Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
11/07/2013
|
| Resumo |
By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Direitos |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a> |
| Palavras-Chave | #Microeconomics #coalitional games #social choice #nash program #implementation #scale invariance #ordinal invariance #randomness |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
