Fundamental Right to Freedom of Conscience without Objection? Some Notes for its Recognition as a Fundamental Guarantee

Conscientious objection is defined as the ability to depart from statutory mandates because of intimate convictions based on ethical or religious convictions. A discussion of this issue presents the conflict between the idea of a State concerned with the promotion of individual rights or the protection of general interests and an idea of law based on the maintenance of order and against a view of the law as a means to claim the protection of minimum conditions of the person. From this conflict is drawn the possibility to argue whether conscientious objection should be guaranteed as a fundamental right of freedom of conscience or as a statutory authority legislatively conferred upon persons. This paper sets out a discussion around the two views so as to develop a position that is more consistent with the context of social and constitutional law.

An inquiry into the right to change the ecclesiastical constitution of the Congregational churches of Massachusetts : with a preface addressed to the Rev. Joseph Lyman, D. D. under the sanction of whose name such a change has been proposed to the people of this state : to which is prefixed Dr. Morse's Report to the General Association of Massachusetts, from the Panoplist of August, 1815 /

Signed: A layman.

Speech of John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, upon the right of the people, men and women, to petition; on the freedom of speech and debate in the House of representatives of the United States; on the resolutions of seven state legislatures, and the petitions of more than one hundred thousand petitioners, relating to the annexation of Texas to this Union. Delivered in the House of representatives of the United States, in fragments of the morning hour, from the 16th of June to the 7th of July 1838, inclusive.

Mode of access: Internet.

A ‘right to have rights’ in the EU public sphere? An Arendtian justification for the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

This paper discusses the Court’s reasoning in interpreting the EU Charter, using recent case law on horizontal effect as a case study. It identifies two possible means of interpreting the provisions of the Charter: firstly, an approach based on common values (e.g. equality or solidarity) and, secondly, an approach based on access to the public sphere. It argues in favour of the latter. Whereas an approach based on common values is more consonant with the development of the case law so far, it is conceptually problematic: it involves subjective assessments of the importance and degree of ‘sharedness’ of the value in question, which can undermine the equal constitutional status of different Charter provisions. Furthermore, it marginalises the Charter’s overall politically constructional character, which distinguishes it from other sources of rights protection listed in Art 6 TEU. The paper argues that, as the Charter’s provisions concretise the notion of political status in the EU, they have a primarily constitutional, rather than ethical, basis. Interpreting the Charter based on the very commitment to a process of sharing, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s idea of the ‘right to have rights’ (a right to access a political community on equal terms), is therefore preferable. This approach retains the pluralistic, post-national fabric of the EU polity, as it accommodates multiple narratives about its underlying values, while also having an inclusionary impact on previously underrepresented groups (e.g. non-market-active citizens or the sans-papiers) by recognising their equal political disposition.

A right to a national space of communication? : on Stateless nations, their right to a space of communication of their own

Hem establert les bases metodològiques i teòriques per investigar la pregunta “Tenen les nacions sense estat el dret de controlar el seu propi espai de comunicació?”. La investigació ajusta el concepte d’espai de comunicació a la teoria política, cercant els seus límits en els drets individuals i, des de la perspectiva del liberalisme 2, aportant la justificació del seu control en quant que plataforma que incideix en la conservació i supervivència d’una cultura nacional. El primer article i fase de la tesi és l’adaptació i definició del concepte espai de comunicació. Fins ara, la recerca ha proposat diferents models d’espai de comunicació entenent si es tracta d’una visió emfatitzant la distribució i la producció de material marcat amb els símbols de la identitat nacional de la societat emissora, o bé si emfatitza la idea d’un espai de circulació de fluxos comunicatiu ajustat a un territori tradicionalment vinculat a una identitat nacional o nació sense estat. Igualment, es distingeix la dimensió d’emissió –sortir del territori al món- i la de recepció –fluxos informatius rebuts des del món al territori, concretament, al ciutadà; el paper d’intervenció de les institucions democràtiques és diferent en una dimensió o una altra i, per tant, també són diferents els drets afectats i les teories o principis que neguen o justifiquen el control de l’espai de comunicació. També s’ha indagat en les teories sobre els efectes cognitius dels mitjans de comunicació per relacionar-los amb la construcció nacional com a cohesió simbòlica i cultural. Si bé els mitjans no poden fer canviar de pensament immediatament, sí que poden conformar a llarg termini una percepció nacional general. Una comunitat és imaginada, donada la distància física dels seus components, i la comunicació social és, juntament amb l’educació, el principal factor de construcció nacional, avui en dia.

Right to asylum and border control : implications of european union policies on access to EU territory of people in need of international protection

Depuis plusieurs années, les États membres de l’Union européenne (UE) se soumettent à des politiques restrictives, en matière d’asile, qui les contraignent à respecter leur engagement de protéger les personnes qui fuient la persécution. Plusieurs politiques de dissuasion de l’UE sont controversées. Certaines ont d’abord été élaborées dans différents États, avant que l’UE ne mette en place une politique commune en matière d’asile. Certaines des ces politiques migratoires ont été copiées, et ont un effet négatif sur la transformation des procédures d’asile et du droit des réfugiés dans d’autres pays, tel le Canada. En raison des normes minimales imposées par la législation de l’UE, les États membres adoptent des politiques et instaurent des pratiques, qui sont mises en doute et sont critiquées par l’UNHCR et les ONG, quant au respect des obligations internationales à l'égard des droits de la personne. Parmi les politiques et les pratiques les plus critiquées certaines touchent le secteur du contrôle frontalier. En tentant de remédier à l’abolition des frontières internes, les États membres imposent aux demandeurs d’asile des barrières migratoires quasi impossibles à surmonter. Les forçant ainsi à s’entasser dans des centres de migration, au nord de l’Afrique, à rebrousser chemin ou encore à mourir en haute mer.

