Pratt's hand book for bank directors and officers; treatise on the powers, duties and liabilities of bank directors and officers, with digest of decisions of the course and references to cases cited.

Mode of access: Internet.

The law of directors and officers of joint stock companies, their powers, duties and liabilities,

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigating the development of the internal and external service tasks of non-executive directors: the case of the Netherlands (1997-2005)

During the last decade, globalisation and liberalisation of financial markets, changing societal expectations and corporate governance scandals have increased the attention for the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors. In this context, recent corporate governance reform initiatives have emphasised the control task and independence of non-executive directors. However, little attention has been paid to their impact on the external and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. Therefore, this paper investigates how the service tasks of non-executive directors have evolved in the Netherlands. Data on corporate governance at the top-100 listed companies in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2005 show that the emphasis on non-executive directors' external service task has shifted to their internal service task, i.e. from non-executive directors acting as boundary spanners to non-executive directors providing advice and counselling to executive directors. This shift in board responsibilities affects non-executive directors' ability to generate network benefits through board relationships and has implications for non-executive directors' functional requirements.

A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues Relating to Nominee Directors

Dans la foulée des scandales financiers ayant secoué le milieu des affaires ces dernières années, l’efficacité des pratiques de régie d’entreprise, et, en particulier celles liées à l’indépendance des administrateurs, a été passée au crible. L’administrateur désigné par une partie pour la représenter est un type d’administrateur que l’on rencontre fréquemment au sein des conseils d’administration des entreprises. Toutefois, l’on peut se questionner sur l’indépendance réelle de ces administrateurs, considérant leur loyauté envers la personne les ayant désignés, laquelle détient habituellement un intérêt à titre d’actionnaire ou de partie prenante dans l’entreprise visée. En outre, alors que les principes légaux requièrent que les administrateurs agissent dans le meilleur intérêt de l’entreprise, la réalité pratique est parfois toute autre: aux prises avec les instructions ou les souhaits de la personne les ayant nommés, les administrateurs désignés se retrouvent placés en situation inhérente de conflit d’intérêts. Ce texte vise à offrir une analyse détaillée au sujet de l’administrateur désigné et du conflit d’intérêts résultant de cette double exigence de loyauté. L’objectif est de présenter un examen approfondi des diverses difficultés résultant de la nomination d’un administrateur désigné ou associées à celle-ci, ainsi que des réponses judiciaires et législatives liées à cette problématique. Cette réflexion mènera à une exploration de certains systèmes législatifs et légaux, en particulier ceux du Royaume-Uni, de l’Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande, afin d’obtenir une meilleure compréhension et d’offrir une perspective éclairée quant aux enjeux analysés par la présente.

Some care, little responsibility? Promoting directors'and managers' legal accountability for Occupational Health and Safety in the workplace

Health and safety at work remains a serious and under-recognised problem in Australia. This paper argues for the importance of increasing the individual responsibility and accountability of senior managers and directors of corporations for the development and maintenance of occupational health and safety (OHS) standards in the workplace. In order to do so, the paper first sets out the range of statutory and general law duties and liabilities to which directors and senior managers are subject, considers to what extent these obligations have relevance in the OHS area and argues for the extension of these duties and liabilities in some circumstances. The paper then goes on to argue for a better legislative model for the legal responsibility of managers and officers, supported by the increased prosecution of individuals in appropriate circumstances, as well as acknowledging the benefits of a broader range of non-legal strategies to improve board level commitment to OHS that will influence corporate compliance overall.

Models for reform : the directors’ duty of care in a modern commercial world

The Australian responses to corporate collapses in the modern commercial world have been
implemented at both judicial and legislative levels over a period of decades. South Africa has lagged behind the reform process, only recently reviewing its company laws with a view to legislatively incorporating, inter alia, its directors’ duties. The consequence of such review of the duty of care is found in subsection 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This article critically evaluates the existing South African common law and the new legislative directors’ duty of care in light of the equivalent duties in Australia and the United States. The analysis ultimately aims at determining whether the approach taken in any of these jurisdictions provides useful guidance in regard to reform options for the duty of care. While the Companies Act contains features that are preferable to the Australian Corporations Act 2001, the impact of the Companies Act on crucial features, such as the objectivity of the duty of care, is unclear and will have to await judicial review. It is concluded that while the South African measures at times echo Australian law in a positive manner, the Australian legislative regime is not without legitimate criticism as it can be unnecessarily complicated. Ultimately it is the United States and Australian common law duty of care that provides the best model for legislative reform.

Putting the spoils of litigation into the shareholders’ pockets: when can shareholders bring a personal action against the directors of their company?

company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its rightsand liabilities appropriate to itself”.2 A consequence of this is the “proper plaintiff” principleestablished in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189: the proper plaintiff in an action inrespect of a wrong done to a corporation is the corporation itself.3 It is also a “hallowed rule” thatdirectors owe their duties to the company, not the shareholders,4 and so any loss accruing to thecompany as a result of the directors’ breach of their duties is recoverable only by the company.5An obvious problem with this state of affairs is that a company will be unlikely to initiateproceedings against its directors when the company is controlled by those directors.6 While there aregood economic reasons for this division of management and ownership,7 shareholders are left with acritical question: under what circumstances can they initiate proceedings to recover loss suffered as aresult of company directors’ breach of their duties? Although one writer has referred to the“expansive statutory and common law arsenals” available to aggrieved shareholders,8 it seems ratherthe case that there are few effective remedies. For shareholders have no contractual relationship withdirectors,9 and the personal rights conferred on shareholders by statute or general law are largelyprocedural10 and seem a rather ineffective basis for “scrutinising directorial performance”.

Frameworks in regulating company directors : rethinking the philosophical foundations to enhance accountability

Sets out a system of corporate governance regulation, aimed at combining legal and social methods of governing director behaviour and at creating a framework flexible enough to accommodate different business and ethical cultures. Outlines the theoretical basis of corporate governance and the broad responsibilities of directors, and discusses the extent to which they can and should be regulated. Discusses the constitution of a regulatory framework encompassing law, soft law and best practice, and ethics.

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

The 2008 declaration of independence by the Hong Kong Court and anomalies in the Hong Kong Company Law

Discusses two aspects of Hong Kong law: 1) the judgment of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in A Solicitor v The Law Society of Hong Kong on whether Hong Kong courts were bound, post-1997, by pre-1997 House of Lords or Privy Council decisions, by pre-1997 decisions of their own, or by post-1997 overseas decisions from any jurisdiction; and 2) the need for clarification in the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance of whether a company can have a single legal representative, the ultra vires rule and the duties of company directors

Conceptualising a Chinese corporate governance framework : tensions between tradition, ideologies and modernity

Reflects on the challenges facing China's efforts to reform its corporate governance framework, and the extent to which the modernisation can be reconciled with the country's cultural traditions. Examines the development of China's legal and economic reforms since 1978, the debate which these have generated ad the shortcomings of the current corporate governance regime. Discusses how Confucian principles might be applied to issues of director's duties and corporate governance, and explains the benefits of such an approach.

Regulating non-executive directors in Australia : a socio-legal approach

Discusses the role of legislation and codes of conduct in influencing the behaviour of non-executive directors. Outlines the functions of a board of directors and considers the role on non-executive directors in particular. Traces the development of standards of skill required on non-executive directors both under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and under common law. Questions whether these have brought about a real change in behaviour. Considers whether professionalisation of directorship could be more effective.