System to outline the graduatestudents

Objective: to evaluate the system to outline the graduate students from the Post-Graduate Programs of CAPES Medicine III area. Method: it was analyzed the book of indicators and the Document of Area of the Post-Graduate Programs of Surgery, also checking the literature about this issue. Results: there was a paucity of data from most of the programs, as regards to the methods for evaluation of graduate students. The current system lacks a standard and an institutional support to outline the graduate students. In the public system there is a concentration of postgraduate students in Medicine; however, they represent a small part of those Brazilians students who finished their graduation courses in Medicine. In the current context, the quest for the post graduate courses and consequently for a research field or even a teaching career, has been replaced by the private sector jobs and the labor market, both in non-academic assistance activities. Conclusion: it is imperative to establish not only science and technology innovation policies but also educational and health policies acting harmoniously and stimulating the qualification and the teaching career, improving the post-graduate courses. It is necessary to develop a single form under the institutional guidance of CAPES with the conception of a National Program for Graduate Student in order to consolidate guidelines to mapping the graduate students of post-graduate programs in surgery, in our country.

Mentorointiohjelman kehittäminen toimintatutkimuksen keinoin

Tutkielma on toimintatutkimus mentoroinnin kehittämisestä Osuuskauppa Hämeenmaassa. Tutkielman tavoitteena on ollut suunnitella mentorointiohjelma osuuskaupalle ja kehittää sen sisältöä saatujen tutkimustulosten perusteella sekä kuvata mentoroinnin tuomia hyötyjä ohjelman osallistujille ennen ohjelman päättymistä. Mentorointi on keskeinen osa S-ryhmän osaamisen johtamista. Sen avulla voidaan kehittää tärkeitä osaamisia ja suunnata oppimista organisaation tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi. Mentorointi tukee henkilöstöstrategian mukaista omaehtoista oppimista, jossa yksilöt ottavat vastuun oman ammattitaitonsa ylläpitämisestä ja kehittämisestä organisaation tuella. Tutkielman viitekehykseen on koottu mentoroinnin ja mentorointiohjelman kehittämiseen liittyviä teorioita ja näkökulmia. Viitekehyksen pohjalta on suunniteltu mentorointiohjelman sisältö ja valmennusmateriaalit. Suunnittelu- ja toteutusprosessi on kuvattu tutkielmassa toimintatutkimuksen luonteen mukaisesti. Ohjelmaa ja sen tuomia hyötyjä osallistujille on arvioitu työssä kirjallisen palautekyselyn ja teemahaastatteluiden avulla. Tutkielman keskeisiä tuloksia ovat ohjelman suunnittelua tukeneen viite-kehyksen kokoaminen ja mentorointiohjelman toteuttaminen sille asetettujen tavoitteiden mukaisesti. Ohjelmaa on kehitetty tutkimustulosten perusteella ja tietoa mentoroinnin hyödyistä osallistujien näkökulmasta on kerätty.

Sivistyksestä sivilisaatioon. Kulttuurikäsitys J. V. Snellmanin historiallisessa ajattelussa

From Bildung to Civilisation. Conception of Culture in J. V. Snellman’s Historical Thinking The research explores Johan Vilhelm Snellman’s (1806–1881) conception of culture in the context of his historical thinking. Snellman was a Finnish, Swedish-speaking journalist, teacher and thinker, who held a central position in the Finnish national discourse during the nineteenth century. He has been considered as one of the leading theorists of a Finnish nation, writing widely about the themes such as the advancement of the national education, Finnish language and culture. Snellman is already a widely studied person in Finnish intellectual history, often characterised as a follower of G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophical system. My own research introduces a new kind of approach on Snellman’s texts, emphasising the conceptual level of his thought. With this approach, my aim is to broaden the Finnish research tradition on conceptual history. I consider my study as a cultural history of concepts, belonging also to the field of intellectual history. My focus is on one hand on the close reading of Snellman’s texts and on the other hand on contextualising his texts to the European intellectual tradition of the time. A key concept of Snellman’s theoretical thinking is his concept of bildning, which can be considered as a Swedish counterpart of the German concept of Bildung. The Swedish word incorporated all the main elements of the German concept. It could mean education or the so-called high culture, but most fundamentally it was about the self-formation of the individual. This is also the context in which Snellman’s concept of bildning has often been interpreted. In the study, I use the concept of bildning as a starting point of my research but I broaden my focus on the cognate concepts such as culture (kultur), spirit (anda) and civilisation. The purpose of my study is thus to illustrate how Snellman used and modified these concepts and from these observations to draw a conclusion about the nature of his conception of culture. Snellman was an early Finnish philosopher of history but also interested in the practice of the writing of history. He did not write any historical presentations himself but followed the publications in the field of history and introduced European historical writing to the Finnish, Swedish-speaking reading audience in his newspapers. The primary source material consists of different types of Snellman’s texts, including philosophical writings, lecture material, newspaper articles and private letters. I’m reading Snellman’s texts in the context of other texts produced both by his Finnish predecessors and contemporaries and by Swedish, German and French writers. Snellman’s principal philosophical works, Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit (1841) and Läran om staten (1842), were both written abroad. Both of the works were contributions to contemporary debates on the international level, especially in Germany and Sweden. During the 1840s and 1850s Snellman had two newspapers of his own, Saima and Litteraturblad, which were directed towards the Swedish-speaking educated class. Both of the newspapers were very popular and their circulations were among the largest of their day in Finland. The topics of his articles and reviews covered literature, poetry, philosophy and education as well as issues concerning the economic, industrial and technical development in Finland. In his newspapers Snellman not only brought forth his own ideas but also spread the knowledge of European events and ideas to his readers. He followed very carefully the cultural and political situation in Western Europe. He also followed European magazines and newspapers and was well acquainted with German, French and also English literature – and of course Swedish literature to with which he had the closest ties. In his newspapers Snellman wrote countless number of literary reviews and critics, introducing his readers to European literature. The study consists of three main chapters in which I explore my research question in three different, yet overlapping contexts. In the first of these chapters, I analyse Snellman’n theoretical thinking and his concepts of bildning, kultur, anda and civilisation in the context of earlier cultural discourse in Finland as well as the tradition of German idealistic philosophy and neo-humanism. With the Finnish cultural discourse I refer to the early cultural discussion in Finland, which emerged after the year 1809, when Finland became an autonomous entity of its own as a Grand Duchy of Russia. Scholars of the Academy of Turku opened a discussion on the themes such as the state of national consciousness, the need for national education and the development of the Finnish language as a national language of Finland. Many of these academics were also Snellman’s teachers in the early years of his academic career and Snellman clearly formulated his own ideas in the footsteps of these Finnish predecessors. In his theoretical thinking Snellman was a collectivist; according to him an individual should always be understood in connection with the society, its values and manners, as well as to the traditions of a culture where an individual belongs to. In his philosophy of the human spirit Snellman was in many ways a Hegelian but his notion of education or ‘bildning’ includes also elements that connect him with the wider tradition of German intellectual history, namely the neo-humanist tradition and, at least to some extent, to the terminology of J. G. Herder or J. G. Fichte, for example. In this chapter, I also explore Snellman’s theory of history. In his historical thinking Snellman was an idealist, believing in the historical development of the human spirit (Geist in German language). One can characterise his theory of history by stating