Paradigmenwechsel in der türkischen Regierungspolitik?

Die Kurdenproblematik ist ein Thema, dass die Türkei seit ihrer Gründung innen- und außenpolitisch sehr beschäftigt. In diesem Buch wird die historische Kurdenproblematik vom osmanischen Reich bis zur heutigen Türkei aufgerissen und gezeigt, welche paradigmatischen Entwicklungen es in der Türkei seit dem gegeben hat. Ist es zu einer paradigmatischen Veränderung in der türkischen Innen- und Außenpolitik gekommen? Befindet sich die Türkei auf dem Weg der Demokratisierung? Welche tiefgreifenden Auswirkungen hat die Politik der AKP und Erdoganregierung auf die Türkei und auf ihre Beziehungen zur EU und ihren Nachbarn im Nahen Osten?

Análisis de la política exterior de Turquía como configuradora del equilibrio de poder en Oriente Medio (2002-2010)

Este estudio de caso se encarga de hacer un análisis del cambio en la política exterior de Turquía desde la llegada al gobierno del partido de Justicia y Desarrollo, AKP y su influencia en la configuración del poder en Oriente Medio en el periodo de 2002 a 2010.

Análisis de la transformación de las relaciones militares entre Turquía e Israel a partir de la ruptura de la alianza bilateral generada por el ataque a la Flotilla de Gaza. Período 2008 a 2011

Amenazas como Siria, Irán y el PKK fueron relevantes al momento de forjar una alianza entre Turquía e Israel a mediados de los noventa. Con la firma de varios acuerdos en el ámbito militar se fortaleció la relación bilateral en materia de seguridad. Sin embargo, la llegada de un nuevo gobierno a Turquía en 2002 generó un cambio en materia de política exterior, especialmente con Israel. La monografía sustentada bajo los postulados de la Teoría del Balance de las Amenazas concluye que la ruptura de la alianza se dio por el cambio en la política exterior de seguridad turca, el bloqueo a Gaza por parte de Israel en 2008 y el ataque a la Flotilla de Gaza en 2010, conduciendo a una transformación en los acuerdos militares pactados para la seguridad y estabilidad de ambos países en la región de Medio Oriente.

Las dos caras de la identidad nacional turca en la configuración de su política exterior en medio oriente gobierno Recep Tayyip Erdogan

El interés de esta monografía es explicar la configuración de la política exterior de Turquía dentro del estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales. Se analiza el comportamiento y las acciones emprendidas por la República de Turquía con la llegada del AKP al poder y los cambios que ha enfrentado el sistema internacional, a partir del papel que juega la identidad nacional turca sobre la construcción de su política exterior hacia Medio Oriente. Asimismo, se cuestionan algunos postulados principales de la escuela realista a partir de un análisis alternativo en el que se demuestra que Turquía tiene diferentes formas de crear y proyectar la imagen del país. Siguiendo, a la perspectiva constructivista, la cual establece cómo la identidad nacional, kemalista y neootomana que configura la política exterior de Turquía ha sido construida, cómo es comprendida y cómo esta comprensión da lugar a los intereses nacionales que guían su política exterior.

La transformación del sistema de partidos políticos en Turquía entre 2001 y 2014

El propósito de esta investigación es analizar los cambios que trajo consigo la llegada del Partido de la Justicia y Desarrollo al poder (AKP), en Turquía. Este partido se presentó como conservador moderado y democrático y esto le permitió llegar al poder y mantenerlo desde 2001 hasta la actualidad, pues recibió el apoyo de diversos grupos políticos. La noción general que dio el AKP a la opinión pública era que un partido conservador estaba iniciando un proceso democrático real en Turquía. Sin embargo, el líder del AKP y sus seguidores viraron, desde el 2007, hacia el islamismo. Usando la teoría del clivaje social, propuesta Stein Rokkan y Seymour Lipset, se intenta demostrar que los cambios realizados por el AKP fueron una estrategia para blindarse en el poder, pero el sistema de partidos mantuvo la lógica de los clivajes tradicionales y el clivaje islamismo-kemalismo se consolidó como el principal.

La política exterior turca en el marco del Complejo de Seguridad Regional de Medio Oriente. Del soft power al smart power. (2002 - 2013)

Dada la confluencia de Turquía en Asia, Medio Oriente, los Balcanes y Europa, el gobierno está en la necesidad de responder a los desafíos de ser un Estado pivote. Es en este punto donde su política exterior se convierte en la mayor herramienta para sobresalir y sobrevivir en un ambiente heterogéneo. El objetivo de esta monografía de grado es analizar la política exterior turca en el marco del Complejo de Seguridad Regional de Medio Oriente a partir de los aportes de la Escuela de Copenhague y su Teoría de los Complejos de Seguridad Regional, para comprender sus estrategias de soft y hard power en su política exterior a fin de analizar si se consolidó un smart power que permita posicionar a Turquía en una potencia regional.

Erdoğan moves against 'parallel state'

Provides an analysis of the the deteriorating relationship between Turkey's ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) and the Gülen Movement. 

Electromyographic preactivation pattern of the gluteus medius during weight-bearing functional tasks in women with and without anterior knee pain

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey

Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.

トルコにおける2015年総選挙とエルドアン体制の政策変容

In Turkey, the political system in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan plays the most important role – the "Erdoğan regime" – has been in place since November 2002. After Erdoğan’s party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), won the general elections and he became the prime minster, they were successful in maintaining the single-party administration over ten years. Even since becoming the president and devolving the premiership to Ahmet Davutoğlu in August 2014, Erdoğan has been at the center of the Turkish parliamentary system. However, in the Turkish general elections in June 2015, the AKP failed to get a majority of parliamentary seats for the first time, and the Erdoğan regime seemed to be faced with a crisis. The regime was able to regain the single-party administration in the early general elections in November 2015 by carrying out significant political change after their first electoral defeat. In this sense, for Turkey and the Erdoğan regime, the year 2015 was not only the year of the election, but also of political change. This paper analyzes these two general elections in 2015 and the changes of the political tendencies of the Erdoğan regime which have been observed since the general elections in June 2015 in particular. It also focuses on the changes in the strategies and the relationships among Turkish political actors including President Erdoğan, the AKP government, and the other major political parties.

Secularism, Sharia, and the Turkish Financial Markets

The financial markets in Turkey provide a laboratory to help resolve these competing views. Islamic law or Sharia contains a number of proscriptions that directly affect financial practices. The payment and receipt of interest is prohibited; so are most kinds of commercial insurance. These interpretations provided the impetus in the Islamic world for the creation of a class of banks that sought to offer Sharia compliant services. The first Islamic Banks in Turkey began operations in the 1980s. Their entry was initially tepid, in no small part because of secularist principles. Islamic financial institutions could not overtly advertise their religious orientation. The country had no “Islamic” banks, only finance houses. They were not Sharia compliant but “interest-free.” Moreover, the government left them in an uncertain regulatory status and subjected them to restrictions on growth. In this environment, the Islamic banks remained a peripheral part of the financial system. With the election of the AKP in 2002, however, the environment for Islamic banks in Turkey changed. Limitations on branch networks and capital raising were lifted. The government removed restrictions on the issuance of Sharia compliant bonds. Officials from the Islamic banks were appointed to the highest levels of government. This Article does several things. First, it examines principles of Islam that affect banking practices, with a particular emphasis on deposit insurance and credit cards. Second, the Article discusses the emergence of secularism in Turkey and the introduction of Islamic banks into the Turkish financial markets. The Article then examine their evolution, with particular emphasis on the changes implemented by the AKP. Finally, the Article examines the impact of these reforms, and what that impact says about Islamic influence in Turkey.

Turkey votes: Part I - The storm before the election. EPC Commentary, 26 March 2014

At an election rally on 20 March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared he wanted to “root out Twitter, no matter what the international community thought”. A few hours later Twitter was shut down. The decision backfired. Turkey’s some 12 million Twitter users immediately found ways to circumnavigate the ban; it highlighted the increasingly authoritarian trend of Erdoğan; and it brought immediate condemnation from numerous foreign leaders. The move has been viewed by many Turks as part of an operation to cover up a corruption probe that has consumed Turkey since 17 December, before key local elections on 30 March. The elections, which will be followed by Presidential election in August and political ones expected in 2015, have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s popularity, and are set to shape Turkey’s political landscape. A lot is at stake as a big win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not only be used by Erdoğan to justify his response to the corruption scandal but also risks consolidating his increasingly authoritarian style of governance.

Turkey votes: Part II - Erdoğan reloaded. EPC Commentary, 3 April 2014

On 30 March, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) scooped a significant victory in local elections, taking almost 44 percent of the vote despite accusations of corruption, undermining the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. While there have been claims of election fraud and the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has demanded recounts in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara, it is clear that even allowing for some level of fraud the win was substantial and more than most people expected. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reached a juncture. He has two choices: return to the path of democracy after a period of democratic back-sliding which included passing several controversial reforms such as a new internet law which led to the recent banning of Twitter and Youtube; or alternatively he can forge ahead with his much talked of revenge campaign against those he has accused of creating a “parallel state” and conspiring to remove him from power. Given that Erdoğan viewed this election as a referendum on his popularity and leadership there is a serious risk that he will do the latter; using the significant mandate given to him to do whatever he wants, including further cracking down on democracy.

Helpless and lonely: Turkey's attitude towards the war in Syria. OSW Commentary No. 136, 09.05.2014

The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the efficiency of Turkey’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkey’s security in recent decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a final conclusion regarding the Syrian civil war’s importance for Turkey. However, it can be said today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankara’s influence over the course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihadist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in the conflict, during the past year Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive and focused mainly on defending Turkey’s territory. However, this policy offers no security guarantees and does not prevent the country’s regional position from weakening, especially in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the country fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assad’s forces; most probably it could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assad’s army, could be considered as a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government has been struggling at home.

The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns of Turkish Middle East policy. OSW Commentary No. 142, 29.07.2014

The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entangled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both Ankara’s options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited. Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and finally the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen.