853 resultados para Ancient Greek Thought
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El agua ha sido un elemento presente en muchas cosmogonías. El agua es necesaria a la vida, sin ella no existiría la vida como la conocemos. Esta percepción sobre el agua es tan antigua como la misma humanidad, haciéndose particularmente importante en pueblos donde ella no abunda, pueblos donde la orografía es desértica o pueblos donde el agua en forma de ríos se hace fundamental a la cosecha y por consiguiente a la vida, como los pueblos del cercano oriente, en particular los pueblos de la región del levante. Siendo esto así, pareciera peculiar la importancia dada por los primeros pensadores griegos, llamados filósofos presocráticos, al elemento agua en su filosofía. Argumentaré que el elemento agua es extraño al pensamiento griego, como elemento primigenio. Para ello discutiré algunos de los textos cosmogónicos griegos y del cercano oriente
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El agua ha sido un elemento presente en muchas cosmogonías. El agua es necesaria a la vida, sin ella no existiría la vida como la conocemos. Esta percepción sobre el agua es tan antigua como la misma humanidad, haciéndose particularmente importante en pueblos donde ella no abunda, pueblos donde la orografía es desértica o pueblos donde el agua en forma de ríos se hace fundamental a la cosecha y por consiguiente a la vida, como los pueblos del cercano oriente, en particular los pueblos de la región del levante. Siendo esto así, pareciera peculiar la importancia dada por los primeros pensadores griegos, llamados filósofos presocráticos, al elemento agua en su filosofía. Argumentaré que el elemento agua es extraño al pensamiento griego, como elemento primigenio. Para ello discutiré algunos de los textos cosmogónicos griegos y del cercano oriente
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El agua ha sido un elemento presente en muchas cosmogonías. El agua es necesaria a la vida, sin ella no existiría la vida como la conocemos. Esta percepción sobre el agua es tan antigua como la misma humanidad, haciéndose particularmente importante en pueblos donde ella no abunda, pueblos donde la orografía es desértica o pueblos donde el agua en forma de ríos se hace fundamental a la cosecha y por consiguiente a la vida, como los pueblos del cercano oriente, en particular los pueblos de la región del levante. Siendo esto así, pareciera peculiar la importancia dada por los primeros pensadores griegos, llamados filósofos presocráticos, al elemento agua en su filosofía. Argumentaré que el elemento agua es extraño al pensamiento griego, como elemento primigenio. Para ello discutiré algunos de los textos cosmogónicos griegos y del cercano oriente
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This Introduction offers context for the individual papers by examining the intersections and productive tensions between political thought and classical reception studies. While Plato and Aristotle have long been privileged interlocutors for political philosophers, classical reception studies has pluralised both this ancient canon and given rise to a more complex understanding of the modern heirs of ancient political thought. Similarly, the insights of studying the history of political texts and ideas across a longer tradition calls into question the fixity of concepts such as democracy, empire and political freedom. Indeed, we query the very notion of tradition by emphasising how the past has been repeatedly constructed and reconstructed in divergent modern political discourses and conversely how modern political theories and realities have been shaped and reshaped by an idea of antiquity. The Introduction closes with a brief survey of the collected papers.
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This dissertation is about ancient philosophers notions of mental illness, from Plato onwards. Mental illness here means disorders that, in ancient medical thought, were believed to originate in the body but to manifest themselves predominantly through mental symptoms. These illnesses were treated by physical means, which were believed to address the bodily cause of the illness, conceived of as an elemental imbalance or a state of cephalic stricture , for example. Sometimes the mental symptoms were addressed directly by psychotherapeutic means. The first and most important question explored concerns how the ancient philosophers responded to the medical notion of mental illness, and how they explained such illnesses in their theories of physiology and psychology. Although the illnesses are seldom discussed extensively, the philosophers were well aware of their existence and regarded their occurrence an indication of the soul s close dependence on the body. This called for a philosophical account. The second question addressed has to do with the ancient philosophers role as experts in mental problems of a non-medical kind, such as unwanted emotions. These problems were dubbed diseases of the soul , and the philosophers thus claimed to be doctors of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illnesses and diseases of the soul was often presented as rather obvious, there was some vagueness and overlap. There is still a third question that is explored, concerning the status of both mental illnesses and diseases of the soul as unnatural conditions, the role of the human body in the philosophical aetiologies of evil, and the medico-philosophical theories of psycho-physiological temperaments. This work consists of an introduction and five main chapters, focusing on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen, and the Sceptics, the Epicureans and later Platonists. The sources drawn on are the original Greek and Latin philosophical and medical texts. It appears that the philosophers accepted the medical notion of mental illness, but interpreted it in various ways. The differences in interpretation were mostly attributable to differences in their theories of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illness and diseases of the soul was important, marking the boundary between the fields of expertise of medicine and philosophy, and of the individual s moral responsibilities, the problematic aspects of establishing it are discussed rather little in ancient philosophy. There may have been various reasons for this. The medical descriptions of mental illness are often extreme, symptoms of the psychotic type excluding the possibility of the condition being of the non-medical kind. In addition, the rigid normativeness of ancient philosophical anthropologies and their rigorous notion of human happiness decreased the need to assess the acceptability of individual variation in their emotional and intellectual lives and external behaviour.
