Periodic orbits near a heteroclinic loop formed by one dimensional orbit and a 2-dimensional manifold: application to the charged collinear 3-body problem

The paper is devoted to the study of a type of differential systems which appear usually in the study of some Hamiltonian systems with 2 degrees of freedom. We prove the existence of infinitely many periodic orbits on each negative energy level. All these periodic orbits pass near the total collision. Finally we apply these results to study the existence of periodic orbits in the charged collinear 3–body problem.

The structural approach of a natrex model on equilibrium exchange rates

Following a general macroeconomic approach, this paper sets a closed micro-founded structural model to determine the long run real exchange rate of a developed economy. In particular, the analysis follows the structure of a Natrex model. The main contribution of this research paper is the development of a solid theoretical framework that analyse in depth the basis of the real exchange rate and the details of the equilibrium dynamics after any shock influencing the steady state. In our case, the intertemporal factors derived from the stock-flow relationship will be particularly determinant. The main results of the paper can be summarised as follows. In first place, a complete well-integrated structural model for long-run real exchange rate determination is developed from first principles. Moreover, within the concrete dynamics of the model, it is found that some convergence restrictions will be necessary. On one hand, for the medium run convergence the sensitivity of the trade balance to changes in real exchange rate should be higher that the correspondent one to the investment decisions. On the other hand, and regarding long-run convergence, it is also necessary both that there exists a negative relationship between investment and capital stock accumulation and that the global saving of the economy depends positively on net foreign debt accumulation. In addition, there are also interesting conclusions about the effects that certain shocks over the exogenous variables of the model have on real exchange rates.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

Growth, habit formation, and catching-up\ with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers' problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient during the transition towards the balanced growth path. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds..

On Boas-Type Problem

R.P. Boas has found necessary and sufficient conditions of belonging of function to Lipschitz class. From his findings it turned out, that the conditions on sine and cosine coefficients for belonging of function to Lip α(0 & α & 1) are the same, but for Lip 1 are different. Later his results were generalized by many authors in the viewpoint of generalization of condition on the majorant of modulus of continuity. The aim of this paper is to obtain Boas-type theorems for generalized Lipschitz classes. To define generalized Lipschitz classes we use the concept of modulus of smoothness of fractional order.

Normal forms for rational difference equations with applications to the global periodicity problem

We propose a classification and derive the associated normal forms for rational difference equations with complex coefficients. As an application, we study the global periodicity problem for second order rational difference equations with complex coefficients. We find new necessary conditions as well as some new examples of globally periodic equations.

Real equilibrium exchange rates. A panel data approach for advanced and emerging economies.

Based on an behavioral equilibrium exchange rate model, this paper examines the determinants of the real effective exchange rate and evaluates the degree of misalignment of a group of currencies since 1980. Within a panel cointegration setting, we estimate the relationship between exchange rate and a set of economic fundamentals, such as traded-nontraded productivity differentials and the stock of foreign assets. Having ascertained the variables are integrated and cointegrated, the long-run equilibrium value of the fundamentals are estimated and used to derive equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments. Although there is statistical homogeneity, some structural differences were found to exist between advanced and emerging economies.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

A Computable general equilibrium approach to hypothetical extractions and missing links

Identifying key sectors or key locations in an interconnected economy is of paramount importance for improving policy planning and directing economic strategy. Hence the relevance of categorizing them and hence the corresponding need of evaluating their potential synergies in terms of their global economic thrust. We explain in this paper that standard measures based on gross outputs do not and cannot capture the relevant impact due to self- imposed modeling limitations. In fact, common gross output measures will be systematically downward biased. We argue that an economy wide Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach provides a modeling platform that overcomes these limitations since it provides (i) a more comprehensive measure of linkages and (ii) an alternate way of accounting for links' relevance that is in consonance with standard macromagnitudes in the National Income and Product Accounts.