Towards a multilevel model of the high performance work systems–workplace safety relationship

Human Resource (HR) systems and practices generally referred to as High Performance Work Practices (HPWPs), (Huselid, 1995) (sometimes termed High Commitment Work Practices or High Involvement Work Practices) have attracted much research attention in past decades. Although many conceptualizations of the construct have been proposed, there is general agreement that HPWPs encompass a bundle or set of HR practices including sophisticated staffing, intensive training and development, incentive-based compensation, performance management, initiatives aimed at increasing employee participation and involvement, job safety and security, and work design (e.g. Pfeffer, 1998). It is argued that these practices either directly and indirectly influence the extent to which employees’ knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics are utilized in the organization. Research spanning nearly 20 years has provided considerable empirical evidence for relationships between HPWPs and various measures of performance including increased productivity, improved customer service, and reduced turnover (e.g. Guthrie, 2001; Belt & Giles, 2009). With the exception of a few papers (e.g., Laursen &Foss, 2003), this literature appears to lack focus on how HPWPs influence or foster more innovative-related attitudes and behaviours, extra role behaviors, and performance. This situation exists despite the vast evidence demonstrating the importance of innovation, proactivity, and creativity in its various forms to individual, group, and organizational performance outcomes. Several pertinent issues arise when considering HPWPs and their relationship to innovation and performance outcomes. At a broad level is the issue of which HPWPs are related to which innovation-related variables. Another issue not well identified in research relates to employees’ perceptions of HPWPs: does an employee actually perceive the HPWP –outcomes relationship? No matter how well HPWPs are designed, if they are not perceived and experienced by employees to be effective or worthwhile then their likely success in achieving positive outcomes is limited. At another level, research needs to consider the mechanisms through which HPWPs influence –innovation and performance. The research question here relates to what possible mediating variables are important to the success or failure of HPWPs in impacting innovative behaviours and attitudes and what are the potential process considerations? These questions call for theory refinement and the development of more comprehensive models of the HPWP-innovation/performance relationship that include intermediate linkages and boundary conditions (Ferris, Hochwarter, Buckley, Harrell-Cook, & Frink, 1999). While there are many calls for this type of research to be made a high priority, to date, researchers have made few inroads into answering these questions. This symposium brings together researchers from Australia, Europe, Asia and Africa to examine these various questions relating to the HPWP-innovation-performance relationship. Each paper discusses a HPWP and potential variables that can facilitate or hinder the effects of these practices on innovation- and performance- related outcomes. The first paper by Johnston and Becker explores the HPWPs in relation to work design in a disaster response organization that shifts quickly from business as usual to rapid response. The researchers examine how the enactment of the organizational response is devolved to groups and individuals. Moreover, they assess motivational characteristics that exist in dual work designs (normal operations and periods of disaster activation) and the implications for innovation. The second paper by Jørgensen reports the results of an investigation into training and development practices and innovative work behaviors (IWBs) in Danish organizations. Research on how to design and implement training and development initiatives to support IWBs and innovation in general is surprisingly scant and often vague. This research investigates the mechanisms by which training and development initiatives influence employee behaviors associated with innovation, and provides insights into how training and development can be used effectively by firms to attract and retain valuable human capital in knowledge-intensive firms. The next two papers in this symposium consider the role of employee perceptions of HPWPs and their relationships to innovation-related variables and performance. First, Bish and Newton examine perceptions of the characteristics and awareness of occupational health and safety (OHS) practices and their relationship to individual level adaptability and proactivity in an Australian public service organization. The authors explore the role of perceived supportive and visionary leadership and its impact on the OHS policy-adaptability/proactivity relationship. The study highlights the positive main effects of awareness and characteristics of OHS polices, and supportive and visionary leadership on individual adaptability and proactivity. It also highlights the important moderating effects of leadership in the OHS policy-adaptability/proactivity relationship. Okhawere and Davis present a conceptual model developed for a Nigerian study in the safety-critical oil and gas industry that takes a multi-level approach to the HPWP-safety relationship. Adopting a social exchange perspective, they propose that at the organizational level, organizational climate for safety mediates the relationship between enacted HPWS’s and organizational safety performance (prescribed and extra role performance). At the individual level, the experience of HPWP impacts on individual behaviors and attitudes in organizations, here operationalized as safety knowledge, skills and motivation, and these influence individual safety performance. However these latter relationships are moderated by organizational climate for safety. A positive organizational climate for safety strengthens the relationship between individual safety behaviors and attitudes and individual-level safety performance, therefore suggesting a cross-level boundary condition. The model includes both safety performance (behaviors) and organizational level safety outcomes, operationalized as accidents, injuries, and fatalities. The final paper of this symposium by Zhang and Liu explores leader development and relationship between transformational leadership and employee creativity and innovation in China. The authors further develop a model that incorporates the effects of extrinsic motivation (pay for performance: PFP) and employee collectivism in the leader-employee creativity relationship. The papers’ contributions include the incorporation of a PFP effect on creativity as moderator, rather than predictor in most studies; the exploration of the PFP effect from both fairness and strength perspectives; the advancement of knowledge on the impact of collectivism on the leader- employee creativity link. Last, this is the first study to examine three-way interactional effects among leader-member exchange (LMX), PFP and collectivism, thus, enriches our understanding of promoting employee creativity. In conclusion, this symposium draws upon the findings of four empirical studies and one conceptual study to provide an insight into understanding how different variables facilitate or potentially hinder the influence various HPWPs on innovation and performance. We will propose a number of questions for further consideration and discussion. The symposium will address the Conference Theme of ‘Capitalism in Question' by highlighting how HPWPs can promote financial health and performance of organizations while maintaining a high level of regard and respect for employees and organizational stakeholders. Furthermore, the focus on different countries and cultures explores the overall research question in relation to different modes or stages of development of capitalism.

An Empirical Analysis of Continuing Improvements Following the Implementation of a Performance-Based Compensation Plan

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and/or because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.

A Field Study of the Impact of a Performance-Based Incentive Plan

Much management accounting research focuses on design of incentive compensation contracts. A basic assumption in these contracts is that performance-based incentives improve employee performance. This paper reports on a field test of the multi-period incentive effects of a performance-based compensation plan on the sales of a retail establishment. Analysis of panel data for 15 retail outlets over 66 months indicates a sales increase when the plan is implemented, an effect that persists and increases over time. Sales gains are significantly lower in the peak selling season when more temporary workers are employed.

Evaluation of financial incentives as a quality improvement strategy in the public hospital context : clinician attitudes, design variables, and economic costs

In 2008, a three-year pilot ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) program, known as ‘Clinical Practice Improvement Payment’ (CPIP) was introduced into Queensland Health (QHealth). QHealth is a large public health sector provider of acute, community, and public health services in Queensland, Australia. The organisation has recently embarked on a significant reform agenda including a review of existing funding arrangements (Duckett et al., 2008). Partly in response to this reform agenda, a casemix funding model has been implemented to reconnect health care funding with outcomes. CPIP was conceptualised as a performance-based scheme that rewarded quality with financial incentives. This is the first time such a scheme has been implemented into the public health sector in Australia with a focus on rewarding quality, and it is unique in that it has a large state-wide focus and includes 15 Districts. CPIP initially targeted five acute and community clinical areas including Mental Health, Discharge Medication, Emergency Department, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Stroke. The CPIP scheme was designed around key concepts including the identification of clinical indicators that met the set criteria of: high disease burden, a well defined single diagnostic group or intervention, significant variations in clinical outcomes and/or practices, a good evidence, and clinician control and support (Ward, Daniels, Walker & Duckett, 2007). This evaluative research targeted Phase One of implementation of the CPIP scheme from January 2008 to March 2009. A formative evaluation utilising a mixed methodology and complementarity analysis was undertaken. The research involved three research questions and aimed to determine the knowledge, understanding, and attitudes of clinicians; identify improvements to the design, administration, and monitoring of CPIP; and determine the financial and economic costs of the scheme. Three key studies were undertaken to ascertain responses to the key research questions. Firstly, a survey of clinicians was undertaken to examine levels of knowledge and understanding and their attitudes to the scheme. Secondly, the study sought to apply Statistical Process Control (SPC) to the process indicators to assess if this enhanced the scheme and a third study examined a simple economic cost analysis. The CPIP Survey of clinicians elicited 192 clinician respondents. Over 70% of these respondents were supportive of the continuation of the CPIP scheme. This finding was also supported by the results of a quantitative altitude survey that identified positive attitudes in 6 of the 7 domains-including impact, awareness and understanding and clinical relevance, all being scored positive across the combined respondent group. SPC as a trending tool may play an important role in the early identification of indicator weakness for the CPIP scheme. This evaluative research study supports a previously identified need in the literature for a phased introduction of Pay for Performance (P4P) type programs. It further highlights the value of undertaking a formal risk assessment of clinician, management, and systemic levels of literacy and competency with measurement and monitoring of quality prior to a phased implementation. This phasing can then be guided by a P4P Design Variable Matrix which provides a selection of program design options such as indicator target and payment mechanisms. It became evident that a clear process is required