493 resultados para Nietzsche Minaj
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O objetivo desta tese é o de propor uma via de interpretação e significação possível ao problema ético-estético ou ético-poiētico da criação de si a partir da formulação de um conceito de hipocrisia. A partir de um espectro de análises acerca das práticas de engano, compõe-se um cenário inicial na forma de prolegômenos, nos quais se esboça uma distinção entre hipocrisia e autoengano, sob dois registros: formal, com a distinção de perspectivas entre enganar e ser enganado, com base no reconhecimento do engano; e processual, onde a hipocrisia, como incorporação intencional de personagens, distingue-se do autoengano como processo não reconhecido de incorporação de crenças. O primeiro capítulo dedica-se a compreender como as práticas de engano e a hipocrisia vêm a se tornar um problema moral. Remontando o problema aos gregos, abrem-se, para além dessa condenação, vias para uma reavaliação das formas de inteligência astuciosa nomeada por mêtis. No segundo capítulo, procura-se elaborar um conceito de hipocrisia como significação ao problema ético e estético da criação de si. A oposição entre as formas éticas da amizade e da lisonja, tendo em comum a atenção ao kairós, o tempo oportuno, é o mote para se pensar duas formas de discurso: o retórico, comandado pela mêtis, e o filosófico, pautado pela parrēsía; e para se propor uma forma de cuidado de si distinta da que é constituída pelo discurso parrēsiástico e vertida em ḗthos pela áskēsis. Tal seria a criação de si pela atenção aos acasos e instintos e teria como modelo o trabalho de incorporação e manejo artístico próprio à arte do ator. Daí emerge o conceito de hipocrisia como: arte de interpretar um saber da dóxa pela mestria do kairós, e de configurá-lo pela mímēsis de modo a criar a si como autor e obra de si mesmo. No terceiro capítulo, com enfoque interpretativo, toma-se esse conceito de hipocrisia como fio condutor para uma articulação entre três aspectos do pensamento de Nietzsche: i) a compreensão extramoral acerca das práticas de engano, tendo a vontade de aparência como aquilo que lhes subjaz; ii) a perspectiva epistêmica de processos sem sujeito, tendo as noções de máscara e interpretação como mote para se pensar a hipocrisia como um manuseio ou manejo artístico visando à criação de um eu hipócrita; e iii) a proposta ético-estética de criação de si e constituição de um caráter, onde a hipocrisia poderia ser compreendida como uma ética-estética do espírito livre, que pela incessante troca de papéis, cria a si como obra de arte e se torna o que é.
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O tema da existência ou inexistência de uma filosofia política nietzschiana é recorrente nos meios acadêmicos, e é imensamente problemático desde a vinculação do nome do filósofo às ideologias fascistas da primeira metade do século XX. Especialmente a partir da segunda metade do século XX, a filosofia de Nietzsche tem sido trazida para os debates políticos, dessa vez como uma filosofia das grandes causas, daqueles que buscam a libertação do jugo dos grandes esquemas políticos da modernidade. O objetivo inicial desta dissertação é demonstrar que filosofia de Nietzsche não possui as características que permitam a sua assimilação pelo debate político. O próprio filósofo, reiteradamente, negou-se a ingressar no debate político de seu tempo, recusando-se a limitar seu exame da filosofia e suas reflexões às necessidades e clamores da plebe. Ele alertou para a dureza e radicalidade de seu pensamento, antecipando a vinculação de seu nome a coisas terríveis. Em vista disso, pretende-se levar a cabo nesta dissertação um exame da filosofia nietzschiana sob o ponto de vista da política, isto é, tentar ver se ao quadro geral da filosofia política pode-se juntar o pensamento de Nietzsche. Este exame deve ser feito levando-se em conta o amplo auditório ao qual se destinam os discursos políticos, o vínculo dos discursos políticos aos clamores da plebe, ou ao discurso de dominação. O objetivo final desta dissertação será demonstrar que fora do âmbito da filosofia, isto é, trazida para o seio do senso comum, a filosofia de Nietzsche, dado o caráter controvertido de suas asserções, acaba sendo presa fácil, mais uma vez, dos discursos de dominação e servindo aos piores propósitos. Corre-se o risco, outra vez, de se confirmar o vaticínio do filósofo quanto a sua vinculação a coisas terríveis.
