Nuclear Weapons as Symbols. The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making

Throughout history, nuclear weapons have been considered to be the ultimate weapons. This understanding largely detached them from the portfolio of conventional military means and assigned them a symbolic meaning that influenced the identity and norms creation of nations. In most countries today, the development of nuclear weapons is considered morally prohibitive, incompatible with a country’s identity and international outlook. In some states, however, these negative norms are overridden by a positive set of norms, causing nuclear weapons to become either symbols of invulnerability to perceived threats or the regalia of major power status. Main purpose of this paper is to explore on the conditions that cause most states to develop a moral aversion to nuclear weapons, yet effectively lead to their glorification in others. Many studies on the normative understanding of nuclear weapons consider the existence of a negative normative predisposition, often referred to as ‘nuclear taboo’, as a major factor in preventing their acquisition and use. Other studies acknowledge the existence of a nuclear taboo inhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but point to the existence of the opposing effect of norms, frequently referred to as the ‘nuclear myth’, when it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This myth emerges when certain symbolic meanings are attached to nuclear weapons, such as a state’s identity, self-image, and its desired position in the international system. With 180 odd countries in the world abstaining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 8 countries in possession of them (with two further countries assumed to have pursued their acquisition), one might consider the dominance of the nuclear taboo over the nuclear myth to be the rule. The core question is thus why and how this relationship reversed in the case of defectors.

Commitment to military service among Finnish conscripts

This research establishes the primary components, predictors, and consequences of organizational commitment in the military context. Specifically, the research examines commitment to the military service among Finnish conscripts and whether initial affective commitment prior to service predicts later commitment, attitudes, behavior, and performance, and, furthermore, analyzes the changes in commitment and its possible outcomes. The data were collected from records as well as by surveys from 1,387 rank and file soldiers, immediately after they reported for duty, near the end of basic training, and near the end of 6 to 12 months of service. The data covered a wide array of predictor variables, including background items, attitudes toward conscription, mental and physical health, sociability, training quality, and leadership. Moreover, the archival data included such items as rank, criminal record, performance ratings, and the number of medical examines and exemptions. The measures were further refined based on the results of factor analysis and reliability tests. The results indicated that initial commitment significantly corresponded with expected adjustment, intentions to stay in the military, and acceptance of authority. Moreover, initial commitment moderately related to personal growth, perceived performance, and the number of effective service days at the end of service. During basic training, affective commitment was mostly influenced by challenging training, adjustment experiences, regimentation, and unit climate. At the end of service, committed soldiers demonstrated more personal growth and development in service, had higher-level expected performance, and less malingering during their service. Additionally, they had significantly more positive attitudes toward national defense. The results suggest that affective commitment requires adequate personal adjustment, experiences of personal growth and development, and satisfaction with unit dynamics and training. This research contributes to the theoretical discussion on organizational commitment and the will to defend the nation and advances developing models to support and manage conscript training, education, leadership, and personnel policy. This is achieved by determining the main factors and variables, including their relative strength, that affect commitment to the military service. These findings may also facilitate in designing programs aimed at reducing unwanted discharges and inadequate performance. In particular, these results provide tools for improving conscripts’ overall attachment to and identification with the military service.

Strike hard, strike sure - Operation Musketeer : British military planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

Operation Musketeer, a combined joint Anglo-French operation aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal in 1956, has received much attention from scholars. The most common approach to the crisis has been to examine the political dimension. The political events that led Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s cabinet to decide to use military force against the wishes of their superior American ally and in the face of American economic pressure and a Soviet threat to attack Paris and London with rockets have been analysed thoroughly. This is particularly the case because the ceasefire and eventual withdrawal were an indisputable defeat of British policy in the Middle East. The military operation not only ruined Prime Minister Eden’s career, but it also diminished the prestige of Britain. It was the beginning of the end, some claim. The British Empire would never be the same. As the consequences of using force are generally considered more important than the military operations themselves, very little attention has been paid to the military planning of Operation Musketeer. The difference between the number of publications on Operation Corporate of the Falklands War and Operation Musketeer is striking. Not only has there been little previous research on the military aspects of Musketeer, the conclusions drawn in the existing works have not reached a consensus. Some historians, such as Correlli Barnett, compare Musketeer to the utter failures of the Tudor landings and Gallipoli. Among significant politicians, Winston Churchill, who had retired from the prime ministership only a year before the Suez Crisis, described the operation as “the most ill-conceived and ill-executed imaginable”. Colin McInnes, a well-known author on British defence policy, represents the middle view when he describes the execution as “far from failure”. Finally, some, like Julian Thompson, the Commander of 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War, rate the military action itself as being successful. The interpretation of how successful the handling of the Suez Crisis was from the military point of view depends very much on the approach taken and the areas emphasised in the subject. Frequently, military operations are analysed in isolation from other events. The action of a country’s armed forces is separated from the wider context and evaluated without a solid point of comparison. Political consequences are often used as validated criteria, and complicated factors contributing to military performance are ignored. The lack of comprehensive research on the military action has left room for an analysis concentrating on the military side of the crisis.

Evolution of the Finnish military doctrine, 1945-1985

Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.

Flank or front : an assessment of military-political developments in the High North

Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.

Non-offensive defence : a criteria model of military credibility

Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.

Development of military technology and its impact on the Finnish land warfare doctrine

Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.

The impact of arms technology on military doctrines

Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the War College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the War College.

Civilian-military cooperation in crisis management operations

Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College.

Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

Planning for the reuse of redundant defence estate: disposal processes, policy frameworks and development impacts

This paper reviews recent research and other literature concerning the planning and development of redundant defence estate. It concentrates on UK sources but includes reference to material from Europe and the North America were it is relevant for comparative purposes. It introduces the topic by providing a brief review of the recent restructuring of the UK defence estate and then proceeds to examine the various planning policy issues generated by this process; the policy frameworks used to guide it; comparable approaches to surplus land disposal and the appraisal of impacts; and ending the main body of the review with an analyse of the economic, social and environmental impacts of military base closure and redevelopment. It concludes that there is a significant body of work focusing on the reuse and redevelopment of redundant defence estate in the UK and abroad, but that much of this work is based on limited research or on personal experience. One particular weakness of the current literature is that it does not fully reflect the institutional difficulties posed by the disposal process and the day-to-day pressures which MOD personnel have to deal with. In doing this, it also under-emphasises the embedded cultures of individuals and professional groups who are required to operationalise the policies, procedures and practices for planning and redeveloping redundant defence estate.

How many Frenchmen did you kill? British bombing policy towards France (1940-1945)

The Allied bombing of France between 1940 and 1945 has received comparatively little attention from historians, although the civilian death toll, at about 60,000, was comparable to that of German raids on the UK. This article considers how Allied, and particularly British, bombing policy towards France was developed, what its objectives were and how French concerns about attacks on their territory were (or were not) addressed. It argues that while British policymakers were sensitive to the delicate political implications of attacking France, perceived military necessities tended to trump political misgivings; that Vichy, before November 1942, was a stronger constraint on Allied bombing than the Free French at any time and that the bombing programme largely escaped political control from May 1944.

‘NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making’

It has been argued that the US strategy paper NSC 68 of 1950 which ushered in the great Cold War rearmament process first in the US and then in NATO was a vast overreaction. This paper argues, by contrast, that given the intelligence about the Soviet Union's and its satellites' military buildup and the role of China in that period, this was a reasonable strategy to embrace.