991 resultados para National Archives


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Mode of access: Internet.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Shipping list no.: 99-0130-P.

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Air transportation of Australian casualties in World War II was initially carried out in air ambulances with an accompanying male medical orderly. By late 1943 with the war effort concentrated in the Pacific, Allied military authorities realised that air transport was needed to move the increasing numbers of casualties over longer distances. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) became responsible for air evacuation of Australian casualties and established a formal medical air evacuation system with trained flight teams early in 1944. Specialised Medical Air Evacuation Transport Units (MAETUs) were established whose sole responsibility was undertaking air evacuations of Australian casualties from the forward operational areas back to definitive medical care. Flight teams consisting of a RAAF nursing sister (registered nurse) and a medical orderly carried out the escort duties. These personnel had been specially trained in Australia for their role. Post-WWII, the RAAF Nursing Service was demobilised with a limited number of nurses being retained for the Interim Air Force. Subsequently, those nurses were offered commissions in the Permanent Air Force. Some of the nurses who remained were air evacuation trained and carried out air evacuations both in Australia and as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Australia became responsible for the air evacuation of British Commonwealth casualties from Korea to Japan. With a re-organisation of the Australian forces as part of the British Commonwealth forces, RAAF nurses were posted to undertake air evacuation from Korea and back to Australia from Iwakuni, Japan. By 1952, a specialised casualty staging section was established in Seoul and staffed by RAAF nurses from Iwakuni on a rotation basis. The development of the Australian air evacuation system and the role of the flight nurses are not well documented for the period 1943-1953. The aims of this research are three fold and include documenting the origins and development of the air evacuation system from 1943-1953; analysing and documenting the RAAF nurse’s role and exploring whether any influences or lessons remain valid today. A traditional historical methodology of narrative and then analysis was used to inform the flight nurse’s role within the totality of the social system. Evidence was based on primary data sources mainly held in Defence files, the Australian War Memorial or the National Archives of Australia. Interviews with 12 ex-RAAF nurses from both WWII and the Korean War were conducted to provide information where there were gaps in the primary data and to enable exploration of the flight nurses’ role and their contributions in war of the air evacuation of casualties. Finally, this thesis highlights two lessons that remain valid today. The first is that interoperability of air evacuation systems with other nations is a force multiplier when resources are scarce or limited. Second, the pre-flight assessment of patients was essential and ensured that there were no deaths in-flight.

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This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

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Purpose: This is a study of the social consequences of accounting controls over labour. It examines the system of tasking used to control Indian indentured workers using a governmentality approach in the historical context of Fijian sugar plantations during the British colonial period, from 1879 to 1920. Method/ Methodology: Archival data consisting of documents from the Colonial Secretary’s Office, reports and related literature on Indian indentured labour was accessed from the National Archives of Fiji. In addition, documented accounts of the experiences of indentured labourers over the period of the study give voice to the social costs of the indenture system, highlighting the social impact of accounting control systems. Findings: Accounting and management controls were developed to extract surplus value from Indian labour. The practice of tasking was implemented in a plantation structure where indentured labourers were controlled hierarchically through a variety of calculative monitoring practices. This resulted in the exploitation and consequent economic, social and racial marginalisation of indentured workers. Originality: The paper contributes to the growing body of literature highlighting the social effects of accounting control systems. It exposes the social costs borne by indentured workers employed on Fijian sugar plantations. Practice/ Research Implications: The study promotes better understanding of the practice and impact of accounting as a technology of government and control within a particular institutional setting, in this case the British colony of Fiji. By highlighting the social implications of these controls in their historical context, we alert corporations, government policy makers, accountants and workers to the socially damaging effects of exploitive management control systems.

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Inventory lists of captured German documents; 1933-1945.

