On the Structural Difference between the Evolutionary Approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
10/07/2013
|
| Resumo |
We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993). |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Direitos |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/</a>) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Evolutionary learning, coordination games, equilibrium selection |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
