How contracts and enforcement explain transaction outcomes

This study considers the influence of contracts on enforcement and the subsequent performance impact of aligned and misaligned enforcement. We define enforcement as a corrective action aimed at remedying problems occurring in the transaction. First we explain the role of contracts and show that at the component level, contracts can both increase and decrease enforcement. Building on an alignment perspective and accounting for the endogeneity of enforcement, we use these contractual components and variables related to enforcement to predict the occurrence of enforcement. We use such predictions to show that aligned enforcement results in higher performance. We also show that the performance impact of misaligned enforcement is relatively greater for transactions where enforcement is not expected. We conduct the study using a unique dataset reporting on 971 business transactions across a wide range of industries.

Contracts for the sale of land and personal property:the equitable interests of the purchaser

As property lawyers, we are all familiar with the general principle that a contract for the sale of land, which is capable of specific performance, operates in equity so as to confer a trust on the purchaser pending completion of the sale. Although some controversy exists as to the exact nature of the trust, it is well established that, upon exchange of contracts, equity will ‘‘treat that as done which ought to be done’’1 with the consequence that the purchaser acquires equitable ownership even though full (legal) title to the land will not pass until completion (and registration). As land is unique, specific performance is readily available in the context of sales of land where damages would, clearly, not be an adequate remedy. The same cannot be said for contracts for the purchase of personal property where invariably the subject matter is not unique and where a substitute can easily be acquired in the open market. In circumstances, however, where the property is unique or scarce (for example, a rare painting or vintage car), the maxim that ‘‘equity treats as done that which ought to be done’’ may be invoked so as to confer on the seller an equitable obligation to transfer the property to the purchaser in fulfilment of the contract. Where, therefore, the contract is specifically enforceable in this way, the seller, it is submitted, will again hold the property on trust for the purchaser where, as in a contract for the sale of land, there is an interval between the date of the contract and completion of the sale. The notion that a seller holds personal property upon trust for the purchaser pending completion of the sale is admittedly controversial, but this article seeks to argue that the same principles governing equity’s intervention in sales of land should apply in the context of sales of personalty. It is submitted that equity’s role in imposing a trust on the vendor both in relation to sales of land and personalty may be important in safeguarding the interests of the purchaser prior to, as well as after, completion of the transaction.

How many contracts in an auction sale

Making sense of auction sales, in terms of English contract law, is no easy task. Despite the common perception of hammers hitting blocks, signifying the creation of the basic sale contract,1 a typical auction sale necessarily involves the making of several forms of contract other than the obvious primary sale agreement. The purpose of this article, therefore, is threefold, namely, to (1) examine these various forms of contractual relationship2 which may come into existence as a result of a traditional (face to face) auction sale; (2) consider specifically the selling of land at public auction with a view to advocating a change in the law requiring the formality of writing for sales contracts of land for both private and public auctions, and (3) compare briefly the contractual elements of an online ascending model of auction sale typified by the eBay phenomenon.

Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic industries

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium.

Exclusive contracts with vertically differentiated products

In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to deal exclusively with retailers. If the extent of consumers' heterogeneity is small, manufacturers offer exclusive contracts unilaterally. On the other hand, if consumers' valuations differ significantly both manufacturers engage in exclusive contracting.

Reciprocally Exclusive Contracts and Endogenous Quality

Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible contracts, exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, regardless of the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make the choice of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions for qualities under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our final proposition shows that in this case the choice of quality depends exclusively on the valuation of the median consumer.

A fundamentális transzformáció és a referenciapont szerepe a hiányos szerződések elméletében (The role of basic transformation and reference point in the theory of incomplete contracts)

A cikk Oliver Hart és szerzőtársai modelljeinek következtetéseit hasonlítja össze Williamson tranzakciós költségekre vonatkozó nézeteivel. Megmutatja, hogy a két irányzat a vállalat vagy piac kérdéskörében más eszközöket használ, de hasonlóan érvel. Megismerkedhetünk Williamson Harttal szemben megfogalmazott azon kritikájával, hogy Hart modelljeiben az alkunak nincsenek tranzakciós költségei, illetve a kritika kritikájával is. Hart elképzeléseit támasztja alá a tulajdonjogi irányzaton belül nemrégiben kialakult referenciapont-elmélet, amely kísérleti lehetőségeket is nyújt a különböző feltételezések igazolására. ____ The article compares the conclusions from the models of Oliver Hart et al. with the views of Williamson on transaction costs. It shows that the two schools use different means on the question of the firm or the market, but similar reasoning. The author covers Williamson's criticism of Hart that there are no transaction costs in his models, and also the criticism of that criticism. Hart's notions are supported by the recently developed theory of reference point within the property-right trend, which offers chances of experimental proof of the various assumptions.

Exclusive contracts with private information in successive differentiated oligopolies

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. In contrast with the previous literature, exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers selling highly differentiated products, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that exclusive contracts decrease both consumer and social welfare.

A methodological framework for modeling pavement maintenance costs for projects with performance-based contracts

Performance-based maintenance contracts differ significantly from material and method-based contracts that have been traditionally used to maintain roads. Road agencies around the world have moved towards a performance-based contract approach because it offers several advantages like cost saving, better budgeting certainty, better customer satisfaction with better road services and conditions. Payments for the maintenance of road are explicitly linked to the contractor successfully meeting certain clearly defined minimum performance indicators in these contracts. Quantitative evaluation of the cost of performance-based contracts has several difficulties due to the complexity of the pavement deterioration process. Based on a probabilistic analysis of failures of achieving multiple performance criteria over the length of the contract period, an effort has been made to develop a model that is capable of estimating the cost of these performance-based contracts. One of the essential functions of such model is to predict performance of the pavement as accurately as possible. Prediction of future degradation of pavement is done using Markov Chain Process, which requires estimating transition probabilities from previous deterioration rate for similar pavements. Transition probabilities were derived using historical pavement condition rating data, both for predicting pavement deterioration when there is no maintenance, and for predicting pavement improvement when maintenance activities are performed. A methodological framework has been developed to estimate the cost of maintaining road based on multiple performance criteria such as crack, rut and, roughness. The application of the developed model has been demonstrated via a real case study of Miami Dade Expressways (MDX) using pavement condition rating data from Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) for a typical performance-based asphalt pavement maintenance contract. Results indicated that the pavement performance model developed could predict the pavement deterioration quite accurately. Sensitivity analysis performed shows that the model is very responsive to even slight changes in pavement deterioration rate and performance constraints. It is expected that the use of this model will assist the highway agencies and contractors in arriving at a fair contract value for executing long term performance-based pavement maintenance works.

Food service Contracts That Win: Essentials in the Development of a Food service Agreement

The authors provide tips for institutions wanting to place a contract for operation of their food service and for companies and/or individuals in the business of managing food service operations for a fee.

A Methodological Framework for Modeling Pavement Maintenance Costs for Projects with Performance-based Contracts

Performance-based maintenance contracts differ significantly from material and method-based contracts that have been traditionally used to maintain roads. Road agencies around the world have moved towards a performance-based contract approach because it offers several advantages like cost saving, better budgeting certainty, better customer satisfaction with better road services and conditions. Payments for the maintenance of road are explicitly linked to the contractor successfully meeting certain clearly defined minimum performance indicators in these contracts. Quantitative evaluation of the cost of performance-based contracts has several difficulties due to the complexity of the pavement deterioration process. Based on a probabilistic analysis of failures of achieving multiple performance criteria over the length of the contract period, an effort has been made to develop a model that is capable of estimating the cost of these performance-based contracts. One of the essential functions of such model is to predict performance of the pavement as accurately as possible. Prediction of future degradation of pavement is done using Markov Chain Process, which requires estimating transition probabilities from previous deterioration rate for similar pavements. Transition probabilities were derived using historical pavement condition rating data, both for predicting pavement deterioration when there is no maintenance, and for predicting pavement improvement when maintenance activities are performed. A methodological framework has been developed to estimate the cost of maintaining road based on multiple performance criteria such as crack, rut and, roughness. The application of the developed model has been demonstrated via a real case study of Miami Dade Expressways (MDX) using pavement condition rating data from Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) for a typical performance-based asphalt pavement maintenance contract. Results indicated that the pavement performance model developed could predict the pavement deterioration quite accurately. Sensitivity analysis performed shows that the model is very responsive to even slight changes in pavement deterioration rate and performance constraints. It is expected that the use of this model will assist the highway agencies and contractors in arriving at a fair contract value for executing long term performance-based pavement maintenance works.

Temporary contracts and non-protected employment in Argentina, Chile and Perú: incidence and determinants

The diverse kinds of legal temporary contracts and the employment forms that do not comply with legal requirements both facilitate employment adjustment to firms´ requirements and entail labour cost reductions. Their employment incidence depends not only on the economic and labour market evolutions but also on other factors, in particular the historical trajectories followed by labour legislation, state enforcement, and the degree of compliance. To contribute to the understanding of the determinants of the degree of utilization of different employment practices, the study reported in this article explores the use made of the various legal temporary contracts and of precarious employment relationships by private enterprises in three Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile and Peru) during 2003-2012, a period of economic growth, and the explanatory role of diverse factors.