Can children with autism spectrum disorders be helped to acquire a theory of mind?. '¿Se puede ayudar a los niños con trastornos del espectro autista a adquirir una teoría de la mente?'.

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Theory of mind and language comprehension in schizophrenia

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The relationship of language development to theory of mind understanding in young deaf children

This paper studies cognitive development in young deaf children, specifically Theory of Mind development and its link to language abilities.

Research on theory of mind in deaf education

Prior research has shown that theory of mind (ToM) development is delayed in children who are deaf and hard of hearing. Although research has demonstrated a delay in ToM development in children who are deaf and hard of hearing there are not many suggestions for how ToM is or should be addressed in deaf education. The current research addressed this issue by compiling an extensive literature review and sending 113 surveys’ to OPTION schools for the deaf around the country.

Self-defence: A state of mind for states?

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective ‘psychological’ position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.

Theory of mind in children with traumatic brain injury

Objective: This study was designed to examine the existence of deficits in mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM) in children with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Research design: ToM functioning was assessed in 12 children aged 6-12 years with TBI and documented frontal lobe damage and compared to 12 controls matched for age, sex and verbal ability. Brief measures of attention and memory were also included. Main outcome and results: The TBI group was significantly impaired relative to controls on the advanced ToM measure and a measure of basic emotion recognition. No difference was found in a basic measure of ToM. Conclusion: Traumatic brain damage in childhood may disrupt the developmental acquisition of emotion recognition and advanced ToM skills. The clinical and theoretical importance of these findings is discussed and the implications for the assessment and treatment of children who have experienced TBI are outlined.

Theory of mind and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions: A preliminary study

Theory of mind ability has been associated with performance in interpersonal interactions and has been found to influence aspects such as emotion recognition, social competence, and social anxiety. Being able to attribute mental states to others requires attention to subtle communication cues such as facial emotional expressions. Decoding and interpreting emotions expressed by the face, especially those with negative valence, are essential skills to successful social interaction. The current study explored the association between theory of mind skills and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions. According to the study hypothesis, individuals with poor theory of mind skills showed preferential attention to negative faces over both non-negative faces and neutral objects. Tentative explanations for the findings are offered emphasizing the potential adaptive role of vigilance for threat as a way of allocating a limited capacity to interpret others’ mental states to obtain as much information as possible about potential danger in the social environment.

Language in genetic syndromes and cognitive modularity

In recent years, research into the impact of genetic abnormalities on cognitive development, including language, has become recognized for its potential to make valuable contributions to our understanding of the brain–behaviour relationships underlying language acquisition as well as to understanding the cognitive architecture of the human mind. The publication of Fodor’s ( 1983 ) book The Modularity of Mind has had a profound impact on the study of language and the cognitive architecture of the human mind. Its central claim is that many of the processes involved in comprehension are undertaken by special brain systems termed ‘modules’. This domain specificity of language or modularity has become a fundamental feature that differentiates competing theories and accounts of language acquisition (Fodor 1983 , 1985 ; Levy 1994 ; Karmiloff-Smith 1998 ). However, although the fact that the adult brain is modularized is hardly disputed, there are different views of how brain regions become specialized for specific functions. A question of some interest to theorists is whether the human brain is modularized from the outset (nativist view) or whether these distinct brain regions develop as a result of biological maturation and environmental input (neuroconstructivist view). One source of insight into these issues has been the study of developmental disorders, and in particular genetic syndromes, such as Williams syndrome (WS) and Down syndrome (DS). Because of their uneven profiles characterized by dissociations of different cognitive skills, these syndromes can help us address theoretically significant questions. Investigations into the linguistic and cognitive profiles of individuals with these genetic abnormalities have been used as evidence to advance theoretical views about innate modularity and the cognitive architecture of the human mind. The present chapter will be organized as follows. To begin, two different theoretical proposals in the modularity debate will be presented. Then studies of linguistic abilities in WS and in DS will be reviewed. Here, the emphasis will be mainly on WS due to the fact that theoretical debates have focused primarily on WS, there is a larger body of literature on WS, and DS subjects have typically been used for the purposes of comparison. Finally, the modularity debate will be revisited in light of the literature review of both WS and DS. Conclusions will be drawn regarding the contribution of these two genetic syndromes to the issue of cognitive modularity, and in particular innate modularity.

The modularity of seed dispersal: differences in structure and robustness between bat- and bird-fruit networks

In networks of plant-animal mutualisms, different animal groups interact preferentially with different plants, thus forming distinct modules responsible for different parts of the service. However, what we currently know about seed dispersal networks is based only on birds. Therefore, we wished to fill this gap by studying bat-fruit networks and testing how they differ from bird-fruit networks. As dietary overlap of Neotropical bats and birds is low, they should form distinct mutualistic modules within local networks. Furthermore, since frugivory evolved only once among Neotropical bats, but several times independently among Neotropical birds, greater dietary overlap is expected among bats, and thus connectance and nestedness should be higher in bat-fruit networks. If bat-fruit networks have higher nestedness and connectance, they should be more robust to extinctions. We analyzed 1 mixed network of both bats and birds and 20 networks that consisted exclusively of either bats (11) or birds (9). As expected, the structure of the mixed network was both modular (M = 0.45) and nested (NODF = 0.31); one module contained only birds and two only bats. In 20 datasets with only one disperser group, bat-fruit networks (NODF = 0.53 +/- A 0.09, C = 0.30 +/- A 0.11) were more nested and had a higher connectance than bird-fruit networks (NODF = 0.42 +/- A 0.07, C = 0.22 +/- A 0.09). Unexpectedly, robustness to extinction of animal species was higher in bird-fruit networks (R = 0.60 +/- A 0.13) than in bat-fruit networks (R = 0.54 +/- A 0.09), and differences were explained mainly by species richness. These findings suggest that a modular structure also occurs in seed dispersal networks, similar to pollination networks. The higher nestedness and connectance observed in bat-fruit networks compared with bird-fruit networks may be explained by the monophyletic evolution of frugivory in Neotropical bats, among which the diets of specialists seem to have evolved from the pool of fruits consumed by generalists.

The informational turn in Philosophy: any novelty in the study of Mind?

The concept of information is analyzed starting from Adams' hypothesis in The Informational Turn in Philosophy, according to which there has been a far-reaching turn in Philosophy following the publication of Turing's article "Computing Machinery and Intelligence". Adams maintains that new guidelines are being indicated in philosophical research, having the concept of "information" as the basis for treatment of classical problems, such as the relationships between mind-body, perception-action, and the nature of knowledge, amongst others. Partially agreeing with Adams, we believe, however, that his hypothesis faces difficulties, the most fundamental of which concerns the different meanings given to the concept of information. We argue that even though the concept of information underlying the mechanicist proposal of Turing, according to which "to think is to compute", is indeed being employed in Philosophy, this is not because of its mechanistic nature, but mainly due to the representationist presupposition dominant in this area. From this point of view, the informational turn in philosophy would not provide any great novelty, given that since the earliest days philosophical approaches to the nature of mind have always been mainly representationist. The novelty would not lie specifically in the Turing thesis, but in reflections on the nature of information, especially ecological information, and its relation to action.