Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war
Data(s) |
01/02/2009
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Resumo |
Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador | |
Publicador |
Facultad de Economía |
Relação |
Serie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 61 https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/005282.html |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Fonte |
instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario Aranguren, Mauricio, 2001. Mi ConfesiÛn: Carlos CastaÒo Revela sus Secretos. Bogot·, Oveja Negra. Azam, Jean-Paul and Anke Hoe er (2002). "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars : Looting or Terror?" Journal of Peace Research 39(4): 461-485. 61-485. Berkeley, Bill (2001). The Graves are not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa. Basic Books, New York, NY. Cenarro, Angela (2002) "Matar, Vigilar y Delatar: La Quiebra de la Sociedad Civil Durante la Guerra y la Posguerra en EspaÒa (1936-1948)" Historia Social No. 44: 65-86. ChacÛn, Mario, James Robinson and Ravnar Torvik. (2007). ìWhen is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombiaís La Violenciaî. NBER Working Paper No. 12789. Gates, Scott (2002). "Recruitment and Alliance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion". Journal of Conáict Resolution, 46(1): 111-130. Giraldo, Fernando, Rodrigo Lozada and Patricia MuÒoz (2001). Colombia: Elecciones 2000, PontiÖcia Universidad Javeriana, Bogota. Johnson, Douglas H. (1995). "The Sudan Peopleís Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism", in African guerrillas. Edited by Christopher Clapham, Chapter 4. Indiana University Press. Kirk, Robin (2003). More Terrible Than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and Americaís War in Colombia, New York: Public A§airs. Mahmud, Ahmed S. and Juan F. Vargas (2008). "Combatant Recruitment and the Outcome of War" Documento de Trabajo No. 47, Universidad del Rosario. Petersen Roger and Evangelos Liaras (2006). "Countering Fear in War: The Strategic Use of Emotion", Journal of Military Ethics 5(4): 317-333. Polk, William R. (2007) Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq. Harper Collins. Romero, Mauricio (2003). Paramilitares y Autodefensas 1982-2003. IEPRI, Universidad Nacional, Bogot·. Russell, D. E. H. (1974). Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force. New York: Academic Press. Wolf, Eric (1973). Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. Harper & Row Publishers. New York. World Bank (2003). Breaking the Conáict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington: World Bank Policy Report. |
Palavras-Chave | #Guerra civil #Conflicto armado - Colombia #Muerte violenta #Muerte violenta - Colombia - Modelos econométricos #355.0218 |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/book info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |