952 resultados para Nash, Mary, 1947-
Resumo:
Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditureGDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine three central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after shocks to either revenues or expenditures? Third, are expenditures exogenous? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not; (ii) the behavior of a rational Brazilian consumer may be consistent with Ricardian Equivalence; (iii) seigniorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.
Resumo:
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.
Resumo:
Com base na análise histórica da economia brasileira nas últimas décadas, poder-se-ia supor que sejam expressivas as restrições aos movimentos internacionais de capitais. Para analisar essa questão, usa-se o modelo intertemporal da conta corrente, testando as suas proposições básicas com dados econômicos brasileiros (perfeita mobilidade de capitais sob a Teoria da Renda Permanente). Para testar o modelo, trabalha-se com a técnica econométrica desenvolvida por Campbell (1987) e Campbell e Shiller (1987), aplicáveis a teorias de valor presente, onde a conta corrente é vista como valor presente das mudanças do produto líquido. Os resultados encontrados revelam que o modelo é rejeitado para os dados brasileiros, uma vez que nem todas as proposições testáveis são confirmadas. Isto mostra a inexistência de plena mobilidade de capitais, o que corrobora as suspeitas levantadas a partir da análise histórica. No entanto, foram constatados elevado grau de mobilidade de capitais e significativo fluxo de capitais especulativos, pois a série de conta corrente estimada de acordo com o modelo mostra-se menos volátil que a série observada na economia brasileira.
Resumo:
Romantic English literature – written at a time when prose fiction was predominantly a medium for sheer entertainment – is rooted in poetry. One or two novelists may exceptionally be granted the adjective “Romantic”, but Mary Shelley is not ranked among them. For centuries, her work has been restricted to that section in handbooks reserved for exotic Gothic literature. This thesis argues that literary criticism has failed to recognize Frankenstein’s obvious relation with the movement. The argument will be fostered by a brief look at such handbooks, and developed through the analysis of the imagery of the novel, so as to trace the Romantic elements there contained. The analysis relies mainly on the frame developed by Northrop Frye concerning the nature and function of imagery in literature. The concept of intertextuality will also be useful as a tool to account for the insertion of images in the novel, and for the novel’s insertion within the Romantic context. The work is divided into three parts. The first contextualizes the main issues set forth by Frankenstein, establishing connections with the life of the author and with the Romantic movement. The second exposes the theoretical basis on which the thesis is grounded. The last presents my reading of the novel’s web of images. In the end, I hope to validate the thesis proposed, that Frankenstein embodies the aesthetic and philosophical assessments of the English Romantic agenda, and therefore deserves to be situated in its due place in the English Literary canon as the legitimate representative of Romanticism in prose form.
Resumo:
Este trabalho apresenta uma metodologia para o cálculo do PIB trimestral a preços constantes nos anos anteriores a 1980, quando o IBGE passou a calcular esse indicador para o Brasil, e apresenta os resultados de sua aplicação aos anos de 1947 a 1980. Para a estimação do indicador do PIB trimestral construiu-se primeiramente uma base de dados composta por séries fortemente associadas ao nível de atividade econômica nacional depois de 1980 e que também estivessem disponíveis em frequência mensal ou trimestral no período 1947-80. Em seguida, aplicou-se às séries dessa base de dados o método do filtro de Kalman com a restrição de que a cada ano a taxa de crescimento das médias do PIB trimestral obtido após a estimação seja igual à variação da série anual calculada pelas Contas Nacionais.
Resumo:
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .
Resumo:
We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.
Resumo:
Analysis of the Contribution of Revista de Administração (1947-1992) to the Evolution of the Field of Knowledge in Public Administration.