991 resultados para Mistinguett (1875-1956)
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Includes index.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"A summary of the work on the stomach, with special reference to hunger and appetite, carried out in the Hull physiological laboratory of the University of Chicago during the last four years."--Pref.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Valorar globalmente la labor pedagógico-social de la Escuela Pía en un tiempo de larga duración marcado por el apoyo social a la consolidación y expansión de la enseñanza privada. Explicar cómo se originan los centros escolapios, cuáles son sus normas de actuación, de qué manera satisfacen sus expectativas funcionales y sociales. Demostrar que la acción escolapia presenta unas características propias en cuanto a su ideario pedagógico. Está constituída por varias fundaciones de la orden escolapia, concretamente por 3 colegios, el de Toro (comienza su andadura en 1870), el de Salamanca (comienza en 1956) y el de Soria (1953).. La investigación se estructura en 4 bloques. En el primero se realiza una aproximación al contexto histórico desde distintas perspectiva y la implicación que estas tienen dentro del mundo educativo en general y de la orden escolapia en particular. Se incluyen aspectos como la política estatal en los periodos de la Restauración, la Segunda República y el Franquismo, las relaciones que mantiene la Iglesia con el Estado y los grandes problemas que se debaten, la política eclesial en materia de educación, la propia acción educativa escolapia y los movimientos sociales y culturales que se desarrollan en estos periodos históricos. En el segundo bloque se efectúa un recorrido histórico por los 3 momentos a los que se ha aludido, particularizando en los componentes específicos de la orden: sus recursos económicos y físicos, el personal docente y el alumnado. En el tercer bloque se analiza el proyecto pedagógico de la orden, la didáctica y metodologías empleadas y las relaciones humanas que tienen lugar. En el último bloque se exponen detenidamente las relaciones que mantiene la orden con la sociedad y el entorno donde están enclavados sus centros. Se han utilizado la entrevista sociológica, la biografía, datos económicos y estadísticos. En cuanto a las fuentes hay que destacar que se ha sacado provecho tanto de las orales como de las escritas.. El enfoque es doble: se da una perspectiva intradisciplinar y otra intrahistórica, no por el mero hecho de describir sino con la pretensión de comprender e interpretar la historia.. La orden de los escolapios fue apoyada durante el siglo XIX por amplios sectores de la población española y entre otras cosas por su quehacer educativo y humano. Se observa que la afluencia del alumnado no ha sido elitista. Aquellos situados socialmente en la escala más baja, tenían cabida mediante diversas fórmulas. En los colegios de Toro y de Salamanca no hay una correlación clara que determine que a mayor nivel económico de la familia del alumno, mayor logro académico. Sin embargo esta correlación se da en el colegio de Soria. Con los años y la evolución de la sociedad, los colegios siguieron un desarrollo paralelo. Desapareció la dualidad del alumnado (gratis o de pago), pasando a incorporarse todos a las mismas dependencias. La disciplina y rigidez en el trato se suavizó en los reglamentos escolares y en la práctica. Surgen problemas en la orden, en los años finales del estudio debido a las crisis vocacionales. Esto posibilita la afluencia de profesorado seglar, enriqueciéndose los centros con la aportación de nuevas iniciativas. Se confirma la existencia de un ideario pedagógico común para todos los centros escolares de la orden y que sirve a todos los de nueva fundación. A lo largo de este periodo la enseñanza privada y concretamente la religiosa vive desde un posicionamiento fuertemente arraigado, tanto la persecución como el posterior apoyo que el régimen franquista le otorga permitiendo su expansión. Se observa que los escolapios, según lo revelan las cifras estadísticas, han permitido que el nivel social, cultural y humano alcance cuotas altas en nuestro país y por supuesto en la comunidad autónoma.
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This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.