to standardise how clinical indicators evolve over time and direct movement towards more rigorous ‘pay for performance’ targets and the development of an optimal funding model. Use of this matrix will enable the scheme to mature and build the literacy and competency of clinicians and the organisation as implementation progresses. Furthermore, the research identified that CPIP created a spotlight on clinical indicators and incentive payments of over five million from a potential ten million was secured across the five clinical areas in the first 15 months of the scheme. This indicates that quality was rewarded in the new QHealth funding model, and despite issues being identified with the payment mechanism, funding was distributed. The economic model used identified a relative low cost of reporting (under $8,000) as opposed to funds secured of over $300,000 for mental health as an example. Movement to a full cost effectiveness study of CPIP is supported. Overall the introduction of the CPIP scheme into QHealth has been a positive and effective strategy for engaging clinicians in quality and has been the catalyst for the identification and monitoring of valuable clinical process indicators. This research has highlighted that clinicians are supportive of the scheme in general; however, there are some significant risks that include the functioning of the CPIP payment mechanism. Given clinician support for the use of a pay–for-performance methodology in QHealth, the CPIP scheme has the potential to be a powerful addition to a multi-faceted suite of quality improvement initiatives within QHealth.

Essays on Stock Option Compensation and the Role of Incentives and Risk (summary section only)

Managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity has increased rapidly around the world. Early empirical research showed that pay-for-performance sensitivity resulting from stock ownership and stock options appeared to be quite low during the 1970s and early 1980s in the U.S. However, recent empirical research from the U.S. shows an enormous increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity. The global trend has also reached Finland, where stock options have become a major ingredient of executive compensation. The fact that stock options seem to be an appealing form of remuneration from a theoretical point of view combined with the observation that the use of this compensation form has increased significantly during the recent years, implies that research on the dynamics of stock option compensation is highly relevant for the academic community, as well as for practitioners and regulators. The research questions of the thesis are analyzed in four separate essays. The first essay examines whether stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms are consistent with predictions from principal-agent theory. The second essay explores one of the major puzzles in the compensation literature by studying determinants of stock option contract design. In theory, optimal contract design should vary according to firm characteristics. However, in the U.S., variation in contract design seems to be surprisingly low, a phenomenon generally attributed to tax and accounting considerations. In Finland, however, firms are not subject to stringent contracting restrictions, and the variation in contract design tends, in fact, to be quite substantial. The third essay studies the impact of price- and risk incentives arising from stock option compensation on firm investment. In addition, the essay explores one of the most debated questions in the literature, in particular, the relation between incentives and firm performance. Finally, several strands of literature in both economics and corporate finance hypothesize that economic uncertainty is related to corporate decision-making. Previous research has shown that risk tends to slow down firm investment. In the fourth essay, it is hypothesized that firm risk slows down growth from a more universal perspective. Consistent with this view, it is shown that risk not only tends to slow down firm investment, but also employment growth. Moreover, the essay explores whether the nature of firms’ compensation policies, in particular, whether firms make use of stock option compensation, affects the relation between risk and firm growth. In summary, the four essays contribute to the current understanding of stock options as a form of equity incentives, and how incentives and risk affect corporate decision-making. By this, the thesis promotes the knowledge related to the modern theory of the firm.

Improving clinician self-efficacy does not increase asthma guideline use by primary care clinicians

Objective: The purpose of this study was to show the association between changes in clinician self-efficacy and readiness to change and implementation of an asthma management program (Easy Breathing). Methods: A 36 month randomized, controlled trial was conducted involving 24 pediatric practices (88 clinicians). Randomized clinicians received interventions designed to enhance clinician self-efficacy and readiness to change which were measured at baseline and 3 years. Interventions consisted of an educational toolbox, seminars, teleconferences, mini-fellowships, opinion leader visits, clinician-specific feedback, and pay for performance. The primary outcome was program utilization (number of children enrolled in Easy Breathing/year); secondary outcomes included development of a written treatment plan and severity-appropriate therapy. Results: At baseline, clinicians enrolled 149 ± 147 (mean ± SD) children/clinician/year; 84% of children had a written treatment plan and 77% of plans used severity-appropriate therapy. At baseline, higher self-efficacy scores were associated with greater program utilization (relative rate [RR], 1.34; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.04-1.72; P =.04) but not treatment plan development (RR, 0.63; 95% CI, 0.29-1.35; P =.23) or anti-inflammatory use (RR, 1.76; 95% CI, 0.92-3.35; P =.09). Intervention clinicians participated in 17 interventions over 36 months. At study end, self-efficacy scores increased in intervention clinicians compared to control clinicians (P =.01) and more clinicians were in an action stage of change (P =.001) but these changes were not associated with changes in primary or secondary outcomes. Conclusions: Self-efficacy scores correlated with program use at baseline and increased in the intervention arm, but these increases were not associated with greater program-related activities. Self-efficacy may be necessary but not sufficient for behavior change. Copyright © 2012 by Academic Pediatric Association.

Career concerns: a human capital perspective

We introduce human capital accumulation, in the form of learning by doing, in a life cycle model of career concerns and analyze how human capital acquisition a ects implicit incentives for performance. We show that standard results from the career concerns literature can be reversed in the presence of human capital accumulation. Namely, implicit incentives need not decrease over time and may decrease with the degree of uncertainty about an individual's talent. Furthermore, increasing the pre-cision of output measurement can weaken rather than strengthen implicit incentives. Overall, our results contribute to shed new light on the ability of markets to discipline moral hazard in the absence of explicit contracts linking pay to performance.

Percepção do médico sobre pagamento por desempenho no gerenciamento de doenças cardiovasculares: o caso de uma operadora de plano de saúde

Desde os anos 50, os fatores de risco para as doenças cardiovasculares passaram a ser valorizados. O gerenciamento de doenças cardiovasculares (PGC) busca a construção da autonomia e melhoria da qualidade de vida dos pacientes. Em alguns países, para alcançar esses objetivos, tem sido apontada a utilização de programas de pagamento por desempenho (PPP) aos médicos como um dos elementos de melhoria nos processos e nos resultados dos pacientes e na condição de remuneração. O objetivo deste estudo é analisar o ponto de vista dos médicos sobre a implantação dos pagamentos por desempenho vinculados ao PGC em uma operadora de plano de saúde. Trata-se de investigação de caráter qualitativo, do tipo estudo de caso, apresentando entrevistas semiestruturadas com médicos participantes ou não do PGC, em setembro de 2009, tendo como referência as ações implantadas em 2008. Foram entrevistados 23 médicos (14 homens e 09 mulheres). Como resultado foi observado que o incentivo financeiro é reconhecido pelos médicos como importante, mas não determinante da inclusão de pacientes no PGC. O principal motivo apresentado foi a organização do cuidado, no qual o paciente é mais bem acompanhado e controlado, e o trabalho médico, avaliado segundo parâmetros preestabelecidos. O PGC e o PPP têm potencial de transformação do cuidado em saúde. O trabalho multidisciplinar e a maior produtividade nos atendimentos no consultório foram os principais efeitos positivos identificados. Outros estudos são necessários para acompanhar a evolução e os efeitos do pagamento por desempenho no trabalho médico.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

