Actionable pattern analysis in computing and business intelligence systems

With advances in science and technology, computing and business intelligence (BI) systems are steadily becoming more complex with an increasing variety of heterogeneous software and hardware components. They are thus becoming progressively more difficult to monitor, manage and maintain. Traditional approaches to system management have largely relied on domain experts through a knowledge acquisition process that translates domain knowledge into operating rules and policies. It is widely acknowledged as a cumbersome, labor intensive, and error prone process, besides being difficult to keep up with the rapidly changing environments. In addition, many traditional business systems deliver primarily pre-defined historic metrics for a long-term strategic or mid-term tactical analysis, and lack the necessary flexibility to support evolving metrics or data collection for real-time operational analysis. There is thus a pressing need for automatic and efficient approaches to monitor and manage complex computing and BI systems. To realize the goal of autonomic management and enable self-management capabilities, we propose to mine system historical log data generated by computing and BI systems, and automatically extract actionable patterns from this data. This dissertation focuses on the development of different data mining techniques to extract actionable patterns from various types of log data in computing and BI systems. Four key problems—Log data categorization and event summarization, Leading indicator identification , Pattern prioritization by exploring the link structures , and Tensor model for three-way log data are studied. Case studies and comprehensive experiments on real application scenarios and datasets are conducted to show the effectiveness of our proposed approaches.

Using knowledge management to give context to analytics and big data and reduce strategic risk

At the moment, the phrases “big data” and “analytics” are often being used as if they were magic incantations that will solve all an organization’s problems at a stroke. The reality is that data on its own, even with the application of analytics, will not solve any problems. The resources that analytics and big data can consume represent a significant strategic risk if applied ineffectively. Any analysis of data needs to be guided, and to lead to action. So while analytics may lead to knowledge and intelligence (in the military sense of that term), it also needs the input of knowledge and intelligence (in the human sense of that term). And somebody then has to do something new or different as a result of the new insights, or it won’t have been done to any purpose. Using an analytics example concerning accounts payable in the public sector in Canada, this paper reviews thinking from the domains of analytics, risk management and knowledge management, to show some of the pitfalls, and to present a holistic picture of how knowledge management might help tackle the challenges of big data and analytics.

Espionage against Poland in the Documents and Analyses of the Polish Special Services (1944 - 1989) - as Illustrated by the Intelligence Activities of the USA

The text analyses the intelligence activity against Poland in the period 1944-1989. The paper also contains a case study, i.e. an analysis of the American intelligence service activity held against Poland. While examining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to best illustrate the point, the author presented a number of cases of persons who spied for the USA, which was possible thanks to the analysis of the training materials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directed to the officers of the Security Service and the Citizens’ Militia. The text tackles the following issues: (1) to what extent did the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination?, (2) what was the level of interest of the foreign intelligence services in Poland before the year 1990?, (3) is it possible to indicate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland? 1) The analysis of data indicates that the period 1946-1956 witnessed a great number of convictions for espionage, which is often associated with the peculiar political situation in Poland of that time. Up to 1953, the countries of the Eastern bloc had reproduced the Stalin’s system, which only ceased due to the death of Stalin himself. Since then, the communist systems gradually transformed into the system of nomenklatura. Irrespective of these changes, Poland still witnessed a wave of repressions, which resulted from the threats continuously looming over the communist authorities – combating the anti-communist underground movement, fighting with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Polish government-in-exile, possible revisionism of borders, social discontent related to the socio-political reforms. Hence, a great number of convictions for espionage at that time could be ascribed to purely political sentences. Moreover, equally significant was the fact that the then judicial practice was preoccupied assessing negatively any contacts and relations with foreigners. This excessive number of convictions could ensue from other criminal-law provisions, which applied with respect to the crimes against the State, including espionage. What is also important is the fact that in the Stalin’s period the judiciary personnel acquired their skills and qualifications through intensive courses in law with the predominant spirit of the theory of evidence and law by Andrey Vyshinsky. Additionally, by the decree of 1944 the Penal Code of the Polish Armed Forces was introduced; the code envisaged the increase in the number of offences classified as penalised with death penalty, whereas the high treason was subject to the military jurisdiction (the civilians were prosecuted in military courts till 1955; the espionage, however, still stood under the military jurisdiction). In 1946, there was introduced the Decree on particularly dangerous crimes in the period of the State’s recovery, which was later called a Small Penal Code. 2) The interest that foreign intelligence services expressed in relation to Poland was similar to the one they had in all countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In the case of Poland, it should be noted that foreign intelligence services recruited Polish citizens who had previously stayed abroad and after WWII returned to their home country. The services also gathered information from Poles staying in immigrant camps (e.g. in FRG). The activity of the American intelligence service on the territory of FRG and West Berlin played a key role. The documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs pointed to the global range of this activity, e.g. through the recruitment of Polish sailors in the ports of the Netherlands, Japan, etc. In line with the development in the 1970s, espionage, which had so far concentrated on the defence and strategic sectors, became focused on science and technology of the People’s Republic of Poland. The acquisition of collaborators in academic circles was much easier, as PRL opened to academic exchange. Due to the system of visas, the process of candidate selection for intelligence services (e.g. the American) began in embassies. In the 1980s, the activity of the foreign intelligence services concentrated on the specific political situation in Poland, i.e. the growing significance of the “Solidarity” social movement. 3) The specificity of the American intelligence activity against Poland was related to the composition of the residency staff, which was the largest in comparison to other Western countries. The wide range of these activities can be proved by the quantitative data of convictions for espionage in the years 1944-1984 (however, one has to bear in mind the factors mentioned earlier in the text, which led to the misinterpretation of these data). Analysing the data and the documents prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one should treat them with caution, as, frequently, the Polish counter-intelligence service used to classify the ordinary diplomatic practice and any contacts with foreigners as espionage threats. It is clearly visible in the language of the training materials concerned with “secret service methods of the intelligence activity” as well as in the documents on operational activities of the Security Service in relation to foreigners. The level of interest the USA had in Poland was mirrored in the classification of diplomatic posts, according to which Warsaw occupied the second place (the so-called Group “B”) on the three-point scale. The CIA experienced spectacular defeats during their activity in Poland: supporting the Polish underground anti-communist organisation Freedom and Independence and the so-called Munich-Berg episode (both cases took place in the 1950s). The text focuses only on selected issues related to the espionage activities against Poland. Similarly, the analysis of the problem has been based on selected sources, which has limited the research scope - however, it was not the aim of the author to present the espionage activity against Poland in a comprehensive way. In order to assess the real threat posed by the espionage activity, one should analyse the case of persons convicted for espionage in the period 1944-1989, as the available quantitative data, mentioned in the text, cannot constitute an explicit benchmark for the scale of espionage activity. The inaccuracies in the interpretation of data and variables, which can affect the evaluation of this phenomenon, have been pointed out in the text.