L'application du principe du pollueur-payeur à la gestion du risque environnemental et à la mutualisation des coûts de la pollution

Le but de cette étude est de déterminer qui paie pour le risque de pollution et par conséquent de vérifier si le principe du pollueur-payeur est effectivement mis en œuvre dans le domaine de la gestion du risque environnemental. Il s’agit d’examiner le degré de mutualisation de la gestion du risque dans différentes législations particulière. Les payeurs peuvent a priori se classer dans quatre catégories : les personnes dont l’activité contribue au risque de pollution, les compagnies d’assurance qui acceptent d’assurer ces personnes, les organismes ou autorités publics et les tiers. Divers exemples issus de la législation belge ou européenne seront examinés afin de déterminer s’ils sont conformes à la lettre et/ou à l’esprit du principe pollueur-payeur. Il s’agit notamment de la responsabilité civile, de la responsabilité environnementale, de la gestion des déchets et du marché de quotas d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Les techniques de responsabilité qui interviennent après que le dommage ait lieu et requièrent la démonstration de l’existence d’un lien de causalité ne permettent pas toujours d’assurer pleinement la fonction préventive du principe du pollueur-payeur. Elles ne constituent pas des instruments adéquats de gestion de la pollution diffuse ou chronique. En conséquence, des techniques de mutualisation de la gestion du risque environnemental se sont développées. Le recours à ces techniques de mutualisation (par le recours à l’assurance, aux fonds publics financés par la fiscalité environnementale ou aux marchés de droit d’émissions) est-il conforme au principe pollueur-payeur et permet-il d’atteindre l’objectif d’un niveau élevé de protection de l’environnement ? L’effet dissuasif du principe pollueur-payeur n’est-il pas amoindri par la mutualisation ? L’article montre que la définition du principe pollueur-payeur par la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne est centrée sur la contribution au risque de pollution ce qui permet de recourir aux techniques de mutualisation de la gestion du risque tout en respectant le Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne. 

On the design of customized risk measures in insurance, the problem of capital allocation and the theory of fluctuations for Lévy processes

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions quelques problèmes fondamentaux en mathématiques financières et actuarielles, ainsi que leurs applications. Cette thèse est constituée de trois contributions portant principalement sur la théorie de la mesure de risques, le problème de l’allocation du capital et la théorie des fluctuations. Dans le chapitre 2, nous construisons de nouvelles mesures de risque cohérentes et étudions l’allocation de capital dans le cadre de la théorie des risques collectifs. Pour ce faire, nous introduisons la famille des "mesures de risque entropique cumulatifs" (Cumulative Entropic Risk Measures). Le chapitre 3 étudie le problème du portefeuille optimal pour le Entropic Value at Risk dans le cas où les rendements sont modélisés par un processus de diffusion à sauts (Jump-Diffusion). Dans le chapitre 4, nous généralisons la notion de "statistiques naturelles de risque" (natural risk statistics) au cadre multivarié. Cette extension non-triviale produit des mesures de risque multivariées construites à partir des données financiéres et de données d’assurance. Le chapitre 5 introduit les concepts de "drawdown" et de la "vitesse d’épuisement" (speed of depletion) dans la théorie de la ruine. Nous étudions ces concepts pour des modeles de risque décrits par une famille de processus de Lévy spectrallement négatifs.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

La réclamation en dommages punitifs et son effet sur l’assurance responsabilité : analyse de la faute intentionnelle et de l’atteinte illicite et intentionnelle

Les réclamations pour dommages punitifs en vertu de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne se multiplient depuis plusieurs années devant les tribunaux. Pour être accueillie, cette réclamation implique la démonstration d’une atteinte illicite et intentionnelle à un droit ou une liberté protégé par cette charte. Les recours en responsabilité peuvent faire l’objet d’une couverture d’assurance. Or, le Code civil du Québec prévoit spécifiquement que l’assureur n’est pas tenu de couvrir la faute intentionnelle de l’assuré. Est-ce à dire que l’assureur n’a pas d’obligation envers son assuré lorsque des dommages punitifs sont réclamés? Il s’agit donc de déterminer si le concept de faute intentionnelle et celui d’atteinte illicite et intentionnelle sont des concepts qui s’équivalent ou qu’il est nécessaire de distinguer. Pour cette analyse, ces deux concepts seront abordés en profondeur. Il sera question de l’origine de ces deux notions, de leurs fondements et de leur interprétation pour finalement définir ces termes le plus précisément possible. Ces définitions permettront d’opposer ces deux notions et de déterminer au final qu’il existe plusieurs éléments qui différencient ces concepts, notamment à l’égard de l’intention requise, faisant en sorte qu’ils ne peuvent être assimilés. Cette conclusion aura un impact certain sur les obligations de l’assureur de défendre l’assuré et d’indemniser la victime pour ses dommages compensatoires lorsqu’il existe une réclamation en dommages punitifs et, par conséquent, l’assureur ne pourra faire reposer son refus de défendre ou d’indemniser sur la seule base de la preuve d’une atteinte illicite et intentionnelle.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

Professional Services: Civil Liability for Deficiency

This study deals the professional Services civil Liability for deficiency with special reference to medical professionals.the study deals with the characteristics of profession,basis of liability , historical evolution of legal controls on professional services, liability of doctors for negligence under tort law. Expectations to liability for medical negligence are critically evaluated. consent of medical treatment etc are studied

Compensation to Workmen for Industrial Injuries

This thesis Entitled compensation to workmen for industrial injuries.Evaluation of the different forms of liability for compensating industrial injuries makes it evident that the liability under the social insurance scheme is the most befitting one, as it eliminates the problem of evasion of liability by the employer by providing for sharing of liability. Liability for compensation under the workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 arises only in the case of accidents, arising in the course of and out of employment. Majority of the workers, covered by the workmen's Compensation Act, have supported lumpsum payment of compensation under the Act. It appears that workers are ignorant of the cemerits of lumpsum payment. So, the workers should be properly educated by the Inspectorate, proposed above, about the comparative advantages of periodical payments. It is suggested that the workmens Compensation Act, 1923 may be amended, imposing fee upon the parties for each adjournment. It is also suggested that provision may be made in the workmens Compensation Act, 1923 for the expeditious despatch of amendments of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Workmens· Compensation Rules, 1924 and the Schedules, made from time to time, to the comrnissioners for workmens Compensation, This will help them mete out justice to an injured workman, as required by the changes in the law. The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and the Rules may be amended, requiring the employers to provide the employees with necessary information, in the vernacular language, about the employment injury benefits available under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and the formalities for obtaining the same. This will help the illiterate employees, especially the casual ones, avail of employment injury benefits. Changes in the law, on the lines suggested above, are imperative to make the system of compensation for industrial injuries prove effective and beneficial to injured workmen.

Rashtriya Swasthya Bhima Yojana-Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme (Rsby-Chis) In Kerala: A Study On The Effectiveness And Utilization Of The Scheme With Special Reference To Ernakulam And Wayanad Districts

Health insurance has become a necessity for the common man, next to food, clothing and shelter. The financing of health expense is either catastrophic or sometimes even frequently contracted illnesses, is a major cause of mental agony for the common man. The cost of care may sometimes result in the complete erosion of the family savings or may even lead to indebtedness as many studies on causes of rural indebtedness bear testimony (Jayalakshmi, 2006). A suitable cover by way of health insurance is all that is required to cope with such situations. Health care insurance rightly provides the mechanism for both individuals and families to mitigate the financial burden of medical expenses in the present context. Hence a well designed affordable health insurance policy is the need of the hour.Therefore, it is very significant to study the extent to which the beneficiaries in Kerala make use of the benefits provided by a social health insurance scheme like RSBY-CHIS. Based on the above pertinent points, this study assumes national relevance even though the geographical area of the study is limited to two districts of Kerala. The findings of the study will bring forth valuable inputs on the services availed by the beneficiaries of RSBYCHIS and take appropriate measures to improve the effectiveness of the scheme whereby maximum quality benefit could be availed by the poorest of the poor and develop the scheme as a real dawn of the new era of health for them

Determinants of Consumer Purchase Decisions of Health Insurance in Kerala

This research work was to study the level of awareness of consumers about health insurance concept and market, consumer perceptions about health insurance providers, schemes and various factors that influence buying decision of health insurance. There is need to bring entire age group – high risk and low risk under health insurance cover. Widening the cover of health insurance calls for indepth understanding of consumer thinking and extensive marketing efforts based on that. Hence the study of consumer perceptions and the impact of different contributing factors on consumer purchase decision assume significance to the marketer. Understanding the consumer thinking on health insurance will also be of relevance to governmental/non governmental agencies, as affordable health care to all is a policy objective of the government and new schemes are being launched in this area.

Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Retos y alternativas de inversión para las compañías aseguradoras en Colombia

En este documento se explica el rol de las compañías aseguradoras colombianas dentro del sistema pensional y se busca, a través de la comprensión de la evolución del entorno macroeconómico y del marco regulatorio, identificar los retos que enfrentan. Los retos explicados en el documento son tres: el reto de la rentabilidad, el reto que plantean los cambios relativamente frecuentes de la regulación, y el reto del “calce”. El documento se enfoca principalmente en el reto de la rentabilidad y desarrolla un ejercicio de frontera eficiente que utiliza retornos esperados calculados a partir de la metodología de Damodaran (2012). Los resultados del ejercicio soportan la idea de que en efecto los retornos esperados serán menores para cualquier nivel de riesgo y sugiere que ante tal panorama, la relajación de las restricciones impuestas por el Régimen de inversiones podría alivianar los preocupaciones de las compañías aseguradoras en esta materia. Para los otros dos retos también se sugieren alternativas: el Algorithmic Trading para el caso del reto que impone los cambios en la regulación, y las Asociaciones Público-Privadas para abordar el reto del “calce”.

Identifying job skills in commercial advisors in a health insurance company

The aim of this research was to identify the criticalcompetence of success of the commercial adviserin a company providing insurance and health services.For this research a sample of 34 commercialadvisers. The sample was divided into four groups(two per product and two per criterion of success).Systematic fi eld observations, interviews of criticalincidents, application of response tests and salesworkshops were used to evaluate the differentialcompetences that the successful advisers wereshowing in relation to the advisers de fi ned as average.The success criteria were based on the generatedcommission performance over the 10 months. Allin all, signi fi cant differences were found betweenthe “successful” and “average” groups. Furthermore,competences that correlate positively with atop sales performance were observed and competencesthat have major level of discrimination betweenthe “successful” and “average” groups wereestablished. Orientation to achievement, planningand management, information search, commercialaggressiveness and strategic vision are the competencesthat were considered to be key in the topperformance of a sales agent or commercial adviser.Additionally, the results in the response testswere analyzed in the four study groups, withoutobserving signi fi cant differences between them,which supports the theoretical framework of thepresent study.

Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.