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Earlier studies have shown that the speed of information transmission developed radically during the 19th century. The fast development was mainly due to the change from sailing ships and horse-driven coaches to steamers and railways, as well as the telegraph. Speed of information transmission has normally been measured by calculating the duration between writing and receiving a letter, or between an important event and the time when the news was published elsewhere. As overseas mail was generally carried by ships, the history of communications and maritime history are closely related. This study also brings a postal historical aspect to the academic discussion. Additionally, there is another new aspect included. In business enterprises, information flows generally consisted of multiple transactions. Although fast one-way information was often crucial, e.g. news of a changing market situation, at least equally important was that there was a possibility to react rapidly. To examine the development of business information transmission, the duration of mail transport has been measured by a systematic and commensurable method, using consecutive information circles per year as the principal tool for measurement. The study covers a period of six decades, several of the world's most important trade routes and different mail-carrying systems operated by merchant ships, sailing packets and several nations' steamship services. The main sources have been the sailing data of mail-carrying ships and correspondence of several merchant houses in England. As the world's main trade routes had their specific historical backgrounds with different businesses, interests and needs, the systems for information transmission did not develop similarly or simultaneously. It was a process lasting several decades, initiated by the idea of organizing sailings in a regular line system. The evolution proceeded generally as follows: originally there was a more or less irregular system, then a regular system and finally a more frequent regular system of mail services. The trend was from sail to steam, but both these means of communication improved following the same scheme. Faster sailings alone did not radically improve the number of consecutive information circles per year, if the communication was not frequent enough. Neither did improved frequency advance the information circulation if the trip was very long or if the sailings were overlapping instead of complementing each other. The speed of information transmission could be improved by speeding up the voyage itself (technological improvements, minimizing the waiting time at ports of call, etc.) but especially by organizing sailings so that the recipients had the possibility to reply to arriving mails without unnecessary delay. It took two to three decades before the mail-carrying shipping companies were able to organize their sailings in an optimal way. Strategic shortcuts over isthmuses (e.g. Panama, Suez) together with the cooperation between steamships and railways enabled the most effective improvements in global communications before the introduction of the telegraph.
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Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.
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The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.
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The parasitic protists in the genus Tritrichomonas cause significant disease in domestic cattle and cats. To assess the genetic diversity of feline and bovine isolates of Tritrichomonas foetus (Riedmuller, 1928) Wenrich and Emmerson, 1933, we used 10 different genetic regions, namely the protein coding genes of cysteine proteases 1,2 and 4-9 (CP1, 2, 4-9) involved in the pathogenesis of the disease caused by the parasite. The cytosolic malate dehydrogenase 1 (MDH1) and internal transcribed spacer region 2 of the rDNA unit (ITS2) were included as additional markers. The gene sequences were compared with those of Tritrichomonas suis (Davaine. 1875) Morgan and Hawkins, 1948 and Tritrichomonas mobilensis Culberson et al., 1986. The study revealed 100% identity for all 10 genes among all feline isolates (=T. foetus cat genotype), 100% identity among all bovine isolates (=T. foetus cattle genotype) and a genetic distinctness of 1% between the cat and cattle genotypes of T. foetus. The cattle genotype of T. foetus was 100% identical to T. suis at nine loci (CP1, 2,4-8, ITS2, MDH1). At CP9, three out of four T. suis isolates were identical to the T. foetus cattle genotype, while the T. suis isolate SUI-H3B sequence contained a single unique nucleotide substitution. Tritrichomonas mobilensis was 0.4% and 0.7% distinct from the cat and cattle genotypes of T. foetus, respectively. The genetic differences resulted in amino acid changes in the CP genes, most pronouncedly in CP2, potentially providing a platform for elucidation of genotype-specific host-pathogen interactions of T. foetus. On the basis of this data we judge T. suis and T. foetus to be subjective synonyms. For the first time, on objective nomenclatural grounds, the authority of T. suis is given to Davaine, 1875, rather than the commonly cited Gruby and Delafond, 1843. To maintain prevailing usage of T. foetus, we are suppressing the senior synomym T. suis Davaine, 1875 according to Article 23.9, because it has never been used as a valid name after 1899 and T. foetus is widely discussed as the cause of bovine trichomonosis. Thus bovine, feline and porcine isolates should all be given the name T. foetus. This promotes the stability of T. foetus for the veterinary and economically significant venereal parasite causing bovine trichomonosis. (C) 2012 Australian Society for Parasitology Inc. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.