988 resultados para Financial incentive scheme
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Objective: The objective of this study was to assess the opinions of the Brazilian population about incentives for oocyte donation. Methods: A cross-sectional descriptive approach was used to consult the Brazilian public. The data collection involved the use of a structured questionnaire about legal and ethical issues surrounding oocyte donation. Individuals were randomly selected from the general population using different e-mail lists. Potential participants were contacted by e-mail and invited to participate in the study by completing an online web survey. Results: A total of 1,565 people completed the survey, including 1,284 women(82%) and 281 men(18%). Among the respondents, 1,309(83.6%) were university graduates, 1,033(66%) had a personal income ≥1,250 US dollars/month, 1,346(86%) considered themselves to be religious and 518 (33.1%) were health professionals. While many participants believed that women may donate their oocytes for altruistic reasons, the majority believed that a lack of oocyte donations is due to the prohibition of payments(64.3%) and that incentives would facilitate the decision to donate oocytes(84.7%). The majority of the participants(65.3%) agreed that a financial incentive(i.e., paying the donor) would be the most practical solution for increasing the number of oocyte donations. These results tended to be independent of gender, age, income, religion, education level and profession. Conclusion: While the Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine prohibits payments for oocyte donation, the majority of study participants had no objection to compensating oocyte donors. Moreover, most of the participants agreed that a financial incentive is the most practical solution to increasing the number of oocyte donations.
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A dissertação intitulada “Economia solidária e política pública de geração de trabalho e renda: uma análise do Programa Bolsa Trabalho do Estado do Pará” traz contribuições à proposta de incluir social e economicamente jovens trabalhadores excluídos do mercado formal de trabalho a partir de uma estratégia política que articulou economia solidária, geração de trabalho e renda e incentivo financeiro temporário e condicionado. A pesquisa foi desenvolvida com base na experiência do referido Programa, realizado no período de 2007 a 2010, enquanto proposta de governo que compôs a Política Pública de Trabalho e Renda do Estado, sinalizando para construção de estratégias possíveis no combate ao desemprego, à pobreza, à exclusão social, especialmente da população jovem, a partir da economia solidária. O Programa Bolsa Trabalho foi estruturado em três eixos de qualificação social e profissional, a saber: capacitação profissional para o mercado formal, constituição de empreendimento individual e familiar e organização de empreendimentos coletivos solidários. Para efeito de análise a pesquisa foi delimitada neste último eixo, dado seu diferencial em promover a inclusão produtiva por meio do trabalho cooperado e autogestionário. Assim, elegeu-se a abordagem qualitativa para efetivação desta dissertação combinando pesquisa documental nos projetos e relatórios referentes ao Programa Bolsa Trabalho com a realização de entrevista a coordenadores e técnicos que participaram do mesmo. Além de pesquisa bibliográfica em livros, dissertações, monografias e outras produções sobre as políticas discutidas nesse trabalho. Posto o objetivo desta dissertação consistir na análise do Programa Bolsa Trabalho, em sua articulação entre as políticas de transferência de renda, economia solidária e geração de trabalho, os resultados da pesquisa permitem concluir que a proposta de incluir social e economicamente jovens trabalhadores a partir desta estratégia se mostra possível, contudo demanda interação com as demais políticas sociais e econômicas do governo. Em relação à economia solidária, por se tratar de uma novidade política e na forma de organizar o trabalho observa-se que faltou, principalmente, esclarecimento sobre a proposta, demanda pelo grupo beneficiário e política de financiamento para implantação dos empreendimentos formados pelo Programa.
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Pós-graduação em Odontologia Preventiva e Social - FOA
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Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.
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This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.
