el poeta se habría planteado, con Bacantes, una reflexión acerca del fenómeno del teatro: para ello se analizarán los valores de los distintos espacios en los que se desarrolla la trama de cada una de las acciones dramáticas.

Los enigmas en El libro de los cuentos de Rafael Boira

El libro de los cuentos, de Rafael Boira, fue uno de los muchos que se publicaron como esparcimiento en el siglo xix. Es una recopilación de composiciones jocosas menores, en prosa, salvo algunas en verso; entre éstas hay más de un centenar de enigmas o adivinanzas en quintillas cuya autoría no nos reveló. El autor de las adivinanzas es Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera (1618). Aunque como autor generalmente es original, copia o imita algunas adivinanzas preexistentes en la tradición oral o culta. Boira copió de manera literal muchas adivinanzas de este autor, aunque escribió otras con alteraciones, mayores o menores, quizás por recordarlas de memoria. "Las enigmas", de Pérez de Herrera, fueron muy divulgados anónimamente: pasaron a la tradición escrita pero también se recogieron, y aún es así hoy en día, de modo oral. Lo cierto es que también están ya presentes en la tradición oral algunas versiones tal como Boira las alteró. Incuestionablemente, los enigmas cultos han pasado a la tradición oral en el ámbito de la cultura hispana. Herrera y Boira son dos marcas en este camino de popularización

Espacio teatral y espacio sagrado : Bacantes de Eurípides

En el verso 815 de Bacantes, Dioniso trata de persuadir a Penteo para que vaya a observar algunos aspectos del culto dionisíaco de las ménades tebanas sobre el monte. Al hacerlo, el dios pone a los espectadores de la tragedia como testigos de la presencia, en Penteo, de un sentimiento que ejemplifica lo que se ha denominado la paradoja trágica: el hecho de que el espectador encuentre placer en la contemplación del sufrimiento. En este caso, será Penteo, el espectador del drama humano que las ménades representarán sobre el monte, quien encuentre placer ante este espectáculo. Los sentimientos que manifiesta Penteo ante la contemplación de esta representación espejarán los sentimientos que se esperan en los auténticos espectadores de la representación teatral completa. Intentaremos demostrar que, en los últimos años de su carrera teatral, el poeta se habría planteado, con Bacantes, una reflexión acerca del fenómeno del teatro: para ello se analizarán los valores de los distintos espacios en los que se desarrolla la trama de cada una de las acciones dramáticas.

Consideraciones críticas sobre el modelo de Alexander V. Chayanov

Este trabajo presenta un estado de la cuestión sobre la obra del economista ruso Alexander Chayanov y su crítica. El objetivo es analizar La organización de la unidad económica campesina (1924) desde una perspectiva que contemple tanto las intenciones del autor y la arquitectura de su obra como la crítica pasada y presente de sus lectores. Comenzando por los aspectos metodológicos, se propone revisar el modelo teórico básico y su funcionamiento real. Se entiende que el aislamiento del campesinado de su medio social más amplio es el método utilizado por el autor para construir un modelo conceptual de tipo puro. Sin embargo, su obra no se reduce a este objetivo. Al tratarse de una teoría práctica, Chayanov busca probar el funcionamiento real del modelo dejando caer los supuestos iniciales para insertar a los campesinos en el marco más amplio de la economía de mercado, introduciendo elementos ausentes en la simplificación inicial: la situación de mercado, los salarios y las inversiones de capital. El análisis conduce a sostener que la operación metodológica que el autor realiza para construir la teoría socava su capacidad explicativa. Se reflexiona, finalmente, sobre las virtudes y limitaciones de la obra desde una perspectiva histórica

