Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
01/03/2006
|
| Resumo |
We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Direitos |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a> |
| Palavras-Chave | #Microeconomics #Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods #correlated equilibrium #finite games |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
