Dual role of the antioxidant enzyme peroxiredoxin 6 in skin carcinogenesis.

The antioxidant enzyme peroxiredoxin 6 (Prdx6) is a key regulator of the cellular redox balance, particularly under stress conditions. We identified Prdx6 as an important player in different phases of skin carcinogenesis. Loss of Prdx6 in mice enhanced the susceptibility to skin tumorigenesis, whereas overexpression of Prdx6 in keratinocytes of transgenic mice had the opposite effect. The tumor-preventive effect of Prdx6, which was observed in a human papilloma virus 8-induced and a chemically induced tumor model, was not due to alterations in keratinocyte proliferation, apoptosis, or in the inflammatory response. Rather, endogenous and overexpressed Prdx6 reduced oxidative stress as reflected by the lower levels of oxidized phospholipids in the protumorigenic skin of Prdx6 transgenic mice and the higher levels in Prdx6-knockout mice than in control animals. In contrast to its beneficial effect in tumor prevention, overexpression of Prdx6 led to an acceleration of malignant progression of existing tumors, revealing a dual function of this enzyme in the pathogenesis of skin cancer. Finally, we found strong expression of PRDX6 in keratinocytes of normal human skin and in the tumor cells of squamous cell carcinomas, indicating a role of Prdx6 in human skin carcinogenesis. Taken together, our data point to the potential usefulness of Prdx6 activators or inhibitors for controlling different stages of skin carcinogenesis.

QuesTInSitu: from tests to routes for assessment in situ activities

Test-based assessment tools are mostly focused on the use of computers. However, advanced Information and Communication Technologies, such as handheld devices, opens up the possibilities of creating new assessment scenarios, increasing the teachers’ choices to design more appropriate tests for their subject areas. In this paper we use the term Computing-Based Testing (CBT) instead of Computer-Based Testing, as it captures better the emerging trends. Within the CBT context, the paper is centred on proposing an approach for “Assessment in situ” activities, where questions have to be answered in front of a real space/location (situ). In particular, we present the QuesTInSitu software implementation that includes both an editor and a player based on the IMS Question and Test Interoperability specification and GoogleMaps. With QuesTInSitu teachers can create geolocated questions and tests (routes), and students can answer the tests using mobile devices with GPS when following a route. Three illustrating scenarios and the results from the implementation of one of them in a real educational situation show that QuesTInSitu enables the creation of innovative, enriched and context-aware assessment activities. The results also indicate that the use of mobile devices and location-based systems in assessment activities facilitates students to put explorative and spatial skills into practice and fosters their motivation, reflection and personal observation.

Elokuva Internetissä : katsaus elokuvaan verkossa sekä suunnitelma Uhripuu-elokuvan julkaisemisesta

Opinnäytetyössäni tarkastellaan Internet-elokuvan historiaa sekä nykyistä tilaa. Käyn läpi yleisimmät katseluohjelmat: QuickTime Player, Windows Media Player, RealPlayer ja Flash Player sekä Internet-elokuvasivustot: YouTube, IFILM, AtomFilm ja Pixoff.net. Kerron myös Flash-elokuvista ja siitä miten Internet on luonut kokonaan uuden elokuvan muodon sekä Internetissä julkaistuista Dogma 2001 The New Rules for Internet Cinema -säännöistä. Käsittelen myös lyhyesti miten Internet-elokuva on vaikuttanut perinteiseen elokuvaan. Käsittelen perinteisen, isolta ruudulta katsottavaksi tehdyn, elokuvan julkaisemista Internetissä. Tarkastelen kahta verkossa julkaistua elokuvaa: Star Wreck ja The Silent City ja käyn läpi miksi ne on julkaistu Internetissä. Star Wreck on tamperelainen poikkeuksellisen kunnianhimoinen amatööriprojekti. The Silent City on taas irlantilaisen 3D-animaattorin, Ruairi Robinsonin, lyhytelokuva, jonka hän on tehnyt työnäytteeksi Hollywoodiin. Käsittelen myös ohjaaja David Lynchin verkkosivut, koska ne ovat Internetissä ainoaa laatuaan ja mainio ympäristö elokuvan julkaisemiseen. Kerron oman Uhripuu-kauhuelokuvani synnystä ja tekoprosessista. Uhripuun idea sai alkunsa Iso-Britanniassa vuoden 2004 alussa. Käsikirjoitus sai lopullisen muotonsa keväällä 2006. Käsittelen miksi ja miten se julkaistaan Internetissä. Kerron elokuvan Internet-sivujen sisällöstä ja sen jaosta eri osiin: Tarina, Rooleissa, Tekijät, Uhripuista, Traileri, Näin tehtiin, Kuvagalleria, E-kortti, Näe/Katso elokuva. Koska olen saanut koulutukseni nimenomaan verkkoviestinnän enkä audiovisuaalisen viestinnän puolella, Uhripuu-elokuvan tekoprosessi on ollut minulle elokuvakoulu. Sen tekemisen aikana olen oppinut elokuvan tekemisestä paljon. Elokuva kuvattiin HD-tarkkuuksilla, jotta kuva ei kärsisi liikaa jälkikäsittelyssä. Mitä tulee elokuvan ja Internetin yhteiseen tulevaisuuteen, näyttää siltä, että nämä kaksi mediaa ovat yhdistymässä yhä enemmän toisiinsa.

On the Structural Difference between the Evolutionary Approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob

We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about the game. In fact, players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs and, in a variant of the strategy, players need not even know that their payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for general finite games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learningrule introduced by Foster and Young.

A general class of adaptative strategies

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies,in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the otherplayers; i.e., there is no "regret." Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [1998]) areparticular cases. The motivation and application of this work come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in thelong-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. The basic tool for the analysis is a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.

On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

Effect of Emotion and Personality on Deviation from Purely Rational Decision-Making

Human decision-making has consistently demonstrated deviation from "pure" rationality. Emotions are a primary driver of human actions and the current study investigates how perceived emotions and personality traits may affect decision-making during the Ultimatum Game (UG). We manipulated emotions by showing images with emotional connotation while participants decided how to split money with a second player. Event-related potentials (ERPs) from scalp electrodes were recorded during the whole decision-making process. We observed significant differences in the activity of central and frontal areas when participants offered money with respect to when they accepted or rejected an offer. We found that participants were more likely to offer a higher amount of money when making their decision in association with negative emotions. Furthermore, participants were more likely to accept offers when making their decision in association with positive emotions. Honest, conscientious, and introverted participants were more likely to accept offers. Our results suggest that factors others than a rational strategy may predict economic decision-making in the UG.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria

We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyzewhich of the players will commit when both players have the possibility todo so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player caneither commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show thatcommitting is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently,risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allowthe conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit.Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.