The Effectiveness of Golden Handcuffs

Executive compensation includes components intended to acquire and retain executives as well as to align their goals with those of shareholders. This paper focuses on retention compensation, commonly known as "golden handcuffs", including stock options, long-term incentive plans and restricted stock. The extant literature examines CEOs that change jobs despite their golden handcuffs, and argues that such compensation is not an effective means of executive retention. In this paper, I compare the golden handcuffs of a set of CEOs who change jobs to a matched set of those who do not in order to determine the efficacy of such compensation for executive retention. I find that restricted stock is positively related to CEO turnover whereas stock options are negatively related.

Governança corporativa e custo de agência: uma visão do mercado brasileiro

Esse trabalho investiga empiricamente a relação entre custo de agência e as medidas de monitoramento interno disponíveis aos investidores brasileiros nas empresas nacionais, utilizando amostras de companhias abertas entre os anos de 2010 e 2014, totalizando 134 empresas analisadas e 536 observações. Para medir tal relação, foram utilizadas, como variáveis de monitoramento interno, informações sobre a remuneração variável dos executivos, entre elas o uso de outorgas de opções de compra de ações, a composição do conselho de administração, dando ênfase à representatividade dos conselheiros independentes e à dualidade entre Chairman e CEO, e o percentual do capital social das companhias que está sob propriedade dos executivos. Como proxy para custo de agência, foram utilizados os indicadores Asset Turnover Ratio e General & Administrative Expenses (G&A) como percentual da Receita Líquida. Neste contexto, foram estabelecidas duas hipóteses de pesquisa e estimados modelos de regressão em painel controlados por efeitos fixos de tempo e empresa, empregando como variável dependente as variáveis proxy do custo de agência e utilizando as variáveis endividamento e tamanho das empresas como variáveis de controle. Os resultados dos modelos demonstram que, na amostra selecionada, há uma relação positiva e significativa entre o percentual da remuneração variável e as proxies de custo de agência, comportamento este contrário ao esperado originalmente. Conclui-se assim que as empresas que apresentam uma maior composição variável no total remunerado ao executivo, incorrem em um maior custo de agência, o que leva à conclusão de que tais ferramentas não são boas estratégias de alinhamento de interesses entre executivos e acionistas. As demais variáveis de monitoramento interno não apresentaram significância.

Diseño y aplicación de un modelo de remuneración variable para una empresa del sector de las telecomunicaciones

Actualmente encontramos una fuerte presión en las organizaciones por adaptarse a un mundo competitivo con un descenso en las utilidades y una incertidumbre constante en su flujo de caja. Estas circunstancias obligan a las organizaciones al mejoramiento continuo buscando nuevas formas de gestionar sus procesos y sus recursos. Para las organizaciones de prestación de servicios en el sector de telecomunicaciones una de las ventajas competitivas más importantes de obtener es la productividad debido a que sus ganancias dependen directamente del número de actividades que puedan ejecutar cada empleado. El reto es hacer más con menos y con mejor calidad. Para lograrlo, la necesidad de gestionar efectivamente los recursos humanos aparece, y aquí es donde los sistemas de compensación toman un rol importante. El objetivo en este trabajo es diseñar y aplicar un modelo de remuneración variable para una empresa de prestación de servicios profesionales en el sector de las telecomunicaciones y con esto aportar al estudio de la gestión del desempeño y del talento humano en Colombia. Su realización permitió la documentación del diseño y aplicación del modelo de remuneración variable en un proyecto del sector de telecomunicaciones en Colombia. Su diseño utilizó las tendencias de programas remunerativos y teorías de gestión de desempeño para lograr un modelo integral que permita el crecimiento sostenido en el largo plazo y la motivación al recurso más importante de la organización que es el talento humano. Su aplicación permitió también la documentación de problemas y aciertos en la implementación de estos modelos.

Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information

We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option (ESO) disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001 to 2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements’ continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive ESO information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders’ Association), and regulatory intervention.

Compensation for compulsory acquisition of a licensed car parking space

The Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (‘the Act’) deals with the acquisition of land by the State for public purposes and provides for compensation. The issue that arose for determination in Sorrento Medical Service Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Dept of Main Roads [2007] QCA 73 was whether the appellant was entitled to claim compensation under the Act in respect of land resumed by the Main Roads Department over which the appellant had an exclusive contractual licence for car parking spaces for use in association with a medical centre leased by the appellant. At first instance, it was held by the Land Court that the appellant was not entitled to compensation for the resumption of the car parking spaces. The basis for this decision by the Land Court was that a right to compensation only exists where resumption has taken some proprietary interest of the claimant in the land. Following an appeal to the Land Appeal Court being dismissed, the appellant instituted the present appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and Chesterman J).

