Assignment markets with the same core

[spa] En el contexto de los juegos de asignación bilaterales, estudiamos el conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignación con el mismo nucleo. Se proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos de asignación asociados tienen el mismo núcleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de matrices que dan lugar al mismo núcleo forman un semirretículo con un número finito de elementos minimales y un único máximo. Se da una caracterización de estos elementos minimales. También se proporciona una condición suficiente para obtener un retículo.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Assignment markets with the same core

[spa] En el contexto de los juegos de asignación bilaterales, estudiamos el conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignación con el mismo nucleo. Se proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos de asignación asociados tienen el mismo núcleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de matrices que dan lugar al mismo núcleo forman un semirretículo con un número finito de elementos minimales y un único máximo. Se da una caracterización de estos elementos minimales. También se proporciona una condición suficiente para obtener un retículo.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Asymptotic analysis of stock price densities and implied volatilities in mixed stochastic models

In this paper, we obtain sharp asymptotic formulas with error estimates for the Mellin con- volution of functions de ned on (0;1), and use these formulas to characterize the asymptotic behavior of marginal distribution densities of stock price processes in mixed stochastic models. Special examples of mixed models are jump-di usion models and stochastic volatility models with jumps. We apply our general results to the Heston model with double exponential jumps, and make a detailed analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the stock price density, the call option pricing function, and the implied volatility in this model. We also obtain similar results for the Heston model with jumps distributed according to the NIG law.

Resultados uniformemente seguros e equilíbrio de Nash em jogos compactos

Nós introduzimos uma condição, resultados uniformemente seguros, para jogos compactos e resultados (“payoffs”) limitados e mensur´aveis nas estrat´egias. Demonstramos que se um jogo compacto tem resultados uniformemente seguros, ent˜ao sua extens˜ao mista tem resultados seguros.

Solving the non-convexity problem in some shopping-time and human-capital models

Several works in the shopping-time and in the human-capital literature, due to the nonconcavity of the underlying Hamiltonian, use Örst-order conditions in dynamic optimization to characterize necessity, but not su¢ ciency, in intertemporal problems. In this work I choose one paper in each one of these two areas and show that optimality can be characterized by means of a simple aplication of Arrowís (1968) su¢ ciency theorem.

On choice of technique in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

We report results on the optimal \choice of technique" in a model originally formulated by Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (henceforth, the RSS model) and further discussed by Okishio and Stiglitz. By viewing this vintage-capital model without discounting as a speci c instance of the general theory of intertemporal resource allocation associated with Brock, Gale and McKenzie, we resolve longstanding conjectures in the form of theorems on the existence and price support of optimal paths, and of conditions suÆcient for the optimality of a policy rst identi ed by Stiglitz. We dispose of the necessity of these conditions in surprisingly simple examples of economies in which (i) an optimal path is periodic, (ii) a path following Stiglitz' policy is bad, and (iii) there is optimal investment in di erent vintages at di erent times. (129 words)

On a uniform turnpike of the third kind in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

On using McKenzie’s taxonomy of optimal accumulation in the longrun, we report a “uniform turnpike” theorem of the third kind in a model original to Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (RSS), and further studied by Stiglitz. Our results are presented in the undiscounted, discrete-time setting emphasized in the recent work of Khan-Mitra, and they rely on the importance of strictly concave felicity functions, or alternatively, on the value of a “marginal rate of transformation”, ξσ, from one period to the next not being unity. Our results, despite their specificity, contribute to the methodology of intertemporal optimization theory, as developed in economics by Ramsey, von Neumann and their followers.

The ex-Ante non-optimality of the Dempster-Schafer updating rule for ambiguous beliefs

The most widely used updating rule for non-additive probalities is the Dempster-Schafer rule. Schmeidles and Gilboa have developed a model of decision making under uncertainty based on non-additive probabilities, and in their paper “Updating Ambiguos Beliefs” they justify the Dempster-Schafer rule based on a maximum likelihood procedure. This note shows in the context of Schmeidler-Gilboa preferences under uncertainty, that the Dempster-Schafer rule is in general not ex-ante optimal. This contrasts with Brown’s result that Bayes’ rule is ex-ante optimal for standard Savage preferences with additive probabilities.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Diferenciação vertical em um modelo de hotelling com firmas heterogêneas

O trabalho apresenta um modelo de competição duopolista, com firmas heterogêneas (custos marginais diferentes), produtos espacialmente diferenciados quanto a dimensão vertical e horizontal, e informação privada sobre as preferências por qualidade dos consumidores. Identifica-se que a assimetria de informação sobre a dimensão vertical e a diferença de custos exercem grande relevância sobre a decisão de apreçamento das firmas e sobre as estruturas de mercado de equilíbrio. Um resultado relevante decorrente desses dois aspectos é a existência de uma massa de consumidores que, em equilíbrio, pode demandar de qualquer uma das firmas, sendo essa decisão pautada sobre o real parâmetro de preferência por qualidade de cada consumidor. Observa-se também que quanto maior a heterogeneidade dos custos, maior é o poder de mercado da firma de menor custo.