Incentives and promotion in wage hierarchies

Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organizations has been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervision tasks and to differences in the skills of the workers. However, many firms now employ workers with similar skills, and then the hierarchical structure can be related to an incentive scheme to ensure that workers supply effort. The model we present investigates how firm owners should determine the optimal wage distribution in order to maximize profits.

Planning for disaster : local government's role in civil preparedness,1975

This handbook deals with the duties and responsibilities of a mayor of a city, a member of a county board of supervisor or a sheriff of a county from the standpoint of their relationship with a county/municipal civil defense and emergency planing administration.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Immigration and housing: rethinking the role of fiscal policies to manage diversity

We study the two key social issues of immigration and housing in lightof each other and analyse which housing policies work best to distributediversity (racial, economic, cultural) equally across our cities and towns. Inparticular, we compare the impact of direct government expenditure andtax incentives on the housing conditions of immigrants in four Europeancountries: France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The analysisshows that the different policies which have been adopted in these countrieshave not succeeded in preventing immigrants from being concentratedin certain neighbourhoods. The reason is that housing benefits andtax incentives are normally “spatially blind”. In our opinion, governmentsshould consider immigration indirectly in their housing policies and, forinstance, distribute social housing more evenly across different areas topromote sustainable levels of diversity.

Water planning law and government.

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done. The question then becomes who has the legal authority or responsibility to do what? Are new laws and programs needed or can existing ones be used to implement the recommendations? ... This document is divided into four main parts. The first, “Carrots and Sticks” looks at two basic approaches — regulatory and non-regulatory — that can be, and are, used to carry out water policy. Both have advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered. The second, “The powers of federal, state and local governments…,” looks at the constitutional powers the federal government and state and local governments have to carry out water policy. An initial look at the U. S. Constitution might suggest the federal government’s regulatory authority over water is limited but, in fact, its powers are very substantial. States have considerable authority to do a number of things but have to be mindful of any federal efforts that might conflict with those state efforts. And local governments can only do those things the state constitution or state legislature says they can do and must conform to any requirements or limitations on those powers that are contained in the enabling acts. Parts three and four examine in more detail the main programs and agencies at the federal level as well as Iowa’s state and local levels and the roles they play in national and state water policy.

Chronic disease management: a qualitative study investigating the barriers, facilitators and incentives perceived by Swiss healthcare stakeholders.

BACKGROUND: Chronic disease management has been implemented for some time in several countries to tackle the increasing burden of chronic diseases. While Switzerland faces the same challenge, such initiatives have only emerged recently in this country. The aim of this study is to assess their feasibility, in terms of barriers, facilitators and incentives to participation. METHODS: To meet our aim, we used qualitative methods involving the collection of opinions of various healthcare stakeholders, by means of 5 focus groups and 33 individual interviews. All the data were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis was then performed and five levels were determined to categorize the data: political, financial, organisational/ structural, professionals and patients. RESULTS: Our results show that, at each level, stakeholders share common opinions towards the feasibility of chronic disease management in Switzerland. They mainly mention barriers linked to the federalist political organization as well as to financing such programs. They also envision difficulties to motivate both patients and healthcare professionals to participate. Nevertheless, their favourable attitudes towards chronic disease management as well as the fact that they are convinced that Switzerland possesses all the resources (financial, structural and human) to develop such programs constitute important facilitators. The implementation of quality and financial incentives could also foster the participation of the actors. CONCLUSIONS: Even if healthcare stakeholders do not have the same role and interest regarding chronic diseases, they express similar opinions on the development of chronic disease management in Switzerland. Their overall positive attitude shows that it could be further implemented if political, financial and organisational barriers are overcome and if incentives are found to face the scepticism and non-motivation of some stakeholders.

Water Planning Law and Government, November 2008

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done.

Goal setting and monetary incentives: when large stakes are not enough

The aim of this paper is to test the effectiveness of wage-irrelevant goal setting policies in a laboratory environment. In our design, managers can assign a goal to their workers by setting a certain level of performance on the work task. We establish our theoretical conjectures by developing a model where assigned goals act as reference points to workers’ intrinsic motivation. Consistent with our model, we find that managers set goals which are challenging but attainable for an average-ability worker. Workers respond to these goals by increasing effort, performance and by decreasing on-the-job leisure activities with respect to the no-goal setting baseline. Finally, we study the interaction between goal setting and monetary rewards and find that goal setting is most effective when monetary incentives are strong. These results suggest that goal setting may produce intrinsic motivation and increase workers’ performance beyond what is achieved using solely monetary incentives.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Fiscal Year 2015 Report on the Condition of Affirmative Action, Diversity, and Multi-cultural Programs in State Government and Fiscal Year 2016 Plan, September 30, 2015

Each agency is invited and encouraged to send a representative to a quarterly Department of Administrative Services State Recruitment Coordinating Committee “Committee” meeting. This Committee conducts strategic planning sessions to identify top goals and initiatives for the next 2-3 years.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

The influence of the quality of government institutions on entrepreneurial motivation: exploring the variance across countries

Despite the increasing understanding of the relationships between institutions and entrepreneurship, the influence of the quality of government institutions on entrepreneurship is less addressed. This paper focuses on this critical determinant of entrepreneurship in developing and developed countries. Drawing from institutional theory we hypothesize and empirically assess the role of the quality of institutions in entrepreneurial activity. We examine how the quality of government institutions influences the rate of necessity-based entrepreneurial activity across countries and over time by using a cross-sectional time-series approach on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database covering the years 2001–2011. Our results suggest that higher economic development associated with better quality of institutions reduces the prevalence of necessity-based entrepreneurship. Our findings imply that developing countries must rationally organize their functions, and seek to remove unnecessary barriers, decrease political instability, and controls that hamper entrepreneurial activity

Effects of Government Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence from Finnish Companies

Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää, miten valtionomistajuus vaikuttaa yrityksen suorituskykyyn suomalaisissa pörssinoteeratuissa valtionyhtiöissä, joissa valtio toimii pää- tai osaomistajana. Suorituskykyä tutkitaan kandella eri menetelmällä. Ensin tutkitaan osaketuottoja Jensenin alfan avulla, jonka jälkeen suoritetaan tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen toimialavertailu. Tutkimuksen teoriaosuudessa esitetään yksityistämisen tuottamia etuja yrityksen taloudelliseen suorituskykyyn, sekä myöskin valtionomistajuuden tuottamia etuja. Lisäksi teoriaosuudessa käsitellään aikaisempien empiiristen tutkimusten tuloksia valtionomistajuuden vaikutuksista. Tämän tutkimuksen empiirisessä osiossa käytettävä data on saatu osakedatan osalta Datastreamista ja tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen osalta Balance Consulting Oy:ltä. Kokonaisosakedataa koskeva tutkimus Jensenin alfalla ei osoittanut valtionyhtiöiden toimivan tehottomasti, vaan osoitti yritysten kyenneen tuottamaan epänormaaleja tuottoja riskitasoonsa nähden. Vuositasolle pilkotun datan analysointi sen sijaan tuotti useita negatiivisia alfoja yrityksille eli merkkejä tehottomuudesta tiettyinä vuosina. Lisäksi tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen analysointi osoitti osan valtionyhtiöistä olleen pääosin omaa toimialaansa tehottomampia, kun taas osa kykenipäihittämään toimialansa.