Self-knowledge : a treatise shewing the nature and benefit of that important science, and the way to attain it, intermixed with various reflections and observations on human nature /

Mode of access: Internet.

A treatise on self knowledge; showing the nature and benefit of that important science, and the way to attain it: intermixed with various reflections and observations on human nature.

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A treatise on self knowledge : showing the nature and benefit of that important science, and the way to attain it : intermixed with various reflections and observations on human nature /

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Self-knowledge : a treatise showing the nature and benefit of that important science and the way to attain it : intermixed with various reflections and observations on human nature /

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A treatise on self knowledge.

Added t.p., engraved, has imprint: London, Printed for T. Tegg and J. Mozley, 1813.

Self-knowledge and self-discipline,

Mode of access: Internet.

In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism, detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is,
broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

In My 'Mind's Eye': Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is, broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

Identity and text : developing self-conscious readers

Globalisation and societal change suggest the language and literacy skills needed to make meaning in our lives are increasing and changing radically. Multiliteracies are influencing the future of literacy teaching. One aspect of the pedagogy of multiliteracies is recruiting learners’ previous and current experiences as an integral part of the learning experience. This paper examines the implications of results from a project that examined student responses to a postmodern picture book, in particular, ways teachers might develop students’ self-knowledge about reading. It draws on Freebody and Luke’s Four Resources Model of Reading and recently developed models for teaching multiliteracies.

On the integration of self-tracking data amongst quantified self members

Self-tracking, the process of recording one's own behaviours, thoughts and feelings, is a popular approach to enhance one's self-knowledge. While dedicated self-tracking apps and devices support data collection, previous research highlights that the integration of data constitutes a barrier for users. In this study we investigated how members of the Quantified Self movement---early adopters of self-tracking tools---overcome these barriers. We conducted a qualitative analysis of 51 videos of Quantified Self presentations to explore intentions for collecting data, methods for integrating and representing data, and how intentions and methods shaped reflection. The findings highlight two different intentions---striving for self-improvement and curiosity in personal data---which shaped how these users integrated data, i.e. the effort required. Furthermore, we identified three methods for representing data---binary, structured and abstract---which influenced reflection. Binary representations supported reflection-in-action, whereas structured and abstract representations supported iterative processes of data collection, integration and reflection. For people tracking out of curiosity, this iterative engagement with personal data often became an end in itself, rather than a means to achieve a goal. We discuss how these findings contribute to our current understanding of self-tracking amongst Quantified Self members and beyond, and we conclude with directions for future work to support self-trackers with their aspirations.

Self-generated expressions of residual complaints following brain injury

Following brain injury there is often a prolonged period of deteriorating psychological condition, despite neurological stability or improvement. This is presumably consequent to the remission of anosognosia and the realisation of permanently worsened status. This change is hypothesised to be directed partially by the socially mediated processes which play a role in generating self-awareness and which here direct the reconstruction of the self as a permanently injured person. However, before we can understand this process of redevelopment, we need an unbiassed technique to monitor self-awareness. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 individuals with long-standing brain injuries to capture their spontaneous complaints and their level of insight into the implications of their difficulties. The focus was on what the participants said in their own words, and the extent to which self-knowledge of difficulties was spontaneously salient to the participants. Their responses were subjected to content analysis. Most participants were able to say that they had brain injuries and physical difficulties, many mentioned memory and attentional problems and a few made references to a variety of emotional disturbances. Content analysis of data from unbiassed interviews can reveal the extent to which people with brain injuries know about their difficulties. Social constructionist accounts of self-awareness and recovery are supported.

From Consciousness to Knowledge – The Explanatory Power of Revelation

Epistemology in philosophy of mind is a difficult endeavor. Those who believe that our phenomenal life is different from other domains suggest that self-knowledge about phenomenal properties is certain and therefore privileged. Usually, this so called privileged access is explained by the idea that we have direct access to our phenomenal life. This means, in contrast to perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is non-inferential. It is widely believed that, this kind of directness involves two different senses: an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. Proponents of this view often claim that this is due to the fact that we are acquainted with our current experiences. The acquaintance thesis, therefore, is the backbone in justifying privileged access. Unfortunately the whole approach has a profound flaw. For the thesis to work, acquaintance has to be a genuine explanation. Since it is usually assumed that any knowledge relation between judgments and the corresponding objects are merely causal and contingent (e.g. in perception), the proponent of the privileged access view needs to show that acquaintance can do the job. In this thesis, however, I claim that the latter cannot be done. Based on considerations introduced by Levine, I conclude that this approach involves either the introduction of ontologically independent properties or a rather obscure knowledge relation. A proper explanation, however, cannot employ either of the two options. The acquaintance thesis is, therefore, bound to fail. Since the privileged access intuition seems to be vital to epistemology within the philosophy of mind, I will explore alternative justifications. After discussing a number of options, I will focus on the so called revelation thesis. This approach states that by simply having an experience with phenomenal properties, one is in the position to know the essence of those phenomenal properties. I will argue that, after finding a solution for the controversial essence claim, this thesis is a successful replacement explanation which maintains all the virtues of the acquaintance account without necessarily introducing ontologically independent properties or an obscure knowledge relation. The overall solution consists in qualifying the essence claim in the relevant sense, leaving us with an appropriate ontology for phenomenal properties. On the one hand, this avoids employing mysterious independent properties, since this ontological view is physicalist in nature. On the other hand, this approach has the right kind of structure to explain privileged self-knowledge of our phenomenal life. My final conclusion consists in the claim that the privileged access intuition is in fact veridical. It cannot, however, be justified by the popular acquaintance approach, but rather, is explainable by the controversial revelation thesis.

Self, memory, and imagining the future in a case of psychogenic amnesia

We report a case of psychogenic amnesia and examine the relationships between autobiographical memory impairment, the self, and ability to imagine the future. Case study JH, a 60 year old male, experienced a 6 year period of pervasive psychogenic amnesia covering all life events from childhood to the age of 53. JH was tested during his amnesic period and again following hypnotherapy and the recovery of his memories. JH’s amnesia corresponded with deficits in self-knowledge and imagining the future. Results are discussed with reference to models of self and memory and processes involving remembering and imagining.

Toward highly available, self-healing, adaptable, grid-like and user friendly nondedicated clusters

The human body was used to illustrate an Autonomic Computing system that possesses self-knowledge, self-configuration, self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protection, knowledge of its environment and user friendliness properties. Autonomic Computing was identified by IBM as one of the Grand Challenges. Many researchers and research groups have responded positively to the challenge by initiating research around one or two of the characteristics
identified by IBM as the requirements for Autonomic Computing. One of the areas that could benefit from the comprehensive approach created by the Autonomic Computing vision is parallel processing on nondedicated clusters. This paper shows a general design of services and initial implementation of a system that moves parallel processing on clusters to the computing mainstream using the Autonomic Computing vision.