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The study examines the personnel training and research activities carried out by the Organization and Methods Division of the Ministry of Finance and their becoming a part and parcel of the state administration in 1943-1971. The study is a combination of institutional and ideological historical research in recent history on adult education, using a constructionist approach. Material salient to the study comes from the files of the Organization and Methods Division in the National Archives, parliamentary documents, committee reports, and the magazines. The concentrated training and research activities arranged by the Organization and Methods Division, became a part and parcel of the state administration in the midst of controversial challenges and opportunities. They served to solve social problems which beset the state administration as well as contextual challenges besetting rationalization measures, and organizational challenges. The activities were also affected by a dependence on decision-makers, administrative units, and civil servants organizations, by different views on rationalization and the holistic nature of reforms, as well as by the formal theories that served as resources. It chose long-term projects which extended to the political decision-makers and administrative units turf, and which were intended to reform the structures of the state administration and to rationalize the practices of the administrative units. The crucial questions emerged in opposite pairs (a constitutional state vs. the ideology of an administratively governed state, a system of national boards vs. a system of government through ministries, efficiency of work vs. pleasantness of work, centralized vs. decentralized rationalization activities) which were not solvable problems but impossible questions with no ultimate answers. The aim and intent of the rationalization of the state administration (the reform of the central, provincial, and local governments) was to facilitate integrated management and to render a greater amount of work by approaching management procedures scientifically and by clarifying administrative instances and their respon-sibilities in regards to each other. The means resorted to were organizational studies and committee work. In the rationalization of office work and finance control, the idea was to effect savings in administrative costs and to pare down those costs as well as to rationalize and heighten those functions by developing the institution of work study practitioners in order to coordinate employer and employee relationships and benefits (the training of work study practitioners, work study, and a two-tier work study practitioner organization). A major part of the training meant teaching and implementing leadership skills in practice, which, in turn, meant that the learning environment was the genuine work community and efforts to change it. In office rationalization, the solution to regulate the relations between the employer and the employees was the co-existence of the technical and biological rationalization and the human resource administration and the accounting and planning systems at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. The former were based on the school of scientific management and human relations, the latter on system thinking, which was a combination of the former two. In the rationalization of the state administration, efforts were made to find solutions to stabilize management ideologies and to arrange the relationships of administrative systems in administrative science - among other things, in the Hoover Committee and the Simon decision making theory, and, in the 1960s, in system thinking. Despite the development-related vocabulary, the practical work was advanced rationalization. It was said that the practical activities of both the state administration and the administrative units depended on professional managers who saw to production results and human relations. The pedagogic experts hired to develop training came up with a training system, based on the training-technological model where the training was made a function of its own. The State Training Center was established and the training office of the Organization and Methods Division became the leader and coordinator of personnel training.

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The main purpose of this research is to shed light on the factors that gave rise to the office of Field Bishop in the years 1939-1944. How did military bishophood affect the status of the head of military pastoral care and military clergy during these years? The main sources of my research are the collections in the Finnish National Archives, and I use a historical-qualitative method. The position of the military clergy was debated within both the Church and the Defence Forces before 1939. At that stage, Church law did not yet recognize the office of the leading military priest, the Field Dean. There had been a motion in 1932 to introduce the office of a military bishop, but the bishops' synod blocked it. The concept of Field Bishop appeared for the first time in 1927 in a Finnish military document, which dealt with pastoral care in the Polish military. The Field Dean in Finland had regularly proposed improvements to the salary of the military clergy before the Winter War. After the Winter War, arguments were made for strengthening the position of the military clergy: these arguments were based on the increased respect shown towards this clergy, especially due to their role in the care of the fallen, which had become their task during the war. Younger members of the military clergy in particular supported the demands to improve their position within the Church and the army. The creation of a Field Bishop was perceived as strengthening the whole military clergy, as the Field Bishop was envisioned as a bishop within the Church and a general within the Defence Forces. During that time the Field Dean was still without any military rank. The idea of a Field Bishop was recommended to Mannerheim in June 1940, after which the Defence Forces lent their support to the cause. The status of the military clergy, in Church law, made it to the agenda of the Church council in January 1941, thanks largely to the younger priests' group influence and Mannerheim's leverage. The bishops opposed the notion of a Field Bishop mostly on theological grounds but were ready to concede that the position the Field Dean in Church law required further defining. The creation of the office of Field Bishop was blocked in the Church law committee report issued close to the beginning of the Continuation War. The onset of that war, however, changed the course of events, as the President of the Republic appointed Field Dean Johannes Björklund as Field Bishop. Speculation has abounded about Mannerheim's role in the appointment, but the truth of the matter is not clear. The title of Field Bishop was used to put pressure on the Church, and, at the same time, Mannerheim could remain detached from the matter. Later, in September 1941, the Church council approved the use of the Field Bishop title to denote the head of military pastoral care in Church law, and Field Bishops were assigned some of the duties formerly pertaining to bishops. Despite all expectations and hopes, the new office of Field Bishop did not affect the status of the military clergy within the Defence Forces, as no ranks were established for them, and their salary did not improve. However the office of the Field Bishop within Army HQ was transformed from a bureau into a department in the summer of 1942. At the beginning of the Continuation War, the Field Bishop was criticized by certain military and Church clergy for favouring Russian Orthodox Christians in Eastern Karelia. Björklund agreed in principle with most of the Lutheran clergy on the necessity of Lutheranizing East Karelia but had to take into account the realities at Army HQ. As well, at the same time the majority of the younger clergy were serving in the army, and there was a lack of parish priests on the home front. Bishop Lehtonen had actually expressed the wish that more priests could have been released from the front to serve in local parishes. In his notes Lehtonen accused Björklund of trying to achieve the position of Field Bishop by all possible means. However, research has revealed a varied group of people behind the creation of the office of Field Bishop, including in particular younger clergy and the Defence Forces.

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[ES]Este artículo pretende analizar la situación de la actividad siderometalúrgica guipuzcoana durante el siglo XVII y testar la verdadera repercusión de la crisis del siglo XVII en dicho sector. Para ello se ha utilizado un amplio elenco documental procedente tanto de archivos locales como regionales y nacionales, que responde a una amplia variedad tipológica.

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Wydział Historyczny: Instytut Historii

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The impact of the Vietnam War conditioned the Carter administration’s response to the Nicaraguan revolution in ways that reduced US engagement with both sides of the conflict. It made the countries of Latin America counter the US approach and find their own solution to the crisis, and allowed Cuba to play a greater role in guiding the overthrow of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. This thesis re-evaluates Carter’s policy through the legacy of the Vietnam War, because US executive anxieties about military intervention, Congress’s increasing influence, and US public concerns about the nation’s global responsibilities, shaped the Carter approach to Nicaragua. Following a background chapter, the Carter administration’s policy towards Nicaragua is evaluated, before and after the fall of Somoza in July 1979. The extent of the Vietnam influence on US-Nicaraguan relations is developed by researching government documents on the formation of US policy, including material from the Jimmy Carter Library, the Library of Congress, the National Security Archive, the National Archives and Records Administration, and other government and media sources from the United Nations Archives, New York University, the New York Public Library, the Hoover Institution Archives, Tulane University and the Organization of American States. The thesis establishes that the Vietnam legacy played a key role in the Carter administration’s approach to Nicaragua. Before the overthrow of Somoza, the Carter administration limited their influence in Nicaragua because they felt there was no immediate threat from communism. The US feared that an active role in Nicaragua, without an established threat from Cuba or the Soviet Union, could jeopardise congressional support for other foreign policy goals deemed more important. The Carter administration, as a result, pursued a policy of non-intervention towards the Central American country. After the fall of Somoza, and the establishment of a new government with a left wing element represented by the Sandinistas, the Carter administration emphasised non-intervention in a military sense, but actively engaged with the new Nicaraguan leadership to contain the potential communist influence that could spread across Central America in the wake of the Nicaraguan revolution.

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This thesis is an investigation into the US response to the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia between 1974 and 1981. It argues that the US experience in the Vietnam War acted as a causal factor in the formulation of its Cambodian policy during the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. From taking power in April 1975 to their removal by the Vietnamese in January 1979, the Khmer Rouge initiated a revolution unrivalled in the 20th Century for its brutality and for the total eradication of modern society. This thesis demonstrates that the Ford administration viewed Cambodia only as it pertained to their strategy in Vietnam and, following US disengagement from Indochina all but ignored the atrocities occurring there as they instead pursued informal relations with the Khmer Rouge as a means of punishing the Vietnamese. The Carter administration formulated a foreign policy based on human rights yet failed to adequately address the genocide that occurred in Cambodia due to its temporal and regional proximity to Vietnam. Instead, this collective reluctance to reengage with the region and the resulting anti-Vietnamese attitude reinforced Brzezinski’s broader global strategy that allied the US with China in support of an independent Cambodia to further isolate Hanoi. Thus this thesis argues that the distorting impact of the Vietnam War, as well as global Cold War calculations, undermined any appreciation of the Cambodian conflict and caused both administrations to pursue policies in Cambodia that ultimately supported the Khmer Rouge regime. This project incorporates declassified material from the Ford and Carter Presidential Libraries, supplemented by the material from the National Archives and Library of Congress, and relevant newspapers and periodicals. It demonstrates that the limitations placed upon US foreign policy by their experience in the Vietnam War may be used to reveal unexplored elements in US-Cambodian relations.