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Vol. 1 tr. by L. Magnus, v. 2-4, by G. G. Berry.
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El objeto de este trabajo es realizar un estudio iusfilosófico sobre la aparición de las Leyes (nómoi) personificadas de Atenas en el Critón de Platón. La prosopopeya de las Leyes resulta ser un aspecto central para poder comprender la obra, ya que éstas entablan un diálogo imaginario con Sócrates en el cual instalan diversos argumentos filosóficos para fundamentar la autoridad de la pólis. A los fines de identificar el valor argumentativo de este recurso en la obra, analizaré el significado del nómos en la Atenas del siglo V a. C. y la naturaleza de las Leyes en el contexto general del diálogo. Se busca demostrar la importancia que tienen aquéllas para explicar la decisión de Sócrates de beber la cicuta.
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This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.
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Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the ancients was born out of something like a crisis in the interpretation of the Greeks, which can be characterized as nothing other than the realization of the idea that the Greek philosophers put a serious question mark over existence. This idea, which had its germination in Prussia with Jakob Burckhart and his teacher, but first came to be seriously cultivated in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, was the first in depth investigation into whether the Greeks, on the one hand, questioned existence or, on the other hand, put a question mark over existence. To question existence is rather innocuous, since it amounts to little more, in the end, than a child looking up at the stars and asking what it all means. To put a question mark over existence, however, is another business entirely. For the Greeks, as the life work of Martin Heidegger amply demonstrates, the nature of Greek thinking and the objects towards which it is directed follows so absolutely from the tragic view of the human person that, in a certain sense, philosophy is Greek and could only have developed in Greece. Perhaps stating it a little less categorically, philosophy could have developed elsewhere at least to the extent that something like they way the Greeks understood life was at the forefront: presence, in other words. This thesis deals with the problem ofHeidegger's relation to the Greeks, specifically in terms of his understanding of the Greeks and presence. It is the position of this dissertation that the Greek notion of presence is, as Heidegger understands it, the homeliness of the hearth that radiates through all the things that humans concern themselves with. This is thought by Heidegger, as the Greeks did, specifically in contrast with the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the hqrnan apart from his or her concern with things. Therefore, the thesis is an attempt at exposing the relation between presence and the unhomely by situating it withing Greek existence and the meaning of the Greek Philosopher. In order to support this position, the thesis has been divided into five parts. The first two chapters deal with Heidegger's explanation of the relation between Greek notion of physics (Phusis), metaphysics (specifically in relation to an analysis of time and motion in Greek thought), and what Heidegger calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein (boredom). More exactly, it deals with these issues only so far as they allow us to bring out something like the notion of 'presence' in relation to things and homelessness or restlessness in relation to the human being. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central problem of the paper is that in Heidegger's elucidation of physics and metaphysics, he conducts his analysis in such a way that he explicitly uncovers that dimension of human existence that he calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein. This fundamental attunement is, in tum, similar to what the Greeks understood as the deinon, the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the human. The third and fourth chapters take as their explicit themes the problem of the Greek understanding of the assertion and the ways in which the person can comport himlherself toward things, two issues which are not separable. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central theme of the paper is that Heidegger's analysis of these two areas in Greek thought brings out precisely why the philosopher and the philosophical way of life is the highest mode of existence for the Greeks and how this is thought specifically in tenns of the uncanniness of humans. The final cijapter gives a complete elucidation of presence as the homeliness of the hearth and shows specifically how this is thought of in contradistinction to the uncanny/unhomely for the Greeks. 1I1 This last chapter also explains Martin Heidegger's reaction to the Greek's interpretation of the highest mode of existence, and what he posited as a counter-thought. The essay as a whole is an attempt to fully concertize an important dimension of Heidegger' s understanding of the Greeks, that is, the relation between presence and the deinon or Greek notion ofunhomely, which, to my la)owledge, has not been offered anywhere in commentaries on Heidegger.
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Cette thèse se propose d’étudier les façons dont la pensée et l’imaginaire grec de l’époque archaïque se représentaient quelques pans du réel qui ne se laissaient jamais voir ni atteindre: l’éther, l’air et l’abîme marin. Vu le caractère insondable de ces espaces, l’imagination et l’abstraction se sont ingéniées à les appréhender par un discours spécifique et à les intégrer dans le système de connaissances et de croyances propre à l’époque en leur assignant une place dans le système de l’univers, en les rattachant à une hiérarchie de l’ordre cosmologique, en leur donnant une forme, en classant leurs objets et en les rapportant aux modèles du monde connu, en les aménageant par les moyens les plus divers. Une étude des formes d’expression de la pensée grecque archaïque, autant littéraires qu’iconographiques, permet de cerner les diverses formes de représentation des domaines inaccessibles et les modèles d’organisation spatiale issus de ce type de pensée. Grâce à la dialectique particulière qui ressort du rapport entre espace et mouvement, cette thèse se propose également d’interroger le corpus des sources grecques archaïques sous des angles jusqu’ici peu explorés: comment maîtrise-t-on l’espace par les déplacements physiques en dehors des parcours terrestres? Comment les schémas du mouvement dans l’espace se sont-ils forgés? Comment les dichotomies issues de la logique spatiale archaïque (haut/bas, droite/gauche, est/ouest, en deça/au-delà, etc.) influent-elles sur la structuration spatiale? Quelles espèces d’espace révèlent les déplacements à travers les différents niveaux du monde, que ce soit ceux des dieux, ceux des mortels et d’autres entités, forces physiques et substances privilégiées dans le commerce avec le divin et le monde d’en haut? Ces analyses mettent en valeur les façons dont l’imagination et l’abstraction plutôt que l’expérience vécue ont contribué, à leur façon, à structurer l’espace et à forger l’image du monde comme κόσμος, monde mis en ordre et soumis autant aux lois physiques qu’aux lois divines.
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Ce mémoire se focalise sur la pièce Antony and Cleopatra de Shakespeare en relation avec la pensée biblique, l’humanisme de la Renaissance et les caractéristiques de la tragédie comme genre littéraire et philosophie grecque. La chute d’Adam et Eve dans la Bible, ainsi que le conflit entre le héros tragique et les dieux, sont deux thèmes qui sont au centre de ce mémoire. Le mythe de la chute d’Adam et Eve sert, en effet, d’un modèle de la chute—et par conséquent, de la tragédie—d’Antoine et Cléopâtre mais aussi de structure pour ce mémoire. Si le premier chapitre parle de paradis, le deuxième évoque le péché originel. Le troisième, quant à lui, aborde une contre-rédemption. Le premier chapitre réfère à l’idée du paradis, ou l’Éden dans la bible, afin d’examiner ce qui est édénique dans Antony and Cleopatra. La fertilité, l’épicuréisme, l’excès dionysien sont tous des éléments qui sont présents dans la conception d’un Éden biblique et Shakespearien. Le deuxième chapitre est une étude sur la tragédie comme genre fondamentalement lié à la pensée religieuse et philosophique des grecs, une pensée qui anime aussi Antony and Cleopatra. Ce chapitre montre, en effet, que les deux protagonistes Shakespeariens, comme les héros tragiques grecs, défient les dieux et le destin, engendrant ainsi leur tragédie (ou ‘chute’, pour continuer avec le mythe d’Adam et Eve). Si le deuxième chapitre cherche à créer des ponts entre la tragédie grecque et la tragédie Shakespearienne, le troisième chapitre montre que le dénouement dans Antony and Cleopatra est bien différent des dénouements dans les tragédies de Sophocle, Euripide, et Eschyle. Examinant la pensée de la Renaissance, surtout la notion d’humanisme, la partie finale du mémoire présente les protagonistes de Shakespeare comme des éternels rebelles, des humanistes déterminés à défier les forces du destin.
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John Milton’s political thought has been interpreted in strikingly divergent ways. This article argues that he should be seen as a classical republican, and locates key aspects of his political thought within an ancient Greek discourse critical of democracy or extreme democracy. Milton was clearly familiar with the ancient texts expounding this critique, and he himself deployed both the arguments and the characteristic discourse of the anti-democratic thinkers across the span of his writing. This vision of politics emphasized the rightly-ordered soul of the masculine republican citizen, in contrast to the unruly passions seen both in tyrants and in the democratic rabble.
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Pós-graduação em Música - IA