Los enigmas en El libro de los cuentos de Rafael Boira

El libro de los cuentos, de Rafael Boira, fue uno de los muchos que se publicaron como esparcimiento en el siglo xix. Es una recopilación de composiciones jocosas menores, en prosa, salvo algunas en verso; entre éstas hay más de un centenar de enigmas o adivinanzas en quintillas cuya autoría no nos reveló. El autor de las adivinanzas es Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera (1618). Aunque como autor generalmente es original, copia o imita algunas adivinanzas preexistentes en la tradición oral o culta. Boira copió de manera literal muchas adivinanzas de este autor, aunque escribió otras con alteraciones, mayores o menores, quizás por recordarlas de memoria. "Las enigmas", de Pérez de Herrera, fueron muy divulgados anónimamente: pasaron a la tradición escrita pero también se recogieron, y aún es así hoy en día, de modo oral. Lo cierto es que también están ya presentes en la tradición oral algunas versiones tal como Boira las alteró. Incuestionablemente, los enigmas cultos han pasado a la tradición oral en el ámbito de la cultura hispana. Herrera y Boira son dos marcas en este camino de popularización

Espacio teatral y espacio sagrado : Bacantes de Eurípides

En el verso 815 de Bacantes, Dioniso trata de persuadir a Penteo para que vaya a observar algunos aspectos del culto dionisíaco de las ménades tebanas sobre el monte. Al hacerlo, el dios pone a los espectadores de la tragedia como testigos de la presencia, en Penteo, de un sentimiento que ejemplifica lo que se ha denominado la paradoja trágica: el hecho de que el espectador encuentre placer en la contemplación del sufrimiento. En este caso, será Penteo, el espectador del drama humano que las ménades representarán sobre el monte, quien encuentre placer ante este espectáculo. Los sentimientos que manifiesta Penteo ante la contemplación de esta representación espejarán los sentimientos que se esperan en los auténticos espectadores de la representación teatral completa. Intentaremos demostrar que, en los últimos años de su carrera teatral, el poeta se habría planteado, con Bacantes, una reflexión acerca del fenómeno del teatro: para ello se analizarán los valores de los distintos espacios en los que se desarrolla la trama de cada una de las acciones dramáticas.

Consideraciones críticas sobre el modelo de Alexander V. Chayanov

Este trabajo presenta un estado de la cuestión sobre la obra del economista ruso Alexander Chayanov y su crítica. El objetivo es analizar La organización de la unidad económica campesina (1924) desde una perspectiva que contemple tanto las intenciones del autor y la arquitectura de su obra como la crítica pasada y presente de sus lectores. Comenzando por los aspectos metodológicos, se propone revisar el modelo teórico básico y su funcionamiento real. Se entiende que el aislamiento del campesinado de su medio social más amplio es el método utilizado por el autor para construir un modelo conceptual de tipo puro. Sin embargo, su obra no se reduce a este objetivo. Al tratarse de una teoría práctica, Chayanov busca probar el funcionamiento real del modelo dejando caer los supuestos iniciales para insertar a los campesinos en el marco más amplio de la economía de mercado, introduciendo elementos ausentes en la simplificación inicial: la situación de mercado, los salarios y las inversiones de capital. El análisis conduce a sostener que la operación metodológica que el autor realiza para construir la teoría socava su capacidad explicativa. Se reflexiona, finalmente, sobre las virtudes y limitaciones de la obra desde una perspectiva histórica

Integration versus Outsourcing in Stable Industry Equilibrium with Communication Networks

For the selection of a firm's structure between vertical integration and arm's-length outsourcing, the importance of the thickness of the market had been emphasized in the previous literature. Here we take account of communication networks such as telephone, telex, fax, and the Internet. By doing so, we could illustrate the relationship between communication networks and the make-or-buy decision. With communication network technology differing in each type of firm, both vertically integrated firms and arm's-length outsourcing firms coexist, which was never indicated in the previous literature. However, when common network technology is introduced, such coexistence generically does not occur.

Decentralization in Nation State Building of Indonesia

Introduction：Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly to changes in society under the centralized system. Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). 　　　What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is applicable here. 　　　Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. 　　　This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building. 　　　In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration (dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking that particular service on their own.