China's "Responsible Protection" concept : re-interpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and military intervention for humanitarian purposes

This article assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P’s third pillar following the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals such as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection purposes, and should therefore be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing’s current stance on R2P. More broadly, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance.

India’s indigenization of military aircraft design and manufacturing: Towards a fifth-generation fighter

India’s desire to transform itself into an international military power has brought about a rapid shift in its approach to procuring military hardware. The indigenization of India’s military manufacturing capacity forms an integral part of the strategic objectives of Indian military services, with its realization being a function of significant government investment in strategic technologies. This has a number of ramifications. An indigenous Indian military capacity, particularly in the field of aviation, forms a key part of India’s ambition of achieving regional air superiority, or even supremacy, and being capable of power projection. This is particularly in response to China’s increasing presence in South Asian airspace. A burgeoning Indian military manufacturing machine based on a comparative advantage in skilled technicians and lower-cost labour, together with strategic collaboration with foreign military hardware manufacturers, may also lead to neighbouring countries looking to India as a source of competitively priced military hardware. In short, this chapter seeks to analyse the rationale behind India’s attempt to become militarily self-sufficient in the field of aviation, discuss the technical, economic and political context in which it is achieving this transformation, and assess the potential outlook of success for India’s drive to achieve self-sufficiency in the arena of military aviation. This chapter will do so by using the case of India’s attempt to develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

Comparison of visual status of Iranian military and commercial drivers

Background There is no legal requirement for Iranian military truck drivers to undergo regular visual checkups as compared to commercial truck drivers. Objectives This study aimed to evaluate the impact of drivers’ visual checkups by comparing the visual function of Iranian military and commercial truck drivers. Patients and Methods In this comparative cross-sectional study, two hundred military and 200 commercial truck drivers were recruited and their Visual Acuity (VA), Visual Field (VF), color vision and Contrast Sensitivity (CS) were assessed and compared using the Snellen chart, confrontation screening method, D15 test and Pelli-Robson letter chart, respectively. A questionnaire regarding driving exposure and history of motor-vehicle crashes (MVCs) was also filled by drivers. Results were analyzed using an independent samples t-test, one-way ANOVA (assessing difference in number of MVCs across different age groups), chi-square test and Pearson correlation at statistical significance level of P < 0.05. Results Mean age was 41.6 ± 9.2 for the military truck drivers and 43.4 ± 10.9 for commercial truck drivers (P > 0.05). No significant difference between military and commercial drivers was found in terms of driving experience, number of MVCs, binocular VA, frequency of color vision defects and CS scores. In contrast, the last ocular examination was significantly earlier in military drivers than commercial drivers (P < 0.001). In addition, 4% of military drivers did not meet the national standards to drive as opposed to 2% of commercial drivers. There was a significant but weak correlation between binocular VA and age (r = 0.175, P < 0.001). However, CS showed a significantly moderate correlation with age (r = -0.488, P < 0.001). Conclusions The absence of legal requirement for regular eye examination in military drivers caused the incompetent drivers to be missed in contrast to commercial drivers. The need for scientific revision of VA standard for Iranian drivers is also discussed. The CS measurement in visual checkups of older drivers deserves to be investigated more thoroughly.

Submission to the External Independent Review of the United Nations Response to Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Other Serious Crimes by Members of Foreign Military Forces Not Under United Nations Command in the Central African Republic

In 2015 the UN Secretary-General established an External Independent Review to review how the United Nations has responded to allegations of child sexual exploitation and child sexual abuse, and to make recommendations concerning how the United Nations should respond to allegations in the future. This submission to the Review Panel draws on literature regarding children's rights, the nature of child sexual abuse, international instruments and policy, the nature of institutional child sexual abuse, and the CAR case itself. It makes recommendations for reform of UN protocols and procedures to better prevent child sexual abuse, and to improve responses to future occurrences.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

The story of … the military jacket

Fashion and war don’t seem an obvious pairing, but the military jacket is a fashion staple. It may take the form of a double-breasted dress uniform with brass buttons and epaulettes, trimmed in rock star braid, or it may be a khaki combat jacket, worn with Doc Martens and a scowl. Here I explore how these two forms of the military jacket were frogmarched into fashion...

Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Meyer of Dueren (Rhineland) in military uniform Portraits Men

Digital Image

Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Bing of Nuernberg in his military uniform Portraits Men

Digital Image

Reproduction of portrait of field chaplain Rabbi Dr. Sali Levi Military; World War I; Portraits

Feldrabbiner Dr. Sali Lewi, Breslau

Portrait of Ernst Gottschalk (seated second row center) with eight unidentified soldiers; Rendsburg, Germany. Military Portraits groups

Morgen hat Reserve Ruh / Auf Wiedersehen / Beste Gruesse; postcard signer Gottschalk; addressee: L Nurzinsky, Altona-Othmarschen, Aidikes Str.

Portrait of Leopold Meyerhof in his World War I officer's uniform Military; World War I; Portraits

Digital Image

Portrait of Leo Baeck as military chaplain Military; World War I; Portraits

Digital Image

Leo Baeck with unidentified soldiers Military; World War I; Portraits Groups

Center May 2000