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Esta tese de doutorado é dedicada ao estudo do pensamento de Nietzsche quanto à liberdade e à responsabilidade. Circunscrevendo-se no período que vai de Humano, demasiado Humano até as obras da maturidade produtiva do filósofo, o autor busca identificar os diversos meios que o pensador usou para tentar conceber uma noção de liberdade individual que não incorresse nos pressupostos metafísicos que historicamente determinaram seu conceito, problematizando assim as noções de sujeito, autodeterminação, intencionalidade, vontade, metas, motivos da ação e, particulamente, a noção de responsabilidade. Por meio da análise crítica de determinadas referências teóricas do filósofo, junto de uma leitura cronológica que acompanha as transformações conceituais presentes nas obras publicadas e nas anotações póstumas, esta pesquisa mostra o caminho de experimentação por meio do qual o pensamento de Nietzsche tomou forma e amadureceu ao longo dos anos. O problema que orienta toda a concepção da tese é o questionamento sobre como ser possível a responsabilidade no interior da própria desconstrução do sentido quanto aos critérios de avaliação das ações, de seus motivos e objetivos. Neste sentido, esta pesquisa investiga como Nietzsche busca por outros critérios que possibilitem avaliações e ações com engajamento efetivo e duradouro. Na medida em que sua busca por superação da metafísica envolve o ensaio de pensar num outro modo de relação com a prática de estabilização do devir que não exclua a assunção de sua vigência e as consequências disso, o autor postula a hipótese interpretativa de que o ideal moral de Nietzsche reside na figura do indivíduo soberano apresentado em Para a Genealogia da Moral, no qual se concretizaria a viabilidade de uma forma de comprometimento com projetos e pessoas, reinstaurando-se a liberdade e a responsabilidade como critérios de autorealização que superem, ao mesmo tempo, os seus tradicionais critérios metafísico-niilistas, por meio de uma outra compreensão de subjetividade e de autodeterminação, a partir da prática de experimentos de auto superação que não incorram necessariamente na impossibilidade de engajamentos duradouros.
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The influence of the Essays of Michel de Montaigne on the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche has, hitherto, received scant scholarly attention. The aim of this thesis is to address this lacuna in the literature by making evident the importance of the Essays to the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I argue that, in order to fully appreciate Nietzsche’s thought, it must be recognized that, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical life, Montaigne was for him a thinker of the deepest personal and philosophical significance. Against the received scholarly opinion, which would see Montaigne as influential only for Nietzsche’s middle works, I contend that the Essays continue to be a key inspiration for Nietzsche even into his late and final works. Montaigne, with his cheerful affirmation of life, his experimental mode of philosophizing, and his resolutely naturalized perspective, was an exemplar for Nietzsche as a philosopher, psychologist, sceptic and naturalist. The Essays not only stimulated Nietzsche’s thinking on questions to do with morality, epistemology and the nature of the soul but also informed his conception of the ideal philosophical life. Moreover, to explore the Essays from a Nietzschean viewpoint, allows the drawing out of the more radical aspects of Montaigne’s thought, while to probe Montaigne’s impact on Nietzsche, provides insight into the trajectory of Nietzsche’s philosophy as he broke free from romantic pessimism and embraced the naturalism that would guide his works from Human, All Too Human onward.
