In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism, detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge
Data(s) |
01/10/2014
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Resumo |
It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is,<br/>broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
Fonte |
Macdonald , C 2014 , ' In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism, detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge ' Synthese , vol 191 , no. 15 , pp. 3685-3710 . |
Palavras-Chave | #self-knowledge #Frist-person authority #introspectionism |
Tipo |
article |