How logrolling can explain the failure of the government coalition in Brazil

This article presents an analysis of the behavior of federal representatives in the Brazilian House of Representatives between 1995 and 1998, when a series of constitutional amendments were presented by the president to be voted on by Congress. The objective is to show that the lack of a stable government coalition resulted in costs to society that were not anticipated by the government. The study argues that a logroll - a trade of votes - was the strategy used by the government in order to guarantee the number of votes necessary to approve the amendments. This strategy created a vicious system in which representatives would only vote with the government if they had benefits in return.

A individualização do direito à saúde: contributos a partir de um olhar analítico

Este artigo de natureza ensaística procura contribuir para o desenvolvimento de argumentos já apresentados a respeito de reconfigurações ideológicas nas políticas de saúde. A partir de dimensões analíticas discute-se o espaço e implicações da individualização do direito à saúde no contexto de maior liberalização dos mercados e de maior exposição ao investimento privado lucrativo. A individualização do direito à saúde assume-se como contrária aos princípios éticos e morais consolidados entre os países ocidentais a partir da 2ª metade do séc. XX, em que o acesso aos cuidados passa gradualmente a estar dependente das condições individuais das famílias, não obstante o pagamento de impostos e outros seguros. Não só passa a existir espaço para formas desiguais de acesso ao direito à saúde, como o princípio da utilização racional que baseia esta reconfiguração é uma crença managerialista falaciosa e, em larga medida, irrealista. Esta discussão é ilustrada a partir de dados da OCDE, os quais demonstram tendências díspares a respeito desta dinâmica.

Invoking a cartesian product structure on social states: new resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems

The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard's and Sen's paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard's paradox and to Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.

Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions: An Integer Programming Approach

In the line opened by Kalai and Muller (1997), we explore new conditions on prefernce domains which make it possible to avoid Arrow's impossibility result. In our main theorem, we provide a complete characterization of the domains admitting nondictorial Arrovian social welfare functions with ties (i.e. including indifference in the range) by introducing a notion of strict decomposability. In the proof, we use integer programming tools, following an approach first applied to social choice theory by Sethuraman, Teo and Vohra ((2003), (2006)). In order to obtain a representation of Arrovian social welfare functions whose range can include indifference, we generalize Sethuraman et al.'s work and specify integer programs in which variables are allowed to assume values in the set {0, 1/2, 1}: indeed, we show that, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between solutions of an integer program defined on this set and the set of all Arrovian social welfare functions - without restrictions on the range.

La gripe A desde la teoría de la elección racional: propuestas para la toma de decisiones de políticas preventivas

This article is a reflection on the social uncertainty caused by Influenza A and on the consequences that it can have on decision making in health promotion policies. We use concepts and metaphors of the Rational Choice Theory, among them, the “ingratitude effect” or the “distrust effect”, as we analyse how these can become obstacles for the efficiency of prevention policies. Then, we focus on the information asymmetry of the principal-agent relationship, and we propose measures to diminish the “moral risk” that they cause. We finish by advancing some proposals for designing lines and strategies of action in health promotion policies.

Bureaucracy and the flypaper effect : Evidence from intercommunal fiscal equalisation in the canton of Vaud

Unlike classical theoretical expectations, our empirical study shows that financial transfers to decentralised governments increase local public expenditures much more than would be triggered by an equivalent rise in local income. This empirical evidence of the presence of a flypaper effect is achieved using panel data from 375 municipalities located in the Swiss canton of Vaud covering the period 1994 to 2005. During that time there was a major change in the financial equalisation scheme. Furthermore, our study confirms the analysis of the public choice theory: the effect depends partly on the degree of complexity of the municipal bureaucracy. These results show that local bureaucratic behaviour may impede the effectiveness of a financial equalisation scheme that aims to reduce disparities in local tax.

On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

Rationaalisen valinnan teorian rakenne ja tieteellisen edistyksen arviointi

Abstract: The structure of rational choice theory and the evaluation of scientific progress

Democracia e eficiência: a difícil relação entre política e economia no debate contemporâneo

Democracy and efficiency: hard relations between politics and economy. Many economists see politics as an irrational activity. They also think state action usually generates market inefficiencies and democratic institutions, such as elections, often work as obstacles to sound economic measures. Showing that vision has been embedded into the main currents of economic thought since the last century, we also argue those ideas are exported to great part of contemporary political science, including the area of public policies. Examining the literature, we show that rational choice political scientists, as the economists, claim governability and effective decisions will be guaranteed mainly through concentrated arenas or through insulated arrangements able to protect policy makers from political interference. In other words, governability depends on the reduction of the political arenas. On the contrary, we reject this technocratic solution of splitting politics from economy. With the support of classical pluralist thinkers, we stand another conception, arguing politics is the privileged social space for building interests and values in an institutionalized way. The difficulties to surpass current international crises since 2008 reveal this is a crucial problem: reducing politics would prevent societies from improving institutional solutions which are the only ones able to give space to emerging conflicts and, then, reach eventual consensus around them.

Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism

This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative definition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.

Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being

This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provides an introduction to social-choice theory with interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We argue that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s theorem is to use a richer informational environment than ordinal measurability and the absence of interpersonal comparability of well-being. We discuss welfarist social evaluation (which requires that the levels of individual well-being in two alternatives are the only determinants of their social ranking) and present characterizations of some important social-evaluation orderings.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.

Ordered Model Processes, Reference Declaration And The Economic Organization: Implications For A Balanced Scorecard Contextual Framework

Les Tableaux de Bord de la Performance ont été acclamés avec raison depuis leur introduction en 1992, mais les intellectuels continuent encore à étudier leurs aspects pragmatiques. Ce papier contribue à la littérature sur les Tableaux de Bord de la Performance, tout d’abord, en offrant une explication logique quant à leur succès et ensuite, en présentant un cadre de travail contextuel de tableaux de bord de la performance pour une structure de gestion hiérarchisée. Le cadre de travail contextuel réforme la perspective d’apprentissage et de croissance du tableau de bord de la performance (i) en effectuant la transition de référence (subjective/objective), et (ii) en reconnaissant que la Perspective d’Apprentissage et de Croissance implique avant tout une incidence de formulation stratégique d’une extra-entité. Le transfert de l’incidence (intra-entité/extra-entité) réconcilie l’évolution de la position de politique de gestion non ordonnée [Contenu: (Contenu: Contexte): Contexte] qu’est la Perspective d’Apprentissage et de Croissance Concomitante. Le cadre de travail supplante également les Perspectives des Tableaux de Bord de la Performances développés par Kaplan et Norton en ajoutant la perspective de politique sociale qui manquait. La perspective manquante implique une transition de référence objective [(position endogène, perspective exogène): (position exogène, perspective exogène)]. De tels signaux de transition [Contenu: (Contenu: Contexte): Contexte] ordonnent l’évolution de la position de politique de gestion.

Ordered Conflict Resolution

Ordered conflict resolution: understanding her tenets cost Keynes his life and Arrow to live under extortionate threat. Now that the Supreme Court of the United States has conquered the Informal Capital Market Cartel’s stranglehold on academic freedom, the literature can now vindicate impossibility- resolved social choice theory in the venue of a marriage between ethics and economics; as Sen has pled need be the case. This paper introduces ordered conflict resolution and her two impossibility-resolving axioms in effecting (individual: societal) well-being transitivity.