The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.

Crime and punishment: Further results

I consider a general specification of criminals' objective functionand argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory issubstituted for the traditional expected utility theory, thehigh-fine-low-probability result (Becker, 1968) only holds underspecific and strong restrictions.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Asset pricing implications of benchmarking: A two-factor CAPM

In this paper we consider the equilibrium effects of an institutionalinvestor whose performance is benchmarked to an index. In a partialequilibrium setting, the objective of the institutional investor is modeledas the maximization of expected utility (an increasing and concave function,in order to accommodate risk aversion) of final wealth minus a benchmark.In equilibrium this optimal strategy gives rise to the two-beta CAPM inBrennan (1993): together with the market beta a new risk-factor (that wecall active management risk) is brought into the analysis. This new betais deffined as the normalized (to the benchmark's variance) covariancebetween the asset excess return and the excess return of the market overthe benchmark index. Different to Brennan, the empirical test supports themodel's predictions. The cross-section return on the active management riskis positive and signifficant especially after 1990, when institutionalinvestors have become the representative agent of the market.

Do the eealthy risk more money? An experimental comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks?We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when theamounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is asmaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly,for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthydisplaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy.We also replicate our previous finding that many people display riskattraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. Weargue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts,together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined,independently of reference points, on the choice space.

Portfolio choice beyond the traditional approach

This paper surveys asset allocation methods that extend the traditional approach. An important feature of the the traditional approach is that measures the risk and return tradeoff in terms of mean and variance of final wealth. However, there are also other important features that are not always made explicit in terms of investor s wealth, information, and horizon: The investor makes a single portfolio choice based only on the mean and variance of her final financial wealth and she knows the relevant parameters in that computation. First, the paper describes traditional portfolio choice based on four basic assumptions, while the rest of the sections extend those assumptions. Each section will describe the corresponding equilibrium implications in terms of portfolio advice and asset pricing.

Reflections on gains and losses: A 2x2x7 experiment

We test whether risk attitudes change when losses instead of gains areinvolved. The study of gain-loss asymmetries has been largely confinedto reflected choices, where all the money amounts of a positiveprospect are multiplied by minus one. We define the decomposition reflection = translation + probability switch, and experimentally findboth a translation effect (risk attraction becomes more frequent whengains are translated into losses) and a probability switch effect (riskattraction becomes more frequent when the probability of the best outcomedecreases). Surprisingly, the switch effect is somewhat stronger than thetranslation effect, negating a conventional reflection effect when onestarts with choices between gains with a low probability of the bestoutcome. We conclude by arguing that, while both the translation effectand the switch effect contradict the expected utility hypothesis, thetranslation effect implies a deeper violation of standard preference theory.

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear.We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under thisuncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternativevon Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extensionof the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy(without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation.Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendationsof the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, thenwe prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possibledisappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implicationsfor intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.

Una modelización de los años de vida ajustados por la calidad como utilidades esperadas

En el presente trabajo, los a\~nos de vida ajustados por la calidad(AVAC), son caracterizados como funciones de utilidad von Newman--Morgenstern.Esta caracterizaci\'on se efect\'ua para dos problemas de elecci\'on: laelecci\'on entre loter{\'\i}as definidas sobre estados de salud cr\'onicosy la elecci\'on entre loter{\'\i}as definidas sobre estados de saludtemporales. En el primer caso, deducimos las mismas condiciones que Pliskinet al. (1980), s\'olo que siguiendo un camino m\'as directo. En el segundocaso, una vez establecida una condici\'on de independencia aditiva basadaen Fishburn (1970), inferimos una nueva condici\'on en la literatura sobreAVAC que denominamos \underline{condici\'on de simetr{\'\i}a}.