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

Executive Reorganization: Building a State Government That Worked for People -- Tom Harrison, Diana Dowling & Sheena Wilson “In the Crucible of Change”

One of the primary accomplishments of Governor Forrest Anderson in 1969-71 was the reorganization of the Executive Branch of Montana government, something that had been attempted six different times between 1919 and 1962 as state government had grown from twenty agencies to almost 200 uncontrolled boards, bureaus and commissions. The chaotic structure of the executive branch disempowered governors of both parties and empowered the private corporations and organizations that were the power structure of Montana. With remarkable political acumen, Governor Anderson figured out how to get that near impossible job done. Central to his efforts was the creation of an Executive Reorganization Commission, including eight legislators and the Governor, the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment that limited the executive branch to no more than twenty departments under the Governor, and the timely completion of a massive research effort to delineate the actual structure of the twenty departments. That story is told in this episode by three major players in the effort, all involved directly with the Executive Reorganization Commission: Tom Harrison, Diana Dowling and Sheena Wilson. Their recollections reflect an insider’s perspective of this significant accomplishment that helped change Montana “In the Crucible of Change.” Tom Harrison is a former Republican State Representative and State Senator from Helena, who was a member of the Executive Reorganization Commission. As Majority Leader in the Montana House of Representatives in 1971, he was the primary sponsor of the House’s executive reorganization bill and helped shepherd the Senate’s version to passage. Harrison was the Republican candidate for Attorney General in 1976 after which he practiced private law for 3 more decades. He served in the Montana Army National Guard for almost 34 years, rising to the rank of Colonel in the position of Judge Advocate General. He was a founding Director of Federal Defenders of Montana (legal representation for indigents accused within the Federal Judicial System); appointed Chairman of the original Montana State Fund (workers' compensation insurance) by Gov. Stephens; served as President of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Helena Kiwanis Club and St. Peter's Community Hospital Foundation, as well as Chairman and Director of AAA MountainWest; and was a founder, first Chairman and Director of the Valley Bank of Helena for over 25 years. Diana Dowling was an attorney for the Executive Reorganization Commission and helped draft the legislation that was passed. She also worked for Governor Forrest Anderson and for the 1972 Constitutional Convention where she prepared and directed publication of official explanation of the new Constitution that was mailed to all Montana voters. Diana was Executive Director of the Montana Bar Association and for 20 years held various legal positions with the Montana Legislative Council. For 12 years she was a commissioner on the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and for 7 years was a member of Montana State Board of Bar Examiners. Diana was the first director of the Montana Lottery, an adjunct professor at both Carroll College and the UM Law School, and an administrative officer for Falcon Press Publishing Co. Diana is currently - and intends to continue being - a perpetual college student. Sheena Wilson came fresh out of the University of Montana to become a Research Assistant for the Executive Reorganization Commission. Later she worked for seven years as a field representative in Idaho and Montana for the Mountain Plains Family Education Program, for thirteen years with Congressman Pat Williams as Executive Assistant in Washington and Field Assistant here in Montana, owned and managed a Helena restaurant for seven years, worked as Executive Assistant for State Auditor John Morrison and was Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Brian Schweitzer his full 8 years in the Governorship. Though currently “retired”, Sheena serves on the Montana Board of Investments, the Public Employees Retirement Board and the Capitol Complex Advisory Council and is a partner in a dry-land wheat farm in Teton County that was homesteaded by her great uncle.

Reorganization plan no. 19 of 1950 : transfer of employees' compensation functions from Federal Security Agency to Department of Labor : report.

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Clipping noise compensation for OFDMA systems

This paper presents an efficient low-complexity clipping noise compensation scheme for PAR reduced orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems. Conventional clipping noise compensation schemes proposed for OFDM systems are decision directed schemes which use demodulated data symbols. Thus these schemes fail to deliver expected performance in OFDMA systems where multiple users share a single OFDM symbol and a specific user may only know his/her own modulation scheme. The proposed clipping noise estimation and compensation scheme does not require the knowledge of the demodulated symbols of the other users, making it very promising for OFDMA systems. It uses the equalized output and the reserved tones to reconstruct the signal by compensating the clipping noise. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can significantly improve the system performance.