Modelling and Administration of Contract-Based Systems

Mirroring the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, electronic contracts offer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions on agent behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives are met. However, where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfil them all; computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verification to be automated. In this paper, we describe a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which normative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified, established, renewed, etc. In particular, we aim to allow systems containing multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture with an aerospace example.

Towards a Monitoring Framework for Agent-Based Contract Systems

The behaviours of autonomous agents may deviate from those deemed to be for the good of the societal systems of which they are a part. Norms have therefore been proposed as a means to regulate agent behaviours in open and dynamic systems, and may be encoded in electronic contracts in order to specify the obliged, permitted and prohibited behaviours of agents that are signatories to such contracts. Enactment and management of electronic contracts thus enables the use of regulatory mechanisms to ensure that agent behaviours comply with the encoded norms. To facilitate such mechanisms requires monitoring in order to detect and explain violation of norms. In this paper we propose a framework for monitoring that is to be implemented and integrated into a suite of contract enactment and management tools. The framework adopts a non-intrusive approach to monitoring, whereby the states of a contract with respect to its contained norms can be inferred on the basis of messages exchanged. Specifically, the framework deploys agents that observe messages sent between contract signatories, where these messages correspond to agent behaviours and therefore indicate whether norms are, or are in danger of, being violated.

A contract-based system for aerospace aftercare

The logistics of the aerospace aftermarket raises a number of very interesting challenges from the perspective of electronic contracting. This is a highly dynamic domain, where contracts are established between airlines and engine manufacturers, as well as between engine manufacturers all the way down the supply lines, providing a particularly illustrative showcase for the technologies developed in the CONTRACT project. In this paper, we describe such a domain, as well as our modelling of it as a multiagent simulator where the CONTRACT framework has been used to monitor for compliance with norms.

Monitoring and Explanation of Contract Execution: A Case Study in the Aerospace Domain

In the domain of aerospace aftermarkets, which often has long supply chains that feed into the maintenance of aircraft, contracts are used to establish agreements between aircraft operators and maintenance suppliers. However, violations at the bottom of the supply chain (part suppliers) can easily cascade to the top (aircraft operators), making it difficult to determine the source of the violation, and seek to address it. In this context, we have developed a global monitoring architecture that ensures the detection of norm violations and generates explanations for the origin of violations. In this paper, we describe the implementation and deployment of a global monitor in the aerospace domain of [8] and show how it generates explanations for violations within the maintenance supply chain. We show how these explanations can be used not only to detect violations at runtime, but also to uncover potential problems in contracts before their deployment, thus improving them.

Case studies for contract-based systems

Of the ways in which agent behaviour can be regulated in a multiagent system, electronic contracting – based on explicit representation of different parties' responsibilities, and the agreement of all parties to them – has significant potential for modern industrial applications. Based on this assumption, the CONTRACT project aims to develop and apply electronic contracting and contract-based monitoring and verification techniques in real world applications. This paper presents results from the initial phase of the project, which focused on requirements solicitation and analysis. Specifically, we survey four use cases from diverse industrial applications, examine how they can benefit from an agent-based electronic contracting infrastructure and outline the technical requirements that would be placed on such an infrastructure. We present the designed CONTRACT architecture and describe how it may fulfil these requirements. In addition to motivating our work on the contract-based infrastructure, the paper aims to provide a much needed community resource in terms of use case themselves and to provide a clear commercial context for the development of work on contract-based system.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

The forward- and the equity-premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

In this paper we revisit the relationship between the equity and the forward premium puzzles. We construct return-based stochastic discount factors under very mild assumptions and check whether they price correctly the equity and the foreign currency risk premia. We avoid log-linearizations by using moments restrictions associated with euler equations to test the capacity of our return-based stochastic discount factors to price returns on the relevant assets. Our main finding is that a pricing kernel constructed only using information on American domestic assets accounts for both domestic and international stylized facts that escape consumption based models. In particular, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the foreign currency risk premium has zero price when the instrument is the own current value of the forward premium.

Essays on the relationship between the equity and the forward premium puzzles

Our research agenda consists in showing this strong relation between these puzzles based on evidences that both empirical failures are related to the incapacity of the canonical CCAPM to provide a high volatile intertemporal marginal rate of substitution with reasonable values for the preferences parameters.

Can a habit formation model really explain the Forward Premium Anomaly?

Verdelhan (2009) mostra que desejando-se explicar o comporta- mento do prêmio de risco nos mercados de títulos estrangeiros usando- se o modelo de formação externa de hábitos proposto por Campbell e Cochrane (1999) será necessário especi car o retorno livre de risco de equilíbrio de maneira pró-cíclica. Mostramos que esta especi cação só é possível sobre parâmetros de calibração implausíveis. Ainda no processo de calibração, para a maioria dos parâmetros razoáveis, a razão preço-consumo diverge. Entretanto, adotando a sugestão pro- posta por Verdelhan (2009) - de xar a função sensibilidade (st) no seu valor de steady-state durante a calibração e liberá-la apenas du- rante a simulação dos dados para se garantir taxas livre de risco pró- cíclicas - conseguimos encontrar um valor nito e bem comportado para a razão preço-consumo de equilíbrio e replicar o foward premium anom- aly. Desconsiderando possíveis inconsistências deste procedimento, so- bre retornos livres de risco pró-cíclicos, conforme sugerido por Wachter (2006), o modelo utilizado gera curvas de yields reais decrescentes na maturidade, independentemente do estado da economia - resultado que se opõe à literatura subjacente e aos dados reais sobre yields.

Modelando o prêmio pelo risco cambial no Brasil através de modelos GARCH-M : o mercado forward reflete a visão dos economistas?

O presente estudo demonstra que o mercado brasileiro cambial de forward reflete adequadamente a visão dos economistas – obtida junto a pesquisas de mercado realizadas periodicamente pelo Banco Central do Brasil – quando se modela o prêmio pelo risco cambial através de modelos auto-regressivos condicionais generalizados de heteroscedasticidade na Média (GARCH-M).

Can a habit formation model really explain the forward premium anomaly?

Verdelhan (2009) shows that if one is to explain the foreign exchange forward premium behavior using Campbell and Cochrane (1999)’s habit formation model one must specify it in such a way to generate pro-cyclical short term risk free rates. At the calibration procedure, we show that this is only possible in Campbell and Cochrane’s framework under implausible parameters specifications given that the price-consumption ratio diverges in almost all parameters sets. We, then, adopt Verdelhan’s shortcut of fixing the sensivity function λ(st) at its steady state level to attain a finite value for the price-consumption ratio and release it in the simulation stage to ensure pro-cyclical risk free rates. Beyond the potential inconsistencies that such procedure may generate, as suggested by Wachter (2006), with procyclical risk free rates the model generates a downward sloped real yield curve, which is at odds with the data.

The forward- and the equity-premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

We build a pricing kernel using only US domestic assets data and check whether it accounts for foreign markets stylized facts that escape consumption based models. By interpreting our stochastic discount factor as the projection of a pricing kernel from a fully specified model in the space of returns, our results indicate that a model that accounts for the behavior of domestic assets goes a long way toward accounting for the behavior of foreign assets. We address predictability issues associated with the forward premium puzzle by: i) using instruments that are known to forecast excess returns in the moments restrictions associated with Euler equations, and; ii) by pricing Lustig and Verdelhan (2007)'s foreign currency portfolios. Our results indicate that the relevant state variables that explain foreign-currency market asset prices are also the driving forces behind U.S. domestic assets behavior.

The forward- and the equity-premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

Using information on US domestic financial data only, we build a stochastic discount factor—SDF— and check whether it accounts for foreign markets stylized facts that escape consumption based models. By interpreting our SDF as the projection of a pricing kernel from a fully specified model in the space of returns, our results indicate that a model that accounts for the behavior of domestic assets goes a long way toward accounting for the behavior of foreign assets prices. We address predictability issues associated with the forward premium puzzle by: i) using instruments that are known to forecast excess returns in the moments restrictions associated with Euler equations, and; ii) by pricing Lustig and Verdelhan (2007)’s foreign currency portfolios. Our results indicate that the relevant state variables that explain foreign-currency market asset prices are also the driving forces behind U.S. domestic assets behavior.