Taking "Galton's problem" Seriously : Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion

This article builds on the recent policy diffusion literature and attempts to overcome one of its major problems, namely the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. The literature defines policy diffusion as a process where policy choices are interdependent, and identifies several diffusion mechanisms that specify the link between the policy choices of the various actors. As these mechanisms are grounded in different theories, theoretical accounts of diffusion currently have little internal coherence. In this article we put forward an expected-utility model of policy change that is able to subsume all the diffusion mechanisms. We argue that the expected utility of a policy depends on both its effectiveness and the payoffs it yields, and we show that the various diffusion mechanisms operate by altering these two parameters. Each mechanism affects one of the two parameters, and does so in distinct ways. To account for aggregate patterns of diffusion, we embed our model in a simple threshold model of diffusion. Given the high complexity of the process that results, strong analytical conclusions on aggregate patterns cannot be drawn without more extensive analysis which is beyond the scope of this article. However, preliminary considerations indicate that a wide range of diffusion processes may exist and that convergence is only one possible outcome.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Averting risk in the face of large losses: Bernoulli vs. Tversky and Kahneman

We experimentally question the assertion of Prospect Theory that people display risk attraction in choices involving high-probability losses. Indeed, our experimental participants tend to avoid fair risks for large (up to ? 90), high-probability (80%) losses. Our research hinges on a novel experimental method designed to alleviate the house-money bias that pervades experiments with real (not hypothetical) loses.Our results vindicate Daniel Bernoulli?s view that risk aversion is the dominant attitude,But, contrary to the Bernoulli-inspired canonical expected utility theory, we do find frequent risk attraction for small amounts of money at stake.In any event, we attempt neither to test expected utility versus nonexpected utility theories, nor to contribute to the important literature that estimates value and weighting functions. The question that we ask is more basic, namely: do people display risk aversion when facing large losses, or large gains? And, at the risk of oversimplifying, our answer is yes.

Detecting Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes with Mixed Gambles

We propose a task for eliciting attitudes toward risk that is close to real-world risky decisions which typically involve gains and losses. The task consists of accepting or rejecting gambles that provide a gain with probability p and a loss with probability 1−p . We employ finite mixture models to uncover heterogeneity in risk preferences and find that (i) behavior is heterogeneous, with one half of the subjects behaving as expected utility maximizers, (ii) for the others, reference-dependent models perform better than those where subjects derive utility from final outcomes, (iii) models with sign-dependent decision weights perform better than those without, and (iv) there is no evidence for loss aversion. The procedure is sufficiently simple so that it can be easily used in field or lab experiments where risk elicitation is not the main experiment.

The Rejection of Prioritarianism

Since the late 1990’s, a group of moral doctrines called prioritarianism has received a lot of interest from many moral philosophers. Many contemporary moral philosophers are attracted to prioritarianism to such an extent that they can be called prioritarians. In this book, however, I reject prioritarianism, including not only “pure” prioritarianism but also hybrid prioritarian views which mix one or more non-prioritarian elements with prioritarianism. This book largely revolves around certain problems and complications of prioritarianism and its particular forms. Those problems and complications are connected to risk, impartiality, the arbitrariness of prioritarian weightings and possible future individuals. On the one hand, I challenge prioritarianism through targeted objections to various specific forms of prioritarianism. All those targeted objections are connected to risk or possible future individuals. It seems to me that together they give good grounds for believing that prioritarianism is not the way to go. On the other hand, I challenge prioritarianism by pointing out and discussing certain general problems of prioritarianism. Those general problems are connected to impartiality and the arbitrariness of prioritarian weightings. They may give additional grounds for believing that all prioritarian views should be rejected. Prioritarianism can be seen as a type of weighted utilitarianism and thus as an extension of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is morally ultimately concerned, and morally ultimately concerned only, with some kind of maximization of utility or expected utility. Prioritarianism, on the other hand, is morally ultimately concerned, and morally ultimately concerned only, with some kind of maximization of priority-weighted utility, expected priority-weighted utility or priority-weighted expected utility. Thus prioritarianism, unlike utilitarianism, is a distribution-sensitive moral view. Besides rejecting prioritarianism, I reject also various other distribution-sensitive moral views in this book. However, I do not reject distribution-sensitivity in morality, as I end up endorsing a type of distribution-sensitive hybrid utilitarianism which mixes non-utilitarian elements with utilitarianism.