Report by Jacob Misner on setting contracts for deepening and clearing ditches and estimates of quantities and costs of marsh drainage

Report by Jacob Misner on setting contracts for deepening and clearing ditches and estimates of quantities and costs of marsh drainage (3 ½ pages, handwritten). This is marked as a copy, July 14, 1855.

Preservation of Agricultural Lands Society (PALS) fonds, 1954-2015, n.d.

Preservation of Agricultural Lands Society [PALS] held its first meeting at Brock University on June 21, 1976. Its first executive consisted of Robert Hoover, Rick Teather, Debbie Kehler and Bill Forster. Some objectives of the organization were "to seek the preservation of valuable farm areas from non-agricultural expansion and development and to foster development and support of federal, provinicial and local policy which will provide a secure financial future for farming." Gracia Janes and John Bacher are some of the organizations' well known advocates. The organization was active in raising public awareness of the issues surrounding encroaching development onto existing agricultural lands. The organization is still active today [2016] in educating the public and attempting to influence governments at all levels to protect valuable agricultural lands.

Letter to A.K. Boomer of the Niagara District Agricultural Society, 1845

Mr. Graham of the Bertie Agricultural Society is writing to obtain information from A.K. Boomer of the Niagara District Agricultural Society. The Niagara District Agricultural Society was established in 1793. Regular meetings and annual fairs were held by the society.

Outlines of a System of polítical Economy; written with a view to prove to government and the country, that the cause of the present agricultural distress is entirely artificial..

UANL

The Effect of Agricultural Zoning on Land Prices, Quebec, 1975-1981

Dans Ce Texte Nous Examinons les Effets de la Loi du Zonage Agricole du Quebec, Proclame En Decembre 1978 Sur le Prix du Sol Dans une Banlieu de Montreal. a L'aide de Donnees Sur les Transactions Normales Faites a Carignan et Saint-Mathias de 1975 a 1981, Nous Estimons, a L'aide des Moindres Carrees Ordinaires, une Equation de Determination du Prix Par Acre Avec Comme Variables Independantes la Dimension du Lot, la Distance de Montreal, les Services Disponibles (Egouts,...) et le Zonage Agricole (Ou Non) du Sol. Nos Resultats Nous Indiquent Que le Zonage Agricole Reduit le Prix D'un Acre de Sol.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Contentious Contracts

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.