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In this thesis, I examine the relationship between the Kyoto School philosopher, Nishitani Keiji, and the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, focusing on the two thinkers’ respective approaches to the problem of nihilism. The work begins by positioning Nishitani’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s account of nihilism with reference to diverse readings of Nietzsche in Western scholarship. I then consider the development of Nishitani’s reading of Nietzsche from his lecture series on nihilism, The Self- Overcoming of Nihilism, through to his magnum opus, Religion and Nothingness. I make two key contributions to recent scholarly debate on Nishitani’s relationship to Nietzsche. The first is to emphasise the importance of Nishitani’s response to the idea of eternal recurrence for understanding his critical approach to Nietzsche’s thinking. I argue against the view, offered by Bret Davis, that Nishitani’s criticisms of Nietzsche are primarily based on the former’s negative assessment of the idea of will to power. The second contribution is to situate Nishitani’s critical approach to eternal recurrence within his broader attempt to formulate a Zen-influenced conception of temporality and historicity. I then argue for the necessity of this conceptual background for coming to grips with his conception of the ‘transhistorical’ grounds of historicity in emptiness (śūnyatā), as outlined in the later chapters of Religion and Nothingness.
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In this paper I identify and discuss some themes in the thought of Nietzsche and Bergson respectively as these bear upon the wider project to which the paper contributes – the articulation of a philosophical naturalism which offers a non-reductive account of the origin and nature of religion on the basis that the real is 'religious' in essence. Implicitly, an alternative is thereby proposed to the approaches and presuppositions of the 'theological turn' perspective within contemporary 'continental philosophy of religion'. [PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR]
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Dr. Alexander Tille (1866–1912) was one of the key-figures in Anglo-German intercultural transfer towards the end of the 19th century. As a lecturer in German at Glasgow University he was the first to translate and edit Nietzsche’s work into English. Writers such as W. B. Yeats were influenced by Nietzsche and used Tille’s translations. Tille’s social Darwinist reading of the philosopher’s oeuvre, however, had a narrowing impact on the reception of Nietzsche in the Anglo-Saxon world for decades. Through numerous publications Tille disseminated knowledge about British authors (e.g., Robert Louis Stevenson, William Wordsworth) in Germany and about German authors (e.g., Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) in Britain. His role as mediator also extended into areas such as history, religion, and industry. During the Boer war, however, Tille’s outspoken pro-German nationalism brought him in conflict with his British host society. After being physically attacked by his students he returned to Germany and published a highly anglophobic monograph. Tille personifies the paradox of Anglo-German relations in the pre-war years, which deteriorated despite an increase in intercultural transfer and knowledge about the respective Other. [From the Author]
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Dissertação de Doutoramento em Filosofia
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Dissertação de Mestrado em Filosofia Política
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Tese apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Filosofia
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Pretende-se, neste estudo, levar a cabo uma investigação aos primeiros escritos de Friedrich Nietzsche, com o intuito de compreender de que forma o manifesto jovial interesse do filósofo pelas questões da linguagem pode revelar-nos uma perspectiva muito particular e peculiar sobre a vida e sobre o homem em relação com a vida. Para tal, tentar-se-á demonstrar que subjacente ao problema da linguagem está a questão - herdada de Kant e de Schopenhauer - da inacessibilidade, por parte dos homens, à «coisa em si», e que a esta questão, por sua vez, corresponde um esboço da constituição do homem enquanto insuficiente e incompleta perante a tarefa de conhecer a essência das coisas, de conhecer-se a si mesmo e ao seu papel no cosmos. Por outra parte, dependendo o conhecimento humano da linguagem conceptual, será de particular relevância, numa primeira instância, analisar a noção Nietzschiana de metáfora e, por consequência, o papel que o autor concede ao esquecimento. Será posto em evidência e sob análise o ponto de vista do filósofo segundo o qual a linguagem conceptual resulta de um processo duplamente metafórico que transforma um X para nós inacessível numa imagem e essa imagem, posteriormente, num som, ou seja, numa palavra. Concluir-se-á que, para que o homem possa crer na representatividade das palavras, de acordo com os escritos aurorais de Nietzsche, tornar-se-ia imperiosa a capacidade de esquecer a génese metafórica dos conceitos. Por outras palavras, apenas mediante o esquecimento poderia o homem viver com alguma tranquilidade e serenidade, confiando na verdade resultante do imenso edifício de conceitos por si mesmo criado. Ora, uma vez que tal verdade seria meramente humana, não correspondendo, como tal, a uma veritas aeterna, Nietzsche desenvolve, por um lado, uma crítica à razão pós-Socrática e à metafísica teísta, ambas vigentes na modernidade e sustentadas por uma racionalidade incapaz, por definição, de aceder à verdade, e, por outro lado, uma metafísica de artista pensada a partir dos gregos pré-Socráticos. Para que possamos entender esta metafísica, teremos de reflectir acerca da dicotomia, evidenciada, em especial, no Nascimento da Tragédia, entre Apolo e Dioniso, representando o primeiro um mundo de belas formas plásticas e de sonhos, e o segundo o Uno primordial que romperia com o principium individuationis apolíneo. Acima de tudo mais, será do intuito desta reflexão perceber como, no espírito da tragédia grega, no centro do conflito entre os impulsos dionisíacos e apolíneos, Nietzsche descobre um jogo de transitoriedade, i.e. do devir, e entender qual o papel que o filósofo concede, nesse jogo, ao indivíduo, ou seja, ao homem.
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Memory Mixed with Desire: A preliminary study of Philosophy and Literature in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Milan Kundera Robert Spinelli Brock University, Department of Philosophy This thesis studies intertextuality in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Milan Kundera through the primary themes of memory and forgetting. The thesis starts with two introductory chapters that delineate memory according to Nietzsche and Kundera respectively. From here, I move into a discussion of Nietzsche's Ubermensch as an example of the type of forgetting that Nietzsche sees as a cure for the overabundance of memory that has led to Christian morality. Next, I explore the Kunderan concept of kitsch as the polar opposite of what Nietzsche has sought in his philosophy, finishing the chapter by tying the two thinkers together in a Kunderan critique of Nietzsche. The thesis ends with a chapter devoted to the Eternal Return beginning with an exegesis of Nietzsche's idea and ending with a similar exegesis of Kundera's treatment of this thought. What I suggest in this chapter is that the Eternal Return might itself be a form of kitsch even in its attempt to revalue existence.
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I will argue that the doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same no better interprets cosmology than pink elephants interpret zoology. I will also argue that the eternal-reiurn-of-the-same doctrine as what Magnus calls "existential imperative" is without possibility of application and thus futile. To facilitate those arguments, the validity of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same will be tested under distinct rubrics. Although each rubric will stand alone, one per chapter, as an evaluation of some specific aspect of eternal recurrence, the rubric sequence has been selected to accommodate the identification of what I shall be calling logic abridgments. The conclusions to be extracted from each rubric are grouped under the heading CONCLUSION and appear immediately following rubric ten. Then, or if, at the end of a rubric a reader is inclined to wonder which rubric or topic is next, and why, the answer can be found at the top of the following page. The question is usually answered in the very first sentence, but always answered in the first paragraph. The first rubric has been placed in order by chronological entitlement in that it deals with the evolution of the idea of eternal recurrence from the time of the ancient Greeks to Nietzsche's August, 1881 inspiration. This much-recommended technique is also known as starting at the beginning. Rubric 1 also deals with 20th. Century philosophers' assessments of the relationship between Nietzsche and ancient Greek thought. The only experience of E-R, Zarathustra's mountain vision, is second only because it sets the scene alluded to in following rubrics. The third rubric explores .ii?.ih T jc,i -I'w Nietzsche's evaluation of rationality so that his thought processes will be understood appropriately. The actual mechanism of E-R is tested in rubric four...The scientific proof Nietzsche assembled in support of E-R is assessed by contemporary philosophers in rubric five. E-R's function as an ethical imperative is debated in rubrics six and seven.. .The extent to which E-R fulfills its purpose in overcoming nihilism is measured against the comfort assured by major world religions in rubric eight. Whether E-R also serves as a redemption for revenge is questioned in rubric nine. Rubric ten assures that E-R refers to return of the identically same and not merely the similar. In addition to assemblage and evaluation of all ten rubrics, at the end of each rubric a brief recapitulation of its principal points concludes the chapter. In this essay I will assess the theoretical conditions under which the doctrine cannot be applicable and will show what contradictions and inconsistencies follow if the doctrine is taken to be operable. Harold Alderman in his book Nietzsche's Gift wrote, the "doctrine of eternal recurrence gives us a problem not in Platonic cosmology, but in Socratic selfreflection." ^ I will illustrate that the recurrence doctrine's cosmogony is unworkable and that if it were workable, it would negate self-reflection on the grounds that selfreflection cannot find its cause in eternal recurrence of the same. Thus, when the cosmology is shown to be impossible, any expected ensuing results or benefits will be rendered also impossible. The so-called "heaviest burden" will be exposed as complex, engrossing "what if speculations deserving no linkings to reality. To identify ^Alderman p. 84 abridgments of logic, contradictions and inconsistencies in Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same, I. will examine the subject under the following schedule. In Chapter 1 the ancient origins of recurrence theories will be introduced. ..This chapter is intended to establish the boundaries within which the subsequent chapters, except Chapter 10, will be confined. Chapter 2, Zarathustra's vision of E-R, assesses the sections of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in which the phenomenon of recurrence of the same is reported. ..Nihilism as a psychological difficulty is introduced in this rubric, but that subject will be studied in detail in Chapter 8. In Chapter 2 the symbols of eternal recurrence of the same will be considered. Whether the recurrence image should be of a closed ring or as a coil will be of significance in many sections of my essay. I will argue that neither symbolic configuration can accommodate Nietzsche's supposed intention. Chapter 3 defends the description of E-R given by Zarathustra. Chapter 4, the cosmological mechanics of E-R, speculates on the seriousness with which Nietzsche might have intended the doctrine of eternal recurrence to be taken. My essay reports, and then assesses, the argument of those who suppose the doctrine to have been merely exploratory musings by Nietzsche on cosmological hypotheses...The cosmogony of E-R is examined. In Chapter 5, cosmological proofs tested, the proofs for Nietzsche's doctrine of return of the same are evaluated. This chapter features the position taken by Martin ' Heidegger. My essay suggests that while Heidegger's argument that recurrence of the same is a genuine cosmic agenda is admirable, it is not at all persuasive. Chapter 6, E-R is an ethical imperative, is in essence the reporting of a debate between two scholars regarding the possibility of an imperative in the doctrine of recurrence. Their debate polarizes the arguments I intend to develop. Chapter 7, does E-R of the same preclude alteration of attitudes, is a continuation of the debate presented in Chapter 6 with the focus shifted to the psychological from the cosmological aspects of eternal recurrence of the same. Chapter 8, Can E-R Overcome Nihilism?, is divided into two parts. In the first, nihilism as it applies to Nietzsche's theory is discussed. ..In part 2, the broader consequences, sources and definitions of nihilism are outlined. My essay argues that Nietzsche's doctrine is more nihilistic than are the world's major religions. Chapter 9, Is E-R a redemption for revenge?, examines the suggestion extracted from Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the doctrine of eternal recurrence is intended, among other purposes, as a redemption for mankind from the destructiveness of revenge. Chapter 10, E-R of the similar refuted, analyses a position that an element of chance can influence the doctrine of recurrence. This view appears to allow, not for recurrence of the same, but recurrence of the similar. A summary will recount briefly the various significant logic abridgments, contradictions, and inconsistencies associated with Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same. In the 'conclusion' section of my essay my own opinions and observations will be assembled from the body of the essay.