The influence of financial participation and participation in decision-making on employee job attitudes

This study investigates the direct and indirect effects of financial participation (FP) and participation in decision-making (PDM) on employee job attitudes. The central premise is that both financial participation and participation in decision-making have effects on job attitudes, such as integration, involvement and commitment, perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, satisfaction and motivation. After reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature and testing two theoretical frameworks, developed by Long (1978a) and Florkowski ( 1989), a new model was constructed to consider a combined effects of both FP and PDM, herein referred to as employee participation (EP). The underpinning of the model is based on the assumption that both ( a) the combination of financial participation and participation in decision-making ('employee participation'), and (b) participation in decision-making produce favourable effects on employee job attitudes. The test of the new model showed that employee participation does not produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes, than does participation in decision-making on its own. The data were gathered from a questionnaire study administered in a large British retail organization that operates two types of ownership schemes - profit-sharing and SAYE schemes.

How can HRM promote organizational innovation

Our work investigating managerial practices in UK manufacturing organisations has shown that people management practices play an important role in promoting innovation. Having developed an instrument to analyse innovation (defined by West and Farr in 1990 as “the intentional introduction and application in a job, work team or organisation of ideas, processes, products or procedures which are new, and designed to benefit the job, the work team or the organisation”), we were able to give each of the 30 organisations in our sample a score of between one and seven to capture innovation in a range of domains. This instrument took into account the magnitude of the innovation in terms of the number of people involved in its implementation, and how new and different it was. We found that much innovation involves relatively minor, ongoing improvements, rather than major change. To achieve sustained innovation, organisations must be able to draw upon the skills and knowledge of employees at all levels of the business. So which HRM practices are most likely to promote a positive learning environment? We developed a scale to take into account three facets of HRM that shape the learning environment and predict the extent to which individuals can gain the skills to promote innovation. First, organisations should have a vision statement capturing their approach to learning and development and communicating to staff the importance that they attach to these processes. Second, they must implement and endorse mentoring schemes. Last, they should consider offering staff the opportunity to have regular career development meetings. Where a positive learning climate exists, organisations tend to be more innovative. The results also show that organisations that make explicit the link between appraisal and remuneration perform relatively less well in innovation terms than those whose appraisal systems have no relationship with pay. Many have argued (for example, Lawler,1995) that pay-for-performance schemes provide a “line of sight” between performance and reward, thereby enabling individuals to make appropriate decisions about where best to direct the effort. Our findings do not imply that performance-related pay is ill advised in all circumstances, but we suggest that organisations should exercise caution before introducing such schemes. People are central to innovation, and this study suggests that high innovation can be achieved when people are empowered to make changes at local levels. HRM has an important, perhaps crucial, role to play in creating an environment that enables people to develop the skills and confidence necessary to affect change. Key points: Organisational innovation is an important determinant of competitive performance and advancement, enabling organisations to anticipate and respond to the challenges of globalisation. HRM has an important, perhaps crucial, role to play in promoting organisational innovation – to the extent that it creates a positive environment for learning and removes barriers that may inhibit creative performance (for example, linking appraisal to remuneration).

