Substrata Uralica : Studies on Finno-Ugrian Substrate in Northern Russian Dialects

The thesis consists of five articles and an introduction. It treats the problems of the Uralic substrate, most notably, the substrate toponyms, in the Russian dialects of Arkhangelsk region. The articles contribute to the general linguistic discussion concerning the nature of linguistic substrate and the outcome of language shift and to the onomastic discussion concerning the etymologisation and ethnic interpretation of substrate toponymy. Among the questions the articles scrutinised are the following: 1) How may phonetic and morphosyntactic substrate interference be verified? 2) How typical is the transfer of vocabulary in the case of a language shift? 3) How the borrowing of toponymy and appellative vocabulary are connected in the case of a language shift? 4) How does the etymologisation of the toponyms differ from the etymologisation of appellatives? 5) How reliable can the toponymic etymologies be? 6) How can the substrate language be identified? It is found that the substrate interference that can be meaningfully studied, from the point of view of historical linguistics, is predominantly lexical and not related to phonetics and morphosyntax, as presumed in many handbooks. New methods are outlined for the identification of substrate languages separately from the lexical, phonological and typological point of view by using the substrate toponymy as the main source of information on extinct languages. A reliability scale for the toponymic etymologies is developed that helps to identify the kinds of etymologies containing ethnohistorically meaningful information. The study also sheds light on questions related to Uralistics and Slavistics. The most important of these are the following: 1) Which Uralic languages were spoken in North Russia prior to Slavic? 2) When did the Slavicisation of the Finno-Ugrian population take place in the area of the Arkhangelsk Region? 3) What is the significance of the Finno-Ugrian substrate in northern Russian dialects to comparative Uralistics? 4) Are there any traces of pre-Uralic substrate languages in north-eastern Europe? The Finnic substrate languages, already identified by earlier studies, seem to have consisted of two groups, one of which was closest to the southern Finnic. Also, language(s) close to Sámi in some respects though not identical with it where spoken in pre-Slavic North Russia.

Pre-emptive Breeding for Russian Wheat Aphid Resistance

The aims of the project are to 1) identify closely linked molecular markers to resistance genes and validate them in Australian wheat and barley backgrounds, and 2) introgress RWA resistance into Australian wheat and barley backgrounds.

Juutalaisvastaisuus suomalaisissa aikakauslehdissä ja kirjallisuudessa 1918-1944

Anti-Semitism existed in Finland during the whole period covered by this study. The immoral acts associated with Jews in the articles were mostly regarded as universal habits, qualities and/or modes of action, that is, unconnected with any particular Finnish Jew. Researchers have tried to explain anti-Semitism in several ways. The theory of Jews as outsiders has been a popular explanation as well as xenophobia, chimerical anti-Semitism and the socio-economic models. The main sources of this study have been over 400 Finnish periodicals and magazines, literature and text books published between 1918 and 1944. This vast number of magazines includes those of the army and the civil guard, religion, humour and the papers of the Finnish extreme right. One can see a distinct foreign and especially German influence in the subjects and phraseology of Finnish anti-Semitic writings between 1918 and 1944. Several known Finnish anti-Semitic writers had some kind of link with Germany. Some Finnish organisations and societies were openly anti-Semitic during this period. There had been cycles in the activity of anti-Semitic writing in Finland, obvious peaks appearing in 1918 1919, 1929 1931, 1933 1938 and 1942 1944. The reason for the 1918 1919 activity was the civil rights which were granted to the Jews in Finland, and the Russian Bolshevik revolution. The worldwide depression from 1929 to 1932 seem to be the reason for new anti-Semitic writing activity. The rise of National Socialism in Germany and the influence this phenomenon had in Finland was the reason for the peak during 1933 1938. During the continuation war 1942 1944 National Socialist Germany was fighting side-by-side with Finland and their anti-Semitic propaganda found easier access to Finland. Of the 433 magazines, journals and newspapers which were used in this study, 71 or 16.4 per cent had at least one article that can be identified as anti-Semitic; especially the magazines of national socialists and other extreme right parties were making anti-Semitic annotations. There were about 50 people known to have written anti-Semitic articles. At least half of these known writers had studied at the university, including as many as 10 priests. Over and above these, there was an even larger number of people who wrote under a pseudonym. The material used suggested that anti-Semitism was not very popular in Finland between 1918 and 1944. Anti-Semitic articles appeared mostly in the magazines of the extreme right, but their circulation was not very large. A proof of the slight influence of these extreme right anti-Semitic ideas is that, beside the tightening of policy towards Jewish immigrants in 1938 and the handing over of eight of these refugees to Germany in 1942, the official policy of Finland never became anti-Semitic. As was stated before, despite the cycles in the number of writings, there does not appear to have been any noticeable change in public opinion. One must also remember that most Finns had not at that period actually met a Jew. The material used suggests that between 1918 and 1944 the so-called Jewish question was seemingly unimportant for most Finns and their attitude to Jews and Jewishness can be described as neutral.