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The main thrust of this thesis is the re-exploration of Friedrich Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" through the lenses of Gilles Deleuze. A Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche is motivated by a post-deconstrnctive style of interpretation, inasmuch as Deleuze goes beyond, or in between, henneneutics and deconstrnction. Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading of Nietzsche is, however, only secondary to the main aim of this thesis. The primary thrust of this study is the critique of a way of thinking characterized by Nietzsche as nihilistic. Therefore, it should be noted that this study is not about Deleuze's reading per se; rather, it is an appraisal of Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" using Deleuze's experimental reading. We will accrue Nietzsche's critique and Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading in order to appraise Nietzsche's critique itself. Insofar as we have underscored Deleuze's purported experimentation of Nietzschean themes, this study is also an experiment in itself. Through this experimentation, we will find out whether it is possible to partly gloss Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuzian phraseology. Far from presenting a mere exposition of Nietzsche's text, we are, rather, re-reading, that is, re-evaluating Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuze's experimentation. This is our way of thinking with Nietzsche. Nihilism is the central problem upon which Nietzsche's philosophical musings are directed; he deems nihilism as a cultural experience and, as such, a phenomenon to be reckoned with. In our reconstruction of Nietzsche's critique of nihilism, we locate two related elements which constitute the structure of the prescription of a cure, Le., the ethics of affirmation and the ontology of becoming. Appraising Nietzsche's ethics and ontology amounts to clarifying what Deleuze thinks as the movement from the "dogmatic image of thought" to the "new image of thought." Through this new image of thought, Deleuze makes sense of a Nietzschean counterculture which is a perspective that resists traditional or representational metaphysics. Deleuze takes the reversal of Platonism or the transmutation of values to be the point of departure. We have to, according to Deleuze, abandon our old image of the world in order to free ourselves from the obscurantism of foundationalist or essentialist thinking. It is only through the transmutation of values that we can make sense of Nietzsche's ethics of affirmation and ontology of becoming. We have to think of Nietzsche's ethics as an "ethics" and not a moral philosophy, and we have to think of his ontology as 1/ ontology" and not as metaphysics. Through Deleuze, we are able to avoid reading Nietzsche as a moral philosopher and metaphysician. Rather, we are able to read Nietzsche as one espousing an ethical imperative through the thought of the eternal return and one advocating a theory of existence based on an immanent, as opposed to transcendent, image of the world.
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Abstract: Nietzsche's Will-to-Power Ontology: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil § 36 By: Mark Minuk Will-to-power is the central component of Nietzsche's philosophy, and passage 36 of Beyond Good and Evil is essential to coming to an understanding of it. 1 argue for and defend the thesis that will-to-power constitutes Nietzsche's ontology, and offer a new understanding of what that means. Nietzsche's ontology can be talked about as though it were a traditional substance ontology (i.e., a world made up of forces; a duality of conflicting forces described as 'towards which' and 'away from which'). However, 1 argue that what defines this ontology is an understanding of valuation as ontologically fundamental—^the basis of interpretation, and from which a substance ontology emerges. In the second chapter, I explain Nietzsche's ontology, as reflected in this passage, through a discussion of Heidegger's two ontological categories in Being and Time (readiness-to-hand, and present-at-hand). In a nutshell, it means that the world of our desires and passions (the most basic of which is for power) is ontologically more fundamental than the material world, or any other interpretation, which is to say, the material world emerges out of a world of our desires and passions. In the first chapter, I address the problematic form of the passage reflected in the first sentence. The passage is in a hypothetical style makes no claim to positive knowledge or truth, and, superficially, looks like Schopenhaurian position for the metaphysics of the will, which Nietzsche rejects. 1 argue that the hypothetical form of the passage is a matter of style, namely, the style of a free-spirit for whom the question of truth is reframed as a question of values. In the third and final chapter, 1 address the charge that Nietzsche's interpretation is a conscious anthropomorphic projection. 1 suggest that the charge rests on a distinction (between nature and man) that Nietzsche rejects. I also address the problem of the causality of the will for Nietzsche, by suggesting that an alternative, perspectival form of causality is possible.