that it is a mixture of a Hegelian triumph of the spirit and Herderian emphasis on humanity (Humanität) and the relative nature of ‘Bildung’. For Snellman, the process of ‘bildning’ or ‘Bildung’ is being realised in historical development through the actions of human beings. Snellman believed in the historical development of the human civilization. Still Snellman himself considered that he had abandoned Hegel’s idea about the process of world history. Snellman – rightly or wrongly – criticised Hegel of emphasising the universal end of history (the realisation of the freedom of spirit) at the expense of the historical plurality and the freedom of each historical era. Snellman accused Hegel of neglecting the value and independency of different historical cultures and periods by imposing the abstract norm, the fulfilment of the freedom of spirit, as the ultimate goal of history. The historicist in Snellman believed in the individuality of each historical period; each historical era or culture had values, traditions and modes of thought of its own. This historicist in Snellman could not accept the talk about one measure or the end of history. On the other hand Snellman was also a universalist. He believed that mankind had a common task and that task was the development of ‘Bildung’, freedom or humanity. The second main chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I explore the Finnish nationalistic discourse from the cultural point of view by analysing the notions such as a nation, national spirit or national language and showing how Snellman formulated his own ideas in a dialogic situation, participating in the Finnish discourse but also reacting to international discussions on the themes of the nation and nationality. For Snellman nationality was to a great extent the collective knowledge and customs or practices of the nation. Snellman stated that nationality is to be considered as a form of ‘bildning’. This could be seen not simply as affection for the fatherland but also for the mental identity of the nation, its ways of thinking, its practices, national language, customs and laws, the history of the nation. The simplest definition of nationality that Snellman gives is that nationality is the social life of the people. In the second part of the chapter I exam Snellman’s historical thinking and his understanding about historical development, interaction between different nations and cultures in the course of history, as well as the question of historical change; how do cultures or civilisations develop and who are the creators of culture? Snellman did not believe in one dominating culture but understood the course of history as a dialogue between different cultures. On the other hand, his views are very Eurocentric – here he follows the ideas of Hegel or for example the French historian François Guizot – for Snellman Europe represented the virtue of pluralism; in Europe one could see the diversity of cultures which, on the other hand, were fundamentally based on a common Christian tradition. In the third main chapter, my focus is on the writing of history, more precisely on Snellman’s ideas on the nature of history as a science and on the proper way of writing historical presentations. Snellman wrote critics on the works of history and introduced his readers to the writing of history especially in France, Sweden and German-speaking area – in some extend also in Britain. Snellman’s collectivistic view becomes evident also in his reviews on historical writing. For Snellman history was not about the actions of the states and their heads, nor about the records of ruling families and battles fought. He repeatedly stressed that history is a discipline that seeks to provide a total view of a phenomenon. A historian should not only collect information on historical events, since this information touches only the surface of a certain epoch or civilisation; he has to understand an epoch as totality. This required an understanding about the major contours in history, connections between civilisations and an awareness of significant turning points in historical development. In addition, it required a holistic understanding about a certain culture or historical era, including also the so-called inner life of a specific nation, a common people and their ways of life. Snellman wrote explicitly about ‘cultural history’ in his texts, referring to this kind of broad understanding of a society. In historical writing Snellman found this kind of broader view from the works of the French historians such as François Guizot and Jules Michelet. In all of these chapters, I elaborate the conceptual dimension of Snellman’s historical thinking. In my study I argue that Snellman not only adopted the German concepts of Bildung or Kultur in his own thinking but also developed the Swedish concepts in a way that include personal and innovative aspects. Snellman’s concept of bildning is not only a translation from ‘Bildung’ but he uses the Swedish concept in a versatile way that includes both the moral aspect of human development and social dimension of a human life. Along with ‘bildning’ Snellman used also the terms ‘kultur’ and ‘civilisation’ when referring to the totality of a certain nation or historical era, including both the so-called high culture (arts, science, religion) and the modes of thought as well as ways of life of the people as a whole. Unlike many of his Finnish contemporaries, Snellman did not use civilisation as a negative concept, lacking the moral essence of German term ‘Bildung’ or ‘Kultur’. Instead, for Snellman civilisation was a neutral term and here he comes close to the French tradition of using the term. In the study I argue that Snellman’s conception of culture in fact includes a synthesis of the German tradition of ‘Bildung’ and the French tradition of ‘civilisation’.

Adult education policy in the European Union during the Lisbon decade : the shift to vocational adult learning and work skills matching

This doctoral dissertation investigates the adult education policy of the European Union (EU) in the framework of the Lisbon agenda 2000–2010, with a particular focus on the changes of policy orientation that occurred during this reference decade. The year 2006 can be considered, in fact, a turning point for the EU policy-making in the adult learning sector: a radical shift from a wide--ranging and comprehensive conception of educating adults towards a vocationally oriented understanding of this field and policy area has been observed, in particular in the second half of the so--called ‘Lisbon decade’. In this light, one of the principal objectives of the mainstream policy set by the Lisbon Strategy, that of fostering all forms of participation of adults in lifelong learning paths, appears to have muted its political background and vision in a very short period of time, reflecting an underlying polarisation and progressive transformation of European policy orientations. Hence, by means of content analysis and process tracing, it is shown that the new target of the EU adult education policy, in this framework, has shifted from citizens to workers, and the competence development model, borrowed from the corporate sector, has been established as the reference for the new policy road maps. This study draws on the theory of governance architectures and applies a post-ontological perspective to discuss whether the above trends are intrinsically due to the nature of the Lisbon Strategy, which encompasses education policies, and to what extent supranational actors and phenomena such as globalisation influence the European governance and decision--making. Moreover, it is shown that the way in which the EU is shaping the upgrading of skills and competences of adult learners is modeled around the needs of the ‘knowledge economy’, thus according a great deal of importance to the ‘new skills for new jobs’ and perhaps not enough to life skills in its broader sense which include, for example, social and civic competences: these are actually often promoted but rarely implemented in depth in the EU policy documents. In this framework, it is conveyed how different EU policy areas are intertwined and interrelated with global phenomena, and it is emphasised how far the building of the EU education systems should play a crucial role in the formation of critical thinking, civic competences and skills for a sustainable democratic citizenship, from which a truly cohesive and inclusive society fundamentally depend, and a model of environmental and cosmopolitan adult education is proposed in order to address the challenges of the new millennium. In conclusion, an appraisal of the EU’s public policy, along with some personal thoughts on how progress might be pursued and actualised, is outlined.

Tietoisuuden ongelma

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

Soraääniä, sitaatteja ja suunnitelmallisuutta. Moniäänisyys Eira Stenbergin romaanituotannossa

Tutkin väitöskirjassani Eira Stenbergin (s. 1943) romaanituotannon moniäänisyyttä, joka liittyy niin subjektiin, kertomisen prosessiin kuin todellisuuskäsityksiin. Aineistonani ovat Stenbergin 1980–1990-luvulla kirjoittamat, tutkimusongelmani kannalta keskeiseen ajanjaksoon kuuluvat romaanit Paratiisin vangit (1984), Häikäisy (1987), Kuun puutarhat (1990) sekä Gulliverin tytär (1993). 1980-luvulla postmodernista tuli kirjallisen kulttuurin keskeisimpiä aiheita Suomessa, ja subjektista tuli ongelma jopa siinä määrin että puhuttiin sen kuolemasta. Ääni oli 1980-luvulla osa subjektia koskevaa keskustelua: yhtäältä nousevan feministisen liikkeen identiteettipoliittisena ja emansipatorisena metaforana, toisaalta jälkistrukturalismin antihumanismin uhkakuvana, joka koski subjektin ääntä alkuperän lähteenä ja persoonan ilmaisuna. Äänen käsitteen voidaan katsoa implikoivan jonkinlaista käsitystä subjektista, ja tarkastelenkin tutkimuksessani erityisesti henkilöhahmoja, kertojia ja kertomisen prosessia, mutta myös tekijän suunnitelmallisuutta ja kuulijaa kohti orientoitumista. Yhdistelen tutkimuksessani retorista kertomuksen teoriaa dekonstruktioon sekä feministisiin subjektiteorioihin. Myös Mihail Bahtinin käsitys moniäänisestä romaanista on työssäni keskeinen. Problematisoin tutkimuksessani äänen kytköksen sisimmän ilmaisuun, omistamiseen ja auktoriteettiin ja ymmärrän sen keskustelualueena, jossa kohtaavat erilaiset arvot ja näkemykset maailmasta. Tällöin kaikenkattava puhe subjektin kuolemasta sekä käsitykset 1980-luvun kirjallisuudesta maailmasta vieraantuneena ja yksityisen alueelle vetäytyvänä problematisoituvat. Stenbergin tuotannon perusteella voi sanoa, että kirjallisuuden äänet saavat merkityksensä vasta erilaisina äänensävyinä konkreettisissa ja ainutkertaisissa konteksteissa. Tämä viittaa tarpeeseen ymmärtää kirjallisuusteoreettisessa keskustelussa usein historiattomana ja universaalina nähty käsite historiaan paikantuneena: eivät vain erityiset aineistot, vaan myös erityiset kontekstit määrittelevät äänen saamia merkityksiä.

School Bullies’ Quest for Power: Implications for Group Dynamics and Intervention

Bullying is characterized by an inequality of power between perpetrator and target. Findings that bullies can be highly popular have helped redefine the old conception of the maladjusted school bully into a powerful individual exerting influence on his peers from the top of the peer status hierarchy. Study I is a conceptual paper that explores the conditions under which a skillful, socially powerful bully can use the peer group as a means of aggression and suggests that low cohesion and low quality of friendships make groups easier to manipulate. School bullies’ high popularity should be a major obstacle for antibullying efforts, as bullies are unlikely to cease negative actions that are rewarding, and their powerful position could discourage bystanders from interfering. Using data from the Finnish program KiVa, Study II supported the hypothesis that antibullying interventions are less effective with popular bullies in comparison to their unpopular counterparts. In order to design interventions that can address the positive link between popularity and aggression, it is necessary to determine in which contexts bullies achieve higher status. Using an American sample, Study III examined the effects of five classroom features on the social status that peers accord to aggressive children, including classroom status hierarchy, academic level and grade level, controlling for classroom mean levels of aggression and ethnic distribution. Aggressive children were more popular and better liked in fifth grade relative to fourth grade and in classrooms of higher status hierarchy. Surprisingly, the natural emergence of status hierarchies in children’s peer groups has long been assumed to minimize aggression. Whether status hierarchies hinder or promote bullying is a controversial question in the peer relations’ literature. Study IV aimed at clarifying this debate by testing the effects of the degree of classroom status hierarchy on bullying. Higher hierarchy was concrrently associated with bullying and predictive of higher bullying six months later. As bullies’ quest for power is increasingly acknowledged, some researchers suggest teaching bullies to attain the elevated status they yearn for through prosocial acts. Study V cautions against such solutions by reviewing evidence that prosocial behaviors enacted with the intention of controlling others can be as harmful as aggression.

Kallet til livets embete : mødre i helse og lidelse

Mothers represent the natural caring. Natural caring is the object of caring science and of research interest because it establishes the central core of professional caring. In this study, we encounter patients who are mothers in need of care in a psychiatric context. Motherhood involves taking responsibility that extends beyond one's own life, because the child represents possibilities in a yet unknown future. Understanding and knowledge about the mothers' struggle in health and suffering are of crucial importance to enable clinical practice to make provisions for and adapt to the individual patient. The overall purpose of this dissertation is to illuminate how the innermost essence of caring emerges in health and suffering in patients who are mothers in psychiatric care. The purpose of the study in a clinical sense is to seek to understand and illuminate the patient's inner world in health and suffering in terms of contextual, existential, ontological and ethical dimensions. The dissertation is exploratory and descriptive in nature and encompasses induction, deduction and abduction as logics tools of reasoning. A theoretical model of natural caring and a universal theoretical model of the innermost essence of caring is developed as seen from the patient's world in a psychiatric context. The dissertation is anchored in human science's view of the human being and the world and in caring science's perspective. Caring science's view of the human being as a unity comprising body, soul and spirit is central in the study's concept of the patient. This multi-dimensional conception of the human being encompasses the dissertation's basic values and is decisive for choice of methodology. Hermeneutic epistemology guided the interpretation of the empirical data, the paradigmatic theses and assumptions. The dialectical movement in interpretation moves back and forth between empirical data, caring science theory and philosophical theory and reveals deeper insight into meaningful content in the clinical context. The interpretation process comprises four levels of abstraction: rational, contextual, existential and ontological. Hermeneutic philosophy guides the inductive and deductive approach to interpretation, as well as the movement between the clinical context and the caring science paradigm. In this encounter between the visible and invisible reality, the image of natural caring – motherliness emerged. The dissertation consists of four studies. The first study is a systematic review of nineteen research articles. The three other studies are hermeneutical interpretations based on text materials from open interviews. Fifteen participants were interviewed, all of whom are mothers of children between 0 and 18 years of age. All were outpatients in the psychiatric specialist health service. In the interpretation process, the mothers' struggle in health and suffering emerges as a struggle between the inner and outer world. Being a mother and patient in health and suffering in a psychiatric context means to struggle to be oneself, to create oneself, to live and realize one's good deeds as a mother and human being. To be oneself, to possess oneself as a mother is not only a question of tending, playing and learning in order to master a practical situation or to survive. It involves constituting a deep, inner desire to courageously create oneself so that the child is able to realize his or her potential in health and suffering. Motherliness manifests itself in caring as a call to ministering humanity and life. The voice of motherliness is understood as the voice of life—the eternal, inner call of love and freedom. The inner call craves fulfilment. Motherliness in natural caring does not retreat. Motherliness defines the Other as freedom and proceeds without regard for all other exterior requirements to realizing wellbeing. The inner essence of caring is attentive, aware and heeds the call of the heart. The innermost essence of caring is to be and to make oneself responsible for the Other. Responsibility cannot be relinquished; free choice consists in whether or not to follow the call. To renounce the inner call to responsibility is to deny oneself and one's dignity as a human being. The theoretical models provide clinical and systematic caring science with knowledge and understanding based on the natural caring spirit inherent in the human being. The study elucidates and strengthens the ontological basic assumptions about the human being as a unity of body, soul and spirit, the sanctity of the human being and the core of caring, ethos. The results of the dissertation will provide clinical practice with knowledge about the inner movements of the mothers' souls in relation to their responsibility as mothers and human beings. Being able to understand the basic conditions for responsibility is crucial for developing care that encompasses mother and child and the mutual relationship between them. This is basic knowledge for developing attitudes and actions that meet and provide for the needs of the patient as mother and as a whole, suffering human being.

They Do Things Differently There. Essays on Cultural History

This collection of Finnish essays in cultural history will be revelatory for anglophone readers. Pioneering in the study of cultural history as early as the nineteenth century, by the 1930s Finnish scholars already deployed the broad conception of 'culture' as embracing 'everyday life' that is usually thought of as emerging in the work of Raymond Williams decades later. These essays emanate from the Department of Cultural History, established at the University of Turku in 1972, and its partner department at the University of Lapland. The collection signals new genealogies of cultural historiography in general, and in its distinctively Finnish inflections.

Michal Kalecki, um pioneiro da teoria econômica do desenvolvimento

Kalecki made important contributions to development economics, which rank him among the founding fathers of this area of our discipline. The objective of this paper is to give an account of his contributions, and in particular of his conception of the peculiarities and the way of functioning of the underdeveloped economies, and of the barriers that limits their capacity for high and sustained long run growth. As most socialist economists of his time, he was skeptic about the possibilities of overcoming underdevelopment under capitalism. However, in contradistinction to other pioneers of development economics, Kalecki did not stress the international forces that hamper development, but put the accent rather in the internal institutions and social and political determinants. In particular, the feudal and semi-feudal conditions in agriculture, the reduced market ensuing from income concentration and widespread monopolization of the economy, and the lack of willingness of entrepreneurs to carry out the necessary investments. Accordingly, his economic policy recommendations emphasized also the domestic aspects involved.

Keynes e o conceito de capital: reflexões epistemológicas a respeito das premissas sraffianas da teoria geral

Keynes and the concept of capital: some epistemological observations in regard to the Sraffian premises of the General Theory. This article aims to examine the conception of the nature of capital used by Keynes in the General Theory, to show to what extent this concept is similar to Sraffa's conception, and to highlight the implications related to this concept, in terms of structural instability. So I will study the mechanisms that explain the investment decision in an environment with strong uncertainty, the modalities of aggregation of different generations of capital and the instability of equilibrium. The convergence between the keynesian and the Sraffian approaches comes from this common conception of capital. Finally, i will examine the implications in regard to the structure of the aggregate models.

Dois métodos ou duas antropologias?

This is a commentary to a well-known paper of Bresser-Pereira: The two methods and the hard core of economics. Therefore, it target a very suggestive article that seeks to examine the conceptions of man of classical political economy and Keynesian economics in contrast to the reductive conception of man found in positive economic theory, especially in neoclassical theory. It shows that both conceptions at large think with abstracts economic men. However, the first one reasons with individuals who are determined by the historical and social structures of the capitalistic economic system. The second one seeks to present them in a formal way, as if they were mere pieces of a large automaton, i.e., the mercantile system as a large and standardized mechanism. In the end, Marx is distinguished because he does not reflect based on a static anthropological foundation. For him, men are subjects that become because they can realize themselves only in the course of history.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The relationship between creativity and moral judgment

A sample of 50 male and female subjects ranging in age from 12 to 73 were divided into three groups according to the scale of maturity of moral judgment developed by Lawrence Kohlberg. Subjects were also tested on a measure of creativity developed by Torrance after the formulations of Guilford in order to test the hypothesis that the re^- lationship between creativity and maturity of moral judgment is curvilinear. Researchers have failed to develop any working hypothesis concerning the relationship between creativity and moral judgment or postulate any consistent theoretical framework concerning the possible relationship between these two constructs. The empirical investigation involved a scientific testing of a random selection of elementary subjects9 high school adolescents, and creative adults. Tests included Kohlberg8s Moral dilemmas and Guilford's Product Improvement Task. A trend analysis was conducted to reveal whether or not a curvilinear relationship existed between the independent variable (Moral Maturity Stages) and the de~ pe dent variable (creativity performance under each level). Curvilinear trends were observed in two out of four creativity subscales but were not statistically significant. It was concluded that these contradictory findings were due to the relatively small number of subjects tested, the narrow range or moral judgment scores, and the limited conception of creativity defined by the creativity measure used (The Product Improvement Task). It was suggested that an instrument assessing an identity status would be most useful as well as a creativity measure better suited for a theory of creativity essentially developmental in perspective.

A Pragmatic Approach to Ethical Inquiry on Transhuman Athletes and Gene Doping in Sport

Gene doping is the most recent addition to the list of banned practices formulated by the World Anti-doping Agency. It is a subset of doping that utilizes the technology involved in gene therapy. The latter is still in the experimental phase but has the potential to be used as a type of medical treatment involving alterations of a patient‘s genes. I apply a pragmatic form of ethical inquiry to evaluate the application of this medical innovation in the context of sport for performance-enhancement purposes and how it will affect sport, the individual, society and humanity at large. I analyze the probable ethical implications that will emerge from such procedures in terms of values that lie at the heart of the major arguments offered by scholars on both affirmative and opposing sides of the debate on gene doping, namely fairness, autonomy and the conception of what it means to be human.