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

Palkitsemisen vaikutus kaupan alan myymälähenkilökunnan työmotivaatioon ja työsuoritukseen

Palkitseminen on yksi keskeisimmistä työmotivaatioon ja työsuoritukseen vaikuttavista elementeistä. Tässä kvalitatiivisella tutkimusmenetelmällä laaditussa Pro gradu-tutkielmassa tutkitaan palkitsemisen vaikutusta kaupan alan myymälähenkilökunnan työmotivaatioon ja työsuoritukseen. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää millä tutki-muksen kohdeorganisaation nykyisillä kokonaispalkitsemisen keinoista on merkittävin vaikutus myymälähenkilökunnan työmotivaatioon ja työsuoritukseen. Lisäksi tutkimus havinnollistaa, millaisilla muilla palkitsemisen keinoilla pystytään vaikuttamaan myymälähenkilökunnan työmotivaatioon siten, että sen vaikutus heijastuu positiivisena impulssina myös työntekijän työsuoritukseen. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen viitekehys on rakennettu kokonaispalkitsemisen ja työmotivaation ympärille ja näkökulmia peilataan sekä yksilön kokeman oikeudenmukaisuuden, että yrityksen strategisen palkitsemisen näkökulmista. Tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan nähdä, että tulokseen sidottu palkitseminen on yksi keskeisimmistä työsuoritukseen vaikuttavista palkitsemisen elementeistä myyntityössä. Työsuoritukseen ja työmotivaatioon pystytään vaikuttamaan myös itsenäisellä työskentelytavalla, uramahdollisuuksilla ja ammatillisen kehittymisen mahdollisuuksilla. Kohdeorganisaation kokonaispalkitsemisen mallia tulisikin muokata vastaamaan entistä paremmin näitä indikaattoreita, jotta kokonaispalkitsemisen malli toimisi strategisen palkitsemisen näkökulmasta mahdollisimman optimaalisella tavalla.

Diseño y aplicación de un modelo de remuneración variable para una empresa del sector de las telecomunicaciones

Actualmente encontramos una fuerte presión en las organizaciones por adaptarse a un mundo competitivo con un descenso en las utilidades y una incertidumbre constante en su flujo de caja. Estas circunstancias obligan a las organizaciones al mejoramiento continuo buscando nuevas formas de gestionar sus procesos y sus recursos. Para las organizaciones de prestación de servicios en el sector de telecomunicaciones una de las ventajas competitivas más importantes de obtener es la productividad debido a que sus ganancias dependen directamente del número de actividades que puedan ejecutar cada empleado. El reto es hacer más con menos y con mejor calidad. Para lograrlo, la necesidad de gestionar efectivamente los recursos humanos aparece, y aquí es donde los sistemas de compensación toman un rol importante. El objetivo en este trabajo es diseñar y aplicar un modelo de remuneración variable para una empresa de prestación de servicios profesionales en el sector de las telecomunicaciones y con esto aportar al estudio de la gestión del desempeño y del talento humano en Colombia. Su realización permitió la documentación del diseño y aplicación del modelo de remuneración variable en un proyecto del sector de telecomunicaciones en Colombia. Su diseño utilizó las tendencias de programas remunerativos y teorías de gestión de desempeño para lograr un modelo integral que permita el crecimiento sostenido en el largo plazo y la motivación al recurso más importante de la organización que es el talento humano. Su aplicación permitió también la documentación de problemas y aciertos en la implementación de estos modelos.

On the endogeneity of the pay-performance relationship in professional soccer

In this reply we show that the Nüesch (2009) comment paper to our initial contribution (Torgler and Schmidt 2007) has several shortcomings. He suggests that professional soccer wages seem to buy talent rather than motivation. We therefore provide a larger set of talent proxies and estimations to check whether this assertion is correct. Our results indicate that his conclusion is problematic. We still observe a strong motivational effect, and in some cases the effect is even larger than the talent effect. A further key problem in Nüesch’s contribution is the fact that he neglects to consider the relevance of the relative salary situation.