The Vexing Case of Igor Shafarevich, a Russian Political Thinker

The Russian mathematician, academician and former dissident Igor Shafarevich (b. 1923) is commonly mentioned in Western scholarly studies on perestroika and post-perestroika-era Russian politics as one of the most notable anti-Semites and extreme nationalists of the country. This notoriety owes to Shafarevich’s old samizdat article Russophobia, which was published in 1988. The scandal surrounding Russophobia came to a head when the president of The National Academy of Sciences in the United States asked Shafarevich, its honorary member, to resign. Nothing like this had ever happened in the academy’s history. The present dissertation discusses Shafarevich’s political activities, his texts and ideas as well as their reception. Particular attention is given to Russophobia, whose detailed examination proves very clearly that its reputation as an anti-Semitic text is groundless. The reasons for Russophobia’s hasty but fierce condemnation were many, but only one was that when the Soviet system began to tumble, it was commonly assumed that a vigorous rise in anti-Semitism and extreme nationalism in the Soviet Union/Russia would be just a matter of time. Many observers were highly sensitised to detecting its signs and symptoms. The dissertation also shows that most of those to write the first criticisms of Russophobia and to liken Shafarevich to the ideologues of Nazi Germany were the same people he had criticised in Russophobia for their deterministic view of history and irrational manner of connecting things for the purpose of fanning the flames of distrust between Russia’s Jews and Russians. In retrospect, it is fairly evident that Shafarevich actually managed to effectively “neutralise” the message of many of those obsessed with the Jews among his Russian contemporaries and contributed to the fact that anti-Jewish sentiments have been a great deal less popular in post-communist Russia than so many had feared and expected. The thesis also thoroughly discusses Shafarevich’s other texts and activities before Russophobia’s appearance and after it. In the 1970s, Shafarevich was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He worked together with academician Andrei Sakharov in a dissidents’ unofficial human rights committee and co-operated closely with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn before Solzhenitsyn’s exile. Then, during the chaotic years of perestroika, Shafarevich defended the basic rights of ordinary citizens and warned that the hype concerning democracy could become counterproductive if the most palpable result of the reforms was the disappearance of citizens’ basic security and elementary social justice. One of the conclusions of the thesis is that even if the world around Shafarevich has changed considerably, his views have remained essentially the same since the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs’ shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia’s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article “Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence” by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs’ behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article “A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights” by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs’ behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster.

Paganism, Traditionalism, Nationalism : Narratives of Russian Rodnoverie

The topic of this dissertation is Rodnoverie, a religion that revives pre-Christian Slavic spirituality. Rodnoverie has been noted to be one of the fastest growing new religions in Russia and the aim of the study is to analyse why and how the movement has attained its popularity. First, the analysis asks how Rodnovers themselves explain the revival of ancient Paganism at this particular historical moment. Secondly, these interpretations are reflected in the framework of sociological discussions about contemporary religiosity. The analysis discusses how the Rodnoverie movement corresponds to some tendencies that are considered to characterise late modern religiosity. The primary material of the research is Rodnoverie texts: books, newspapers and electronic articles. The published literature is supplemented by fieldwork material which includes interviews with some Rodnoverie leaders and the author s participant observation of rituals and gatherings. Methodologically, the study draws on a sociological narrative approach that is focused on examining how individuals and groups use narratives to construct their identities and to challenge mainstream discussions and interpretations. The analysis discerns three narratives. The first one of these portrays Rodnoverie as a revival of the native Russian or Slavic religion. The narrative provides a new version of the old Slavophile idea, according to which imitation of the West has misguided Russia and, therefore, Russians should turn to their own tradition. In the second narrative, Rodnoverie is presented as a nature religion that features tolerance and pluralistic values. According to these perceptions, the emergence of Rodnoverie marks the dead-end of the earlier hegemonic universalistic world-views, the mono-ideologies . While the nationalist narrative focuses on Russia s national heritage, the third narrative interprets the tradition in more universal terms as an alternative to modern values and way of life. The main argument of this narrative is that contemporary people have become alienated from nature, their roots and their community. The themes that are discussed in the theoretical literature on late modern religiosity often configure in Rodnovers interpretations either directly or when looked at through an analytical framework. Of the various themes that are addressed in a sociological study of religion the ones that have most relevance for Rodnoverie are the discussions on individualisation, globalisation and secularisation. Rodnoverie reflects such tendencies as the subjectivisation of religion and the modern crisis of authority. The movement also both exemplifies and actively promotes religious pluralisation in Russia.

The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs’ shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia’s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article “Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence” by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs’ behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article “A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights” by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs’ behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster.