Angepasste Kommunikationssysteme für den effizienten Einsatz in dezentralen elektrischen Versorgungsstrukturen

Angepasste Kommunikationssysteme für den effizienten Einsatz in dezentralen elektrischen Versorgungsstrukturen - In öffentlichen Elektrizitätsnetzen wird der Informationsaustausch seit längerem durch historisch gewachsene und angepasste Systeme erfolgreich bewerkstelligt. Basierend auf einem weiten Erfahrungsspektrum und einer gut ausgebauten Kommunikationsinfrastruktur stellt die informationstechnische Anbindung eines Teilnehmers im öffentlichen Versorgungsnetz primär kein Hemmnis dar. Anders gestaltet sich dagegen die Situation in dezentralen Versorgungsstrukturen. Da die Elektrifizierung von dezentralen Versorgungsgebieten, mittels der Vernetzung vieler verteilter Erzeugungsanlagen und des Aufbaus von nicht an das öffentliche Elektrizitätsnetz angeschlossenen Verteilnetzen (Minigrids), erst in den letzten Jahren an Popularität gewonnen hat, sind nur wenige Projekte bis dato abgeschlossen. Für die informationstechnische Anbindung von Teilnehmern in diesen Strukturen bedeutet dies, dass nur in einem sehr begrenzten Umfang auf Erfahrungswerte bei der Systemauswahl zurückgegriffen werden kann. Im Rahmen der Dissertation ist deshalb ein Entscheidungsfindungsprozess (Leitfaden für die Systemauswahl) entwickelt worden, der neben einem direkten Vergleich von Kommunikationssystemen basierend auf abgeleiteten Bewertungskriterien und Typen, der Reduktion des Vergleichs auf zwei Systemwerte (relativer Erwartungsnutzenzuwachs und Gesamtkostenzuwachs), die Wahl eines geeigneten Kommunikationssystems für die Applikation in dezentralen elektrischen Versorgungsstrukturen ermöglicht. In Anlehnung an die klassische Entscheidungstheorie werden mit der Berechnung eines Erwartungsnutzens je Kommunikationssystems, aus der Gesamtsumme der Einzelprodukte der Nutzwerte und der Gewichtungsfaktor je System, sowohl die technischen Parameter und applikationsspezifischen Aspekte, als auch die subjektiven Bewertungen zu einem Wert vereint. Mit der Ermittlung der jährlich erforderlichen Gesamtaufwendungen für ein Kommunikationssystem bzw. für die anvisierten Kommunikationsaufgaben, in Abhängigkeit der Applikation wird neben dem ermittelten Erwartungsnutzen des Systems, ein weiterer Entscheidungsparameter für die Systemauswahl bereitgestellt. Die anschließende Wahl geeigneter Bezugsgrößen erlaubt die Entscheidungsfindung bzgl. der zur Auswahl stehenden Systeme auf einen Vergleich mit einem Bezugssystem zurückzuführen. Hierbei sind nicht die absoluten Differenzen des Erwartungsnutzen bzw. des jährlichen Gesamtaufwandes von Interesse, sondern vielmehr wie sich das entsprechende System gegenüber dem Normal (Bezugssystem) darstellt. Das heißt, der relative Zuwachs des Erwartungsnutzen bzw. der Gesamtkosten eines jeden Systems ist die entscheidende Kenngröße für die Systemauswahl. Mit dem Eintrag der berechneten relativen Erwartungsnutzen- und Gesamtkostenzuwächse in eine neu entwickelte 4-Quadranten-Matrix kann unter Berücksichtigung der Lage der korrespondierenden Wertepaare eine einfache (grafische) Entscheidung bzgl. der Wahl des für die Applikation optimalsten Kommunikationssystems erfolgen. Eine exemplarisch durchgeführte Systemauswahl, basierend auf den Analyseergebnissen von Kommunikationssystemen für den Einsatz in dezentralen elektrischen Versorgungsstrukturen, veranschaulicht und verifiziert die Handhabung des entwickelten Konzeptes. Die abschließende Realisierung, Modifikation und Test des zuvor ausgewählten Distribution Line Carrier Systems unterstreicht des Weiteren die Effizienz des entwickelten Entscheidungsfindungsprozesses. Dem Entscheidungsträger für die Systemauswahl wird insgesamt ein Werkzeug zur Verfügung gestellt, das eine einfache und praktikable Entscheidungsfindung erlaubt. Mit dem entwickelten Konzept ist erstmals eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung unter Berücksichtigung sowohl der technischen und applikationsspezifischen, als auch der ökonomischen Aspekte und Randbedingungen möglich, wobei das Entscheidungsfindungskonzept nicht nur auf die Systemfindung für dezentrale elektrische Energieversorgungsstrukturen begrenzt ist, sondern auch bei entsprechender Modifikation der Anforderungen, Systemkenngrößen etc. auf andere Applikationsanwendungen übertragen werden.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Risk, ambiguity, and diversification

Attitudes toward risk influence the decision to diversify among uncertain options. Yet, because in most situations the options are ambiguous, attitudes toward ambiguity may also play an important role. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of ambiguity on the decision to diversify. I find that diversification is more prevalent and more persistent under ambiguity than under risk. Moreover, excess diversification under ambiguity is driven by participants who stick with a status quo gamble when diversification among gambles is not feasible. This behavioral pattern cannot be accommodated by major theories of choice under ambiguity.

Applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion

The paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer. The construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the Yitzhaki version of the Allingham–Sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion. Recent approaches have applied non-expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction. The models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the Yitzhaki model.

Sobre la toma de decisiones economicas bajo incertidumbre

In this article we review the evolution of economic theory on decision making under uncertainty. After a brief reference to Expected Utility Theory, we refer to behavioural paradoxes, forcing the theorists to adopt less restrictive approaches, allowing us to explain a broader spectrum of phenomena. The complexity entailed in the new theories requires a multidimensional description of human attitudes towards risk. Nevertheless, measurement of this attitudes has not followed the desired path, with most elicitation methods remaining uni-dimensional.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

Ensaio sobre o agente racional: esparadrapos para um paciente terminal?

The Rational Agent model have been a foundational basis for theoretical models such as Economics, Management Science, Artificial Intelligence and Game Theory, mainly by the ¿maximization under constraints¿ principle, e.g. the ¿Expected Utility Models¿, among them, the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory, from Savage, placed as most influence player over theoretical models we¿ve seen nowadays, even though many other developments have been done, indeed also in non-expected utility theories field. Having the ¿full rationality¿ assumption, going for a less idealistic sight ¿bounded rationality¿ of Simon, or for classical anomalies studies, such as the ¿heuristics and bias¿ analysis by Kahneman e Tversky, ¿Prospect Theory¿ also by Kahneman & Tversky, or Thaler¿s Anomalies, and many others, what we can see now is that Rational Agent Model is a ¿Management by Exceptions¿ example, as for each new anomalies¿s presentation, in sequence, a ¿problem solving¿ development is needed. This work is a theoretical essay, which tries to understand: 1) The rational model as a ¿set of exceptions¿; 2) The actual situation unfeasibility, since once an anomalie is identified, we need it¿s specific solution developed, and since the number of anomalies increases every year, making strongly difficult to manage rational model; 3) That behaviors judged as ¿irrationals¿ or deviated, by the Rational Model, are truly not; 4) That¿s the right moment to emerge a Theory including mental processes used in decision making; and 5) The presentation of an alternative model, based on some cognitive and experimental psychology analysis, such as conscious and uncounscious processes, cognition, intuition, analogy-making, abstract roles, and others. Finally, we present conclusions and future research, that claims for deeper studies in this work¿s themes, for mathematical modelling, and studies about a rational analysis and cognitive models possible integration. .

O efeito manada nos fundos de investimento no Brasil: um teste em finanças comportamentais

Utilizando-se de uma amostra de movimentações diárias de fundos de investimento em ações, multimercados e renda fixa no Brasil, por meio de uma metodologia baseada na direção das captações líquidas de um grande número de fundos de investimento, agregados em grupos de investidores de acordo com o porte médio de seu investimento (ricos e pobres), foi encontrada forte evidência da ocorrência de efeito manada de forma heterogênea entre diferentes grupos de investidores, sendo que a intensidade do efeito manada varia de acordo com o porte do investidor, tipo de fundo e com a época. Também foi testado um viés de heurística: a ancoragem de preço, que supõe que após uma nova máxima ou mínima histórica nos preços das ações, haverá uma movimentação anormal de investidores, que acreditam ser este evento um indicador sobre os preços futuros. Encontrou-se evidência de que este fenômeno ocorre em diferentes tipos de fundos de investimento, não apenas os fundos de investimento em ações, e que tem maior impacto quando há uma nova mínima do que quando há uma cotação recorde no índice Ibovespa. Entretanto, o poder de explicação deste viés sobre o efeito manada é pequeno, e há uma série de variáveis ainda não exploradas que têm maior poder de explicação sobre o efeito manada. Desta maneira, este estudo encontrou evidências de que os pressupostos de finanças comportamentais de que a informação e as expectativas dos investidores não são homogêneas, e que os investidores são influenciáveis pelas decisões de outros investidores, estão corretos, mas que há fraca evidência que o viés de heurística de ancoragem de preço tenha papel relevante no comportamento dos investidores.

Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences

Recently Kajii and (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa--Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular MaxMin expected utility. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon and Stralecki (2008).

A Common-feature approach for testing present-value restrictions with financial data

It is well known that cointegration between the level of two variables (labeled Yt and yt in this paper) is a necessary condition to assess the empirical validity of a present-value model (PV and PVM, respectively, hereafter) linking them. The work on cointegration has been so prevalent that it is often overlooked that another necessary condition for the PVM to hold is that the forecast error entailed by the model is orthogonal to the past. The basis of this result is the use of rational expectations in forecasting future values of variables in the PVM. If this condition fails, the present-value equation will not be valid, since it will contain an additional term capturing the (non-zero) conditional expected value of future error terms. Our article has a few novel contributions, but two stand out. First, in testing for PVMs, we advise to split the restrictions implied by PV relationships into orthogonality conditions (or reduced rank restrictions) before additional tests on the value of parameters. We show that PV relationships entail a weak-form common feature relationship as in Hecq, Palm, and Urbain (2006) and in Athanasopoulos, Guillén, Issler and Vahid (2011) and also a polynomial serial-correlation common feature relationship as in Cubadda and Hecq (2001), which represent restrictions on dynamic models which allow several tests for the existence of PV relationships to be used. Because these relationships occur mostly with nancial data, we propose tests based on generalized method of moment (GMM) estimates, where it is straightforward to propose robust tests in the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also propose a robust Wald test developed to investigate the presence of reduced rank models. Their performance is evaluated in a Monte-Carlo exercise. Second, in the context of asset pricing, we propose applying a permanent-transitory (PT) decomposition based on Beveridge and Nelson (1981), which focus on extracting the long-run component of asset prices, a key concept in modern nancial theory as discussed in Alvarez and Jermann (2005), Hansen and Scheinkman (2009), and Nieuwerburgh, Lustig, Verdelhan (2010). Here again we can exploit the results developed in the common cycle literature to easily extract permament and transitory components under both long and also short-run restrictions. The techniques discussed herein are applied to long span annual data on long- and short-term interest rates and on price and dividend for the U.S. economy. In both applications we do not reject the existence of a common cyclical feature vector linking these two series. Extracting the long-run component shows the usefulness of our approach and highlights the presence of asset-pricing bubbles.

Aggregate uncertainty, disappointment aversion and the business cycle

We investigate the eff ect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on real variables. More speci fically, we introduce a shock in the volatility of productivity in an RBC model with long-run volatility risk and preferences that exhibit generalised disappointment aversion. We find that, when combined with a negative productivity shock, a volatility shock leads to further decline in real variables, such as output, consumption, hours worked and investment. For instance, out of the 2% decrease in output as a result of both shocks, we attribute 0.25% to the e ffect of an increase in volatility. We also fi nd that this e ffect is the same as the one obtained in a model with Epstein-Zin- Weil preferences, but higher than that of a model with expected utility. Moreover, GDA preferences yield superior asset pricing results, when compared to both Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and expected utility.

A consumption CAPM with a reference level

We study an intertemporal asset pricing model in which a representative consumer maximizes expected utility derived from both the ratio of his consumption to some reference level and this level itself. If the reference consumption level is assumed to be determined by past consumption levels, the model generalizes the usual habit formation specifications. When the reference level growth rate is made dependent on the market portfolio return and on past consumption growth, the model mixes a consumption CAPM with habit formation together with the CAPM. It therefore provides, in an expected utility framework, a generalization of the non-expected recursive utility model of Epstein and Zin (1989). When we estimate this specification with aggregate per capita consumption, we obtain economically plausible values of the preference parameters, in contrast with the habit formation or the Epstein-Zin cases taken separately. All tests performed with various preference specifications confirm that the reference level enters significantly in the pricing kernel.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Integral representation with convex capacities that are squeeze of (additive) probability measures

In this paper I will investigate the conditions under which a convex capacity (or a non-additive probability which exhibts uncertainty aversion) can be represented as a squeeze of a(n) (additive) probability measure associate to an uncertainty aversion function. Then I will present two alternatives forrnulations of the Choquet integral (and I will extend these forrnulations to the Choquet expected utility) in a parametric approach that will enable me to do comparative static exercises over the uncertainty aversion function in an easy way.

Asymmetric preferences in investment decisions in the Brazilian financial market

The main objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that utility preferences that incorporate asymmetric reactions between gains and losses generate better results than the classic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in the Brazilian market. The asymmetric behavior can be computed through the introduction of a disappointment (or loss) aversion coefficient in the classical expected utility function, which increases the impact of losses against gains. The results generated by both traditional and loss aversion utility functions are compared with real data from the Brazilian market regarding stock market participation in the investment portfolio of pension funds and individual investors.