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O presente estudo tem como objetivo, analisar sobre as dificuldades enfrentadas tanto pelas Empresas em cumprir a Legislação de Cotas, como também da Pessoa Portadora de Deficiência (PPDs) em ser inserida no mercado de trabalho, devido a falta de qualificação dos candidatos. Através da pesquisa literária ficou claro que nossa Legislação demonstra de forma evidente que o legislador pretendeu assegurar aos PPDs, as condições mínimas de participação influente na vida ativa da sociedade brasileira e num avanço sem precedentes, criaram-se as linhas básicas do processo de integração do deficiente à sociedade e ao mercado produtivo nacional. Verificou-se também que as empresas estão em busca de profissionais dentre o universo dos PPDs, já qualificados, o que normalmente não encontram. As Organizações do Direito Privado também já desenvolveram alguns projetos para a qualificação desses PPDs. A Lei 6.297/75 que garantia às empresas o desconto em dobro no IR dos gastos com treinamento, foi extinta em 12 de Dezembro de 1990. As empresas precisam de um incentivo financeiro para que possam tratar da qualificação desses profissionais, não mais como um peso, mas sim como um projeto social. Caso as empresas fossem beneficiadas por incentivos fiscais, assim como eram na vigência dessa Lei, teriam as empresas uma visão diferenciada por ocasião da contratação dos PPDs? A metodologia de pesquisa prevê um levantamento bibliográfico e uma pesquisa exploratória que será feita em empresas privadas, instituições que visam ajudar na inserção dos PPDs e nas Organizações do Direito Privado tais como Senai, Sesi, Força Sindical, Fiesp. Verificou-se, mediante a pesquisa, que há uma preocupação por parte de todos os envolvidos, em encontrar meios eficazes para garantir a inserção dos PPDs no mercado de trabalho, embora a falta de qualificação ainda seja o maior problema. A criação de Leis similares à Lei 6.297/75 foi apontada como uma grande ajuda às empresas, já que a elas foi imposta essa responsabilidade.(AU)
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O presente estudo tem como objetivo, analisar sobre as dificuldades enfrentadas tanto pelas Empresas em cumprir a Legislação de Cotas, como também da Pessoa Portadora de Deficiência (PPDs) em ser inserida no mercado de trabalho, devido a falta de qualificação dos candidatos. Através da pesquisa literária ficou claro que nossa Legislação demonstra de forma evidente que o legislador pretendeu assegurar aos PPDs, as condições mínimas de participação influente na vida ativa da sociedade brasileira e num avanço sem precedentes, criaram-se as linhas básicas do processo de integração do deficiente à sociedade e ao mercado produtivo nacional. Verificou-se também que as empresas estão em busca de profissionais dentre o universo dos PPDs, já qualificados, o que normalmente não encontram. As Organizações do Direito Privado também já desenvolveram alguns projetos para a qualificação desses PPDs. A Lei 6.297/75 que garantia às empresas o desconto em dobro no IR dos gastos com treinamento, foi extinta em 12 de Dezembro de 1990. As empresas precisam de um incentivo financeiro para que possam tratar da qualificação desses profissionais, não mais como um peso, mas sim como um projeto social. Caso as empresas fossem beneficiadas por incentivos fiscais, assim como eram na vigência dessa Lei, teriam as empresas uma visão diferenciada por ocasião da contratação dos PPDs? A metodologia de pesquisa prevê um levantamento bibliográfico e uma pesquisa exploratória que será feita em empresas privadas, instituições que visam ajudar na inserção dos PPDs e nas Organizações do Direito Privado tais como Senai, Sesi, Força Sindical, Fiesp. Verificou-se, mediante a pesquisa, que há uma preocupação por parte de todos os envolvidos, em encontrar meios eficazes para garantir a inserção dos PPDs no mercado de trabalho, embora a falta de qualificação ainda seja o maior problema. A criação de Leis similares à Lei 6.297/75 foi apontada como uma grande ajuda às empresas, já que a elas foi imposta essa responsabilidade.(AU)
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O presente estudo tem como objetivo, analisar sobre as dificuldades enfrentadas tanto pelas Empresas em cumprir a Legislação de Cotas, como também da Pessoa Portadora de Deficiência (PPDs) em ser inserida no mercado de trabalho, devido a falta de qualificação dos candidatos. Através da pesquisa literária ficou claro que nossa Legislação demonstra de forma evidente que o legislador pretendeu assegurar aos PPDs, as condições mínimas de participação influente na vida ativa da sociedade brasileira e num avanço sem precedentes, criaram-se as linhas básicas do processo de integração do deficiente à sociedade e ao mercado produtivo nacional. Verificou-se também que as empresas estão em busca de profissionais dentre o universo dos PPDs, já qualificados, o que normalmente não encontram. As Organizações do Direito Privado também já desenvolveram alguns projetos para a qualificação desses PPDs. A Lei 6.297/75 que garantia às empresas o desconto em dobro no IR dos gastos com treinamento, foi extinta em 12 de Dezembro de 1990. As empresas precisam de um incentivo financeiro para que possam tratar da qualificação desses profissionais, não mais como um peso, mas sim como um projeto social. Caso as empresas fossem beneficiadas por incentivos fiscais, assim como eram na vigência dessa Lei, teriam as empresas uma visão diferenciada por ocasião da contratação dos PPDs? A metodologia de pesquisa prevê um levantamento bibliográfico e uma pesquisa exploratória que será feita em empresas privadas, instituições que visam ajudar na inserção dos PPDs e nas Organizações do Direito Privado tais como Senai, Sesi, Força Sindical, Fiesp. Verificou-se, mediante a pesquisa, que há uma preocupação por parte de todos os envolvidos, em encontrar meios eficazes para garantir a inserção dos PPDs no mercado de trabalho, embora a falta de qualificação ainda seja o maior problema. A criação de Leis similares à Lei 6.297/75 foi apontada como uma grande ajuda às empresas, já que a elas foi imposta essa responsabilidade.(AU)
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This book covers a broad spectrum from job evaluation systems and how they help staff to understand different job benchmarks, to a range of financial incentive schemes and other benefits which are important to employees - helping you to build loyalty, motivation and productivity. The author highlights the pitfalls of some schemes, using real case studies and offers advice and guidance on packages that work.
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In recent years, a surprising new phenomenon has emerged in which globally-distributed online communities collaborate to create useful and sophisticated computer software. These open source software groups are comprised of generally unaffiliated individuals and organizations who work in a seemingly chaotic fashion and who participate on a voluntary basis without direct financial incentive. ^ The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between the social network structure of these intriguing groups and their level of output and activity, where social network structure is defined as (1) closure or connectedness within the group, (2) bridging ties which extend outside of the group, and (3) leader centrality within the group. Based on well-tested theories of social capital and centrality in teams, propositions were formulated which suggest that social network structures associated with successful open source software project communities will exhibit high levels of bridging and moderate levels of closure and leader centrality. ^ The research setting was the SourceForge hosting organization and a study population of 143 project communities was identified. Independent variables included measures of closure and leader centrality defined over conversational ties, along with measures of bridging defined over membership ties. Dependent variables included source code commits and software releases for community output, and software downloads and project site page views for community activity. A cross-sectional study design was used and archival data were extracted and aggregated for the two-year period following the first release of project software. The resulting compiled variables were analyzed using multiple linear and quadratic regressions, controlling for group size and conversational volume. ^ Contrary to theory-based expectations, the surprising results showed that successful project groups exhibited low levels of closure and that the levels of bridging and leader centrality were not important factors of success. These findings suggest that the creation and use of open source software may represent a fundamentally new socio-technical development process which disrupts the team paradigm and which triggers the need for building new theories of collaborative development. These new theories could point towards the broader application of open source methods for the creation of knowledge-based products other than software. ^
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This dissertation comprised two experiments, which addressed three main goals: (a) to test a new paradigm for measuring objectively the accuracy of alibis, (b) to explore the effectiveness of three retrieval cues (time only, location only, and time-and-location) in an alibi context, and (c) to explore the metacognitive strategies of innocent alibi providers who experience different financial incentives as well as different motivations for reporting (be informative vs. be convincing). ^ The novel paradigm appears promising: by surreptitiously controlling the whereabouts of future alibi providers during a critical time, objective accuracy measurements were in fact possible. Such accuracy measurements revealed that time-cued retrieval can be devastating to innocent alibi providers. Participants who attempted to recall their whereabouts via a time cue were significantly less accurate than participants who attempted recall via a location cue (Experiment 1). ^ Innocent alibi providers, when cued effectively, may not, however, report their memories differently from memory reporters in non-alibi contexts. When cued effectively, participants who experienced a goal of being convincing did not differ in accuracy from participants who experienced a goal of merely being informative (Experiment 2). Similarly, participants did not differ from one another in accuracy across different levels of financial incentive (Experiment 2). ^ Despite the indistinguishable accuracy rates of alibi providers and non-alibi memory reporters when retrieval was cued effectively, proffering mistaken alibis presents a real risk for innocent suspects. Future research needs to address methods by which that risk can be reduced. ^
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In recent years, a surprising new phenomenon has emerged in which globally-distributed online communities collaborate to create useful and sophisticated computer software. These open source software groups are comprised of generally unaffiliated individuals and organizations who work in a seemingly chaotic fashion and who participate on a voluntary basis without direct financial incentive. The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between the social network structure of these intriguing groups and their level of output and activity, where social network structure is defined as 1) closure or connectedness within the group, 2) bridging ties which extend outside of the group, and 3) leader centrality within the group. Based on well-tested theories of social capital and centrality in teams, propositions were formulated which suggest that social network structures associated with successful open source software project communities will exhibit high levels of bridging and moderate levels of closure and leader centrality. The research setting was the SourceForge hosting organization and a study population of 143 project communities was identified. Independent variables included measures of closure and leader centrality defined over conversational ties, along with measures of bridging defined over membership ties. Dependent variables included source code commits and software releases for community output, and software downloads and project site page views for community activity. A cross-sectional study design was used and archival data were extracted and aggregated for the two-year period following the first release of project software. The resulting compiled variables were analyzed using multiple linear and quadratic regressions, controlling for group size and conversational volume. Contrary to theory-based expectations, the surprising results showed that successful project groups exhibited low levels of closure and that the levels of bridging and leader centrality were not important factors of success. These findings suggest that the creation and use of open source software may represent a fundamentally new socio-technical development process which disrupts the team paradigm and which triggers the need for building new theories of collaborative development. These new theories could point towards the broader application of open source methods for the creation of knowledge-based products other than software.
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Résumé: Problématique : En réponse à la prévalence accrue de la maladie du diabète et au fardeau économique important que représente cette maladie sur le système de santé international, des programmes incitatifs pour les maladies chroniques furent instaurés à travers le monde. Ces programmes visent à inciter les médecins à appliquer les lignes directrices chez leurs patients avec besoin complexe en vue d’améliorer la santé des patients et par la suite de réduire les coûts incombés par le système de santé. Les programmes incitatifs étant nombreux et différents d’un pays à l’autre, les études actuelles ne semblent pas s’entendre sur les répercussions de tels programmes sur la santé des patients atteints de diabète. L’objectif de cette étude est d’évaluer les retombées d’un incitatif financier sur le contrôle glycémique de la population atteinte de diabète du Nouveau-Brunswick, au Canada. Méthodes : Cette étude transversale répétée et de cohorte a été menée grâce à des bases de données administratives du Nouveau-Brunswick contenant des données sur dix ans pour 83 580 patients adultes atteints de diabète et 583 médecins de famille éligibles. La santé des patients a été évaluée au niveau du contrôle glycémique, en mesurant les valeurs moyennes d’A1C annuelles à l’aide de régressions linéaires multivariées. Afin d’évaluer si les médecins changeaient leur pratique avec l’implantation du programme incitatif, nous regardions au niveau de la probabilité de recours annuel à au moins deux tests d’A1C en utilisant des régressions logistiques multivariées. Résultats : La probabilité de recours annuel à au moins deux tests d’A1C était plus élevée dans quatre sous-groupes étudiés : les patients nouvellement diagnostiqués après l’implantation du programme avaient des cotes plus élevées comparées aux nouveaux patients avant l’implantation du programme (OR=1.23 [1.18-1.28]); les patients pour lesquels un médecin avait réclamé l’incitatif comparés aux patients pour lesquels aucun médecin n’avait réclamé l’incitatif (OR=2.73 [2.64-2.81]); les patients pour lesquels un médecin avait réclamé l’incitatif avaient des cotes plus élevées après l’implantation du programme comparé à avant (OR=1.89 [1.80-1.98]); et finalement, les patients suivis par un médecin de famille qui a déjà réclamé l’incitatif avaient des cotes 24% plus élevées (OR=1.24 [1.15-1.34]). Il n’y avait pas de différence dans les valeurs d’A1C annuelles entre les 4 sous-groupes étudiés. Conclusion : L’implantation du programme incitatif a démontré que les médecins ont une meilleure probabilité de prescrire au moins deux tests d’A1C, ce qui suggère une meilleure prise en charge des patients. Cependant, le manque de changement au niveau du contrôle glycémique du patient suggère que l’étude des répercussions de l’incitatif devra être poursuivie afin de voir si elle mène à une amélioration d’issues cliniques chez les patients.
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Financial protection is one of the objectives of health systems, which protects poor households from falling into poverty as a result of health care related expenses. Expanding prepayment schemes to the poor is difficult in developing countries because labor is largely informal. Providing health care free-at-point-of-service does not adequately target spending on the poorest, but occupation- or community-based schemes have also inherent limitations to achieve universal coverage. Colombia adopted a government-subsidized health insurance scheme (SHI) strategy. The political debate about increasing SHI enrollment needs evidence about the effectiveness of this scheme regarding financial protection. This study runs a four-part model to estimate the effect of SHI on out-of-pocket expenses by the poor that are currently uninsured, if they were enrolled in the SHI. The results show a 43% and 50% reduction in expenses at Bogotá and national level respectively, which confirms the effectiveness of SHI as a financial protection tool.