The taxation of multinational banks : alternative apportionment through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia’s future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process. On 16 March 2012, an Exposure Draft and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum outlining the proposed amendments to implement the first stage of the transfer pricing reforms were released. Within the proposed changes is the explicit embedding of the use of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations to help determine the arm’s length price. Does this mean that Australia engages in an international tax regime?

Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks is currently governed by general principles of international tax. However, there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant consideration of a separate taxing regime, as the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment.

Australia's adoption of an international tax regime : to engage or not to engage?

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia's future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

Neither an international tax, nor an international taxing body exists. Rather, there are domestic taxing rules adopted by jurisdictions which, coupled with double tax treaties, apply to cross-border transactions and international taxation issues. International bodies such as the OECD and UN, which provide guidance on tax issues, often steer and supplement these domestic adoptions but have no binding international taxing powers. These pragmatic realities, together with the specific use of the word ‘regime’ within the tax community, lead many to argue that an international tax regime does not exist. However, an international tax regime should be defined no differently to any other area of international law and when we step outside the confines of tax law to consider the definition of a ‘regime’ within international relations it is possible to demonstrate that such a regime is very real. The first part of this article, by defining an international tax regime in a broader and more traditional context, also outlining both the tax policy and principles which frame that regime, reveals its existence. Once it is accepted that an international tax regime exists, it is possible to consider its adoption by jurisdictions and subsequent constraints it places on them. Using the proposed changes to transfer pricing laws as the impetus for assessing Australia’s adoption of the international tax regime, the constraints on sovereignty are assessed through a taxonomy of the level adoption. This reveals the subsequent constraints which flow from the broad acceptance of an international tax regime through to the specific adoption of technical detail. By undertaking this analysis, the second part of this article demonstrates that Australia has inherently adopted an international tax regime, with a move towards explicit adoption and a clear embedding of its principles within the domestic tax legislation.

International tax and the Australian wine industry: Is your client’s product destined to sail the seven seas?

The export market for Australian wine continues to grow at a rapid rate, with imported wines also playing a role in market share in sales in Australia. It is estimated that over 60 per cent of all Australian wine is exported, while 12 per cent of wine consumed in Australia has overseas origins. In addition to understanding the size and direction (import or export) of wines, the foreign locales also play an important role in any tax considerations. While the export market for Australian produced alcohol continues to grow, it is into the Asian market that the most significant inroads are occurring. Sales into China of bottled wine over $7.50 per litre recently overtook the volume sold our traditional partners of the United States and Canada. It is becoming easier for even small to medium sized businesses to export their services or products overseas. However, it is vital for those businesses to understand the tax rules applying to any international transactions. Specifically, one of the first tax regimes that importers and exporters need to understand once they decide to establish a presence overseas is transfer pricing. These are the rules that govern the cross-border prices of goods, services and other transactions entered into between related parties. This paper is Part 2 of the seminar presented on transfer pricing and international tax issues which are particularly relevant to the wine industry. The predominant focus of Part 2 is to discuss four key areas likely to affect international expansion. First, the use of the available transfer pricing methodologies for international related party transactions is discussed. Second, the affects that double tax agreements will have on taking a business offshore are considered. Third, the risks associated with aggressive tax planning through tax information exchange agreements is reviewed. Finally, the paper predicts future ‘trip-wires’ and areas to ‘watch out for’ for practitioners dealing with clients operating in the international arena.

A nation’s role in addressing base erosion and profit shifting : balancing sovereignty with international collaboration and coordination

The notion of sovereignty is central to any international tax issue. While a nation is free to design its tax laws as it sees fit and raise revenue in accordance with the needs of its citizens, it is not possible to undertake such a task in isolation. In a world of cross-border investments and business transactions, all tax regimes impact on one another. Tax interactions between sovereign states cannot be avoided. Ultimately, the interactions mean that a nation must decide whether to engage in both collaboration and coordination with other nations and supranational bodies alike or maintain an individualised stance in relation to its tax policy. Whatever the decision, there is arguably an exercise in national sovereignty in some form. In the context of an international tax regime, whether that regime is interpreted broadly as meaning international norms generally adopted by nations around the world or domestic regimes legislating for cross-border transactions, rhetoric around national fiscal sovereignty takes on many different forms. At one end of the spectrum it is relied upon by financial secrecy jurisdictions (tax havens) as a defence to their position on the basis that ‘other’ nations cannot interfere with the fiscal sovereignty of a jurisdiction. At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that profit shifting and international tax avoidance if not stopped is, in and of itself, a threat to a nation’s fiscal sovereignty on the basis that it threatens the ability to tax and raise the revenue needed. This paper considers a modern conceptualisation of sovereignty along with its role within international tax coordination and collaboration to argue that a move towards a more unified approach to addressing international base erosion and profit shifting may be the ultimate exercise of national fiscal sovereignty. By using the current transfer pricing regime as a case study, this paper posits that it is not merely enough to have international agreement on allocation rules to be applied, but that the ultimate exercise of national sovereignty is political agreement with other states to ensure that it is governments which determine the allocational basis of worldwide profits to be taxed. In doing so, it is demonstrated that the arm’s length pricing requirement of the current transfer pricing regime, rather than providing governments with the ability to determine the location of profits, is providing multinational entities with the ultimate power to determine that location. If left unchecked, this will eventually erode a nation’s ability to capture the required tax revenue and, as a consequence, may be deemed a failure by nation states to exercise their fiscal sovereignty.

The case for unitary taxation with formulary apportionment in the finance sector and the effect on developing nations

In 2013 the OECD released its 15 point Action plan to deal with base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). In that plan it was recognised that BEPS has a significant effect on developing countries. This is because the lack of tax revenue can lead to a critical underfunding of public investment that would help promote economic growth. To this end, the BEPS project is aimed at ensuring an inclusive approach to take into account not only views of the G20 and OECD countries but also the perspective of developing nations. With this focus in mind and in the context of developing nations, the purpose of this article is to consider a possible solution to profit shifting which occurs under the current transfer pricing regime, with that solution being unitary taxation with formulary apportionment. It does so using the finance sector as a specific case for application. Multinational financial institutions (MNFIs) play a significant role in financing activities of their clients in developing nations. Consistent with the ‘follow-the-client’ phenomenon which explains financial institution expansion, these entities are increasingly profiting from activities associated with this growing market. Further, not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens but also, more than other industries, have opportunities to reduce tax through transfer pricing measures. This article establishes a case for an industry specific adoption of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the current regime. It argues that such a model would benefit not only developed nations but also developing nations which are currently suffering the effects of BEPS. In doing so, it considers the practicalities of such an implementation by examining both definitional issues and a possible formula for MNFIs. This article argues that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important guidance as to how the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs should be defined as well as factors that should be included in an allocation formula, along with the appropriate weighting. While it would be difficult for developing nations to adopt such a regime, it is argued that it would be no more difficult than addressing issues they face with the current transfer pricing regime. As such, this article concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable industry specific alternative for MNFIs which would assist developing nations and aid independent fiscal soundness.

Unitary Taxation of the Finance Sector

Multinational financial institutions (MNFIs) play a significant role in financing the activities of their clients in developing nations. Consistent with the ‘follow-the-customer’ phenomenon which explains financial institution expansion, these entities are increasingly profiting from activities associated with this growing market. However, not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens, but also, more than other industries, have the opportunity to reduce tax through transfer pricing measures. This paper establishes a case for an industry-specific adoption of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the current regime. In doing so, it considers the practicalities of implementing this by examining both definitional issues and possible formulas for MNFIs. This paper argues that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important guidance as to how the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs should be defined, as well as the factors that should be included in an allocation formula, and the appropriate weighting. This paper concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable industry-specific alternative for MNFIs.

Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment

It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada use so-called formula apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU is debating a switch from separate accounting (SA) to FA. This paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation, input choice, and transfer pricing, as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not eliminate such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually aggravate them.

Os preços de transferência e o âmbito de intervenção do auditor: abordagem e enquadramento

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria Auditoria, sob orientação de Adalmiro Álvaro Malheiro de Castro Andrade

Preços de transferência – o caso português

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria, sob orientação da Mestre Gabriela Pinheiro

Hacia la aplicación de las guías de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) sobre precios de transferencia para empresas multinacionales y administraciones tributarias en Colombia

Los precios de transferencia ocupan el interés de los Estados en el mundo actual al constituir uno de los retos fundamentales del Derecho Internacional Tributario. En el seno de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), creada en 1961, se discutieron y desarrollaron diversas propuestas para regular el fenómeno. Estas, se materializaron en Modelos de Convenios Tributarios e instrumentos de soft law, que hoy en día constituyen los principios internacionalmente aceptados en la materia. Las Guías de la OCDE sobre precios de transferencia para empresas multinacionales y administraciones tributarias son el cuerpo normativo de soft law que se erigen, en el Ordenamiento Internacional, como el norte de las legislaciones a nivel interno para efectos de regulación de dicha temática. Su adopción por parte de los países miembros y no miembros de la OCDE se enfrenta a problemas teóricos derivados del quebrantamiento del decantado principio de reserva de ley tributaria y el respeto por la seguridad jurídica, razón por la cual su incorporación ha variado de Estado a Estado. El presente trabajo recoge la experiencia en varios países europeos y latinoamericanos y pretende proponer una fórmula de adopción en Colombia, coherente con los principios constitucionales tributarios y con virtualidad de superar las críticas realizadas por la doctrina a la aplicación directa de las Guías.

Internal rents and corporate property management: a study into the use of internal rents in UK corporate organisations

Research in the late 1980s showed that in many corporate real estates users were not fully aware of the full extent of their property holdings. In many cases, not only was the value of the holdings unknown, but there was uncertainty over the actual extent of ownership within the portfolio. This resulted in a large number of corporate occupiers reviewing their property holdings during the 1990s, initially to create a definitive asset register, but also to benefit from an more efficient use of space. Good management of corporately owned property assets is of equal importance as the management of other principal resources within the company. A comprehensive asset register can be seen as the first step towards a rational property audit. For the effective, efficient and economic delivery of services, it is vital that all property holdings are utilised to the best advantage. This requires that the property provider and the property user are both fully conversant with the value of the property holding and that an asset/internal rent/charge is made accordingly. The advantages of internal rent charging are twofold. Firstly, it requires the occupying department to “contribute” an amount to the business equivalent to the open market rental value of the space that it occupies. This prevents the treating of space as a free good and, as individual profit centres, each department will then rationalise its holdings to minimise its costs. The second advantage is from a strategic viewpoint. By charging an asset rent, the holding department can identify the performance of its real estate holdings. This can then be compared to an internal or external benchmark to help determine whether the company has adopted the most efficient tenure pattern for its properties. This paper investigates the use of internal rents by UK-based corporate businesses and explains internal rents as a form of transfer pricing in the context of management and responsibility accounting. The research finds that the majority of charging organisations introduced internal rents primarily to help calculate true profits at the business unit level. However, less than 10% of the charging organisations introduced internal rents primarily to capture the return on assets within the business. There was also a sizeable element of the market who had no plans to introduce internal rents. Here, it appears that, despite academic and professional views that internal rents are beneficial in improving the efficient use of property, opinion at the business and operational level has not universally accepted this proposition.

Global profit split: An evolutionary approach to international income allocation

International taxation is concerned mainly with the equitable allocation of cross-border income between countries in which income-earning activities take place. Such allocation has traditionally been governed by the arm’s-length principle, which has been interpreted as requiring a comparable transactional pricing approach. This approach assumes that each member of a multinational enterprise (MNE) group is a separate entity and that the transactions between related parties can be separated and compared with arm’s-length transactions. It has, however, proved difficult to apply comparable transactional pricing to internationally integrated businesses, especially those involving intangibles and services, and formulary apportionment has been suggested as an alternative. Essentially, formulary apportionment treats the MNE group as a single economic entity. The group’s profit is allocated to members according to a formula that reflects the particular member’s contribution to the production of that profit. A rich academic literature exists which either defends or attacks this alternative approach. The OECD and national governments have rejected formulary apportionment mainly on the ground that it violates the arm’s-length principle. This article proposes a global profit split (GPS) method for allocating international income. The GPS would allocate the global profit of an integrated business to each country in accordance with the economic contributions made by components of the business located in that country. The allocation would be based on a formula that would reflect the economic factors that contribute to profit making. While the GPS draws on elements of the traditional formulary apportionment and profit split methods, it also differs from them. The author discusses in detail the key issues involved in designing the GPS. She also presents and evaluates the main policy and pragmatic justifications for the adoption of this innovative approach. The author argues that the GPS is not only theoretically and practically superior to traditional income allocation methods, but also consistent with the arm’s-length principle. On the basis of historical developments, interpretation of article 9 of the OECD model tax convention, and international tax policy considerations, the author establishes that the GPS is not a radical departure from the arm’s-length principle, but rather a natural development in its evolution. She concludes that the law of evolution ison the side of reform because the GPS would provide for a fair and effective allocation of income derived from globally integrated business activities.