Improving How Listening Skills are Taught in the Efl Classroom: Guidelines to Producing Better Speakers of the English Language

This research paper is concerned with the need to improve how listening skills are taught in the Capeverdian EFL classroom. Teaching English through listening is not an easy task, especially when there are many factors that impede the learning process such as: lack of adequate materials and conditions; lack of qualified teachers with good pronunciation, and lack of innovative approaches to teaching listening skills. If our goal as teachers is to produce good English speakers we must invest in training good listeners. In this work I will focus on the following aspects: an evaluation of how effectively listening skills are taught in the Capeverdian EFL classroom; a look at how we can turn teaching problems into positive solutions; how to improve teaching listening skills and materials and recommendations for best practices in teaching listening skills in the EFL classroom. In conclusion I will include listening activities which reflect these best practices and offer recommendations for further research.

Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study

Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside optionreveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.

Nonparametric bounds on the returns to language skills

This paper applies the theoretical literature on nonparametric bounds ontreatment effects to the estimation of how limited English proficiency (LEP)affects wages and employment opportunities for Hispanic workers in theUnited States. I analyze the identifying power of several weak assumptionson treatment response and selection, and stress the interactions between LEPand education, occupation and immigration status. I show that thecombination of two weak but credible assumptions provides informative upperbounds on the returns to language skills for certain subgroups of thepopulation. Adding age at arrival as a monotone instrumental variable alsoprovides informative lower bounds.

An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games

We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency,converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems.The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with thesame axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

English as a world language: its role as a lingua francaa sociolinguistic profile of students of secondary schools in Santiago Island, in the Archipelago of Cape Verde

Esta tese centra-se em aspectos relevantes do inglês como uma língua universal, no actual contexto globalizado e examina possíveis mudanças relacionadas com o seu uso, em especial no continente africano, particularmente no caso de Cabo Verde, no sentido de ponderar eventuais alternativas nas pedagogias linguísticas no ensino desta língua que impliquem uma adaptação à realidade contemporânea. Uma vez que, nos nossos tempos, o inglês é a língua de eleição para a comunicação intercultural entre povos com várias experiências culturais e linguísticas, o conhecimento deste idioma torna-se, a cada dia que passa, impreterível e indispensável, na interacção intercultural. Em África, as funções desempenhadas pelo inglês são complexas; além da língua inglesa ser usada para comunicação entre etnias, com o estatuto de língua franca, também tem o papel de preservar a identidade nacional e de estabelecer a unidade entre os povos da mesma nação. Por conseguinte, é de considerar talvez ainda com mais pertinência, a adopção de uma nova filosofia de pedagogia de ensino que permita dotar os seus cidadãos de capacidades que lhes possibilitem comunicar de forma inteligível com povos de outras culturas e línguas. O primeiro capítulo aborda aspectos teóricos relacionados com a expansão, comunicação e mudança associadas à língua inglesa e suas implicações no ensino em países onde esta não é língua nativa (L1). O segundo capítulo reflecte, em primeiro lugar, sobre a situação linguística em África e as línguas francas predominantes no continente, incluindo a língua inglesa. Considera também questões relacionadas com o multilinguismo e a identidade, bem como assuntos relacionados com as implicações da diversidade linguística para a educação dos povos africanos.

Three Continents, one Language: Studying English in a Portuguese Landscape (Brazil, Cape Verde and Portugal)

Unlike other languages, English has spread to all continents and become a truly global language, a process observable in countries, like Brazil, Cape Verde, and Portugal, located in three different continents, and sharing a common official language: Portuguese. This relatively recent development has contributed to the wide exposure to English and the growing influence of the language in their societies, being used with lingua franca communicative purposes, which raises pedagogical issues. Our aim is to map the exposure and use of English as a Lingua Franca in these Portuguese speaking countries through a comparative study of the results from three case studies (Berto 2009, Cavalheiro 2008 and Nunes 2010). By taking into consideration the findings from questionnaires answered by students and teachers of English, it compares and contrasts the respondents’ opinions on the profile of English teachers — native vs. non-native —, the varieties of English to be taught, and the language teaching resources available. In addition, it explores the learners’ interests, motives and purposes in relation to English and the potential communicative interactions between all speakers, so as to better understand ELF in English language education, and how these factors affect or should affect pedagogical practices in a Portuguese environment.