906 resultados para Eigenstructure Assignment
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Dissertação de mestrado em Património e Turismo Cultural
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Dissertação de mestrado em Direito Judiciário
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Dissertação de mestrado em História
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Relatório de estágio de mestrado em Tradução e Comunicação Multilingue
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Mestrado Gestão e Estratégia Industrial
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The morphological characteristics of the mandible of adult Chaetophractus vellerosus (Gray, 1865) and Zaedyus pichiy (Desmarest, 1804) were studied to establish its generalized design and to identify inter- and intra- (sexual) specific differences. Morphological descriptions were complemented with the application of univariate and multivariate (analysis of correlation matrices, PCA, discriminant analysis) techniques. The mandible of both species is very similar, and is characterized by elevated condyle, well developed angular process, distinct coronoid process, tooth row which extends to the rear end of the angle between body and ramus, and unfused but firm symphysis. Although both armadillos are omnivorous, a more slender configuration of the jaw in Z. pichiy could be indicative of a better adaptation of its masticatory apparatus to insectivory. The PCA showed an almost total segregation of both species on PC1 (47.7% of the total variance), with C. vellerosus being associated to mandibles taller and with wider body and ramus. Zaedyus pichiy was characterized by heavy loadings of length parameters on PC2 (22.6% of the variance). A small degree of sexual dimorphism was found, with size-based differences in C. vellerosus (larger mandibles in females) and shape-based differences in Z. pichiy (taller mandibles in males, longer ones in females). Correlations between variables were higher in males of both species, indicating a more stable shape of the mandible than in females. The selected parameters to discriminate sexes were the body length of the mandible in C. vellerosus (correct classification: ca. 86% in males, 81% in females), and the height of the mandible at the level of the last tooth in Z. pichiy (near 85% of right assignment in both sexes). The inclusion of a new variable (body length) in the latter species improved the classification of the females to 100%. Teeth are typically 10 in C. vellerosus and 9 in Z. pichiy, but aberrancies in this basic number, such as unilateral or bilateral extra or fewer teeth, are common.
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I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.
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We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).
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We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
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Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely toget distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guaranteestability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal actionas lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.
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We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
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Aquest projecte és una eina per a la gestió avançada del Comitè Tècnic d’Àrbitres de Futbol Sala de Catalunya. Creant una base de dades forta i robusta com la que ens proporciona la tecnologia ORACLE, i agafant APEX com a gestor de continguts de la base de dades, hem creat una aplicació per realitzar l'assignació d'arbitratges i altres recursos d'una manera intel·ligent i equitativa.
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Therapeutic drug monitoring (TDM) aims to optimize treatments by individualizing dosage regimens based on the measurement of blood concentrations. Dosage individualization to maintain concentrations within a target range requires pharmacokinetic and clinical capabilities. Bayesian calculations currently represent the gold standard TDM approach but require computation assistance. In recent decades computer programs have been developed to assist clinicians in this assignment. The aim of this survey was to assess and compare computer tools designed to support TDM clinical activities. The literature and the Internet were searched to identify software. All programs were tested on personal computers. Each program was scored against a standardized grid covering pharmacokinetic relevance, user friendliness, computing aspects, interfacing and storage. A weighting factor was applied to each criterion of the grid to account for its relative importance. To assess the robustness of the software, six representative clinical vignettes were processed through each of them. Altogether, 12 software tools were identified, tested and ranked, representing a comprehensive review of the available software. Numbers of drugs handled by the software vary widely (from two to 180), and eight programs offer users the possibility of adding new drug models based on population pharmacokinetic analyses. Bayesian computation to predict dosage adaptation from blood concentration (a posteriori adjustment) is performed by ten tools, while nine are also able to propose a priori dosage regimens, based only on individual patient covariates such as age, sex and bodyweight. Among those applying Bayesian calculation, MM-USC*PACK© uses the non-parametric approach. The top two programs emerging from this benchmark were MwPharm© and TCIWorks. Most other programs evaluated had good potential while being less sophisticated or less user friendly. Programs vary in complexity and might not fit all healthcare settings. Each software tool must therefore be regarded with respect to the individual needs of hospitals or clinicians. Programs should be easy and fast for routine activities, including for non-experienced users. Computer-assisted TDM is gaining growing interest and should further improve, especially in terms of information system interfacing, user friendliness, data storage capability and report generation.
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Recent work on optimal policy in sticky price models suggests that demand management through fiscal policy adds little to optimal monetary policy. We explore this consensus assignment in an economy subject to ‘deep’ habits at the level of individual goods where the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple (but potentially nonlinear) policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy.
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Les enquestes són un mètode excel·lent per a extreure informació relativa a conjunts de població específics, amb la finalitat de conèixer l’opinió d’aquests sobre l’objectiu de la enquesta. En aquest treball es proposa una implementació d’una aplicació que té com objectiu reduir l’esforç associat a la creació d’enquestes, recepció de respostes i visualització de resultats. Totes les tecnologies utilitzades són gratuïtes, i la implementació es porta a terme amb els estàndards de J2EE, prioritzant la extensibilitat i la portabilitat per sobre altres característiques.