Socioterritorials forms of appropiation of living and right to the differencial space

The aim of this work is to recover Henri Lefèbvre's methodological contributions for (re)thinking the right to the city, based on the need to know the appropriation of space´s dialectical triad. Empirically, it refers to the urban genesis of Mar del Plata (Argentina), an intermediate Latin American city, and its heterogeneous socio-territorial forms of appropriating inhabitance, or different forms of appropriating goods of use, that lead to think about opening to the transformation of the capitalist social order, and of its urban order, naturalized after the fetischism of private property.

Housing or property? The dynamics of housing policy and property principles in the right to buy

This paper examines the interplay and tension between housing law and policy and property law, in the specific context of the right to buy (RTB). It focuses on funding arrangements between the RTB tenant and another party. It first examines how courts determine the parties' respective entitlements in the home, highlighting the difficulty of categorising, under traditional property law principles, a contribution in the form of the statutory discount conferred on the RTB tenant. Secondly, it considers possible exploitation of the RTB scheme, both at the macro level of exploitation of the policy underpinning the legislation and, at the micro level, of exploitation of the tenant. The measures contained in the Housing Act 2004 intended to curb exploitation of the RTB are analysed to determine what can be considered to be legitimate and illegitimate uses of the scheme. It is argued that, despite the government's implicit approval, certain funding arrangements by non-resident relatives fail to give effect to the spirit of the scheme.

On the Search for an Adequate Scope of the Right to Be Forgotten

During the last decades, the virtual world increasingly gained importance and in this context the enforcement of privacy rights became more and more difficult. An important emanation of this trend is the right to be forgotten enshrining the protection of the data subject’s rights over his/her “own” data. Even though the right to be forgotten has been made part of the proposal for a completely revised Data Protection Regulation and has recently been acknowledged by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“Google/Spain” decision), to date, the discussions about the right and especially its implementation with regard to the fundamental right to freedom of expression have remained rather vague and need to be examined in more depth.

Design of an Advanced Platform for Citizen Participation Committed to Ensuring Freedom of Speech

This paper presents a proposal for an advanced system of debate in an environment of digital democracy which overcomes the limitations of existing systems. We have been especially careful in applying security procedures in telematic systems, for they are to offer citizens the guarantees that society demands. New functional tools have been included to ensure user authentication and to permit anonymous participation where the system is unable to disclose or even to know the identity of system users. The platform prevents participation by non-entitled persons who do not belong to the authorized group from giving their opinion. Furthermore, this proposal allows for verifying the proper function of the system, free of tampering or fraud intended to alter the conclusions or outcomes of participation. All these tools guarantee important aspects of both a social and technical nature, most importantly: freedom of expression, equality and auditability.

The Right to Bodily Integrity and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Through Medical Interventions : A Reply to Thomas Douglas

Peer reviewed

No right to sext? A critical examination of media and legal debates about teenage girls' sexual agency in the digital age

Advances in digital photography and distribution technologies enable many people to produce and distribute images of their sex acts. When teenagers do this, the photos and videos they create can be legally classified as child pornography since the law makes no exception for youth who create sexually explicit images of themselves. The dominant discussions about teenage girls producing sexually explicit media (including sexting) are profoundly unproductive: (1) they blame teenage girls for creating private images that another person later maliciously distributed and (2) they fail to respect—or even discuss—teenagers’ rights to freedom of expression. Cell phones and the internet make producing and distributing images extremely easy, which provide widely accessible venues for both consensual sexual expression between partners and for sexual harassment. Dominant understandings view sexting as a troubling teenage trend created through the combination of camera phones and adolescent hormones and impulsivity, but this view often conflates consensual sexting between partners with the malicious distribution of a person’s private image as essentially equivalent behaviors. In this project, I ask: What is the role of assumptions about teen girls’ sexual agency in these problematic understandings of sexting that blame victims and deny teenagers’ rights? In contrast to the popular media panic about online predators and the familiar accusation that youth are wasting their leisure time by using digital media, some people champion the internet as a democratic space that offers young people the opportunity to explore identities and develop social and communication skills. Yet, when teen girls’ sexuality enters this conversation, all this debate and discussion narrows to a problematic consensus. The optimists about adolescents and technology fall silent, and the argument that media production is inherently empowering for girls does not seem to apply to a girl who produces a sexually explicit image of herself. Instead, feminist, popular, and legal commentaries assert that she is necessarily a victim: of a “sexualized” mass media, pressure from her male peers, digital technology, her brain structures or hormones, or her own low self-esteem and misplaced desire for attention. Why and how are teenage girls’ sexual choices produced as evidence of their failure or success in achieving Western liberal ideals of self-esteem, resistance, and agency? Since mass media and policy reactions to sexting have so far been overwhelmingly sexist and counter-productive, it is crucial to interrogate the concepts and assumptions that characterize mainstream understandings of sexting. I argue that the common sense that is co-produced by law and mass media underlies the problematic legal and policy responses to sexting. Analyzing a range of nonfiction texts including newspaper articles, talk shows, press releases, public service announcements, websites, legislative debates, and legal documents, I investigate gendered, racialized, age-based, and technologically determinist common sense assumptions about teenage girls’ sexual agency. I examine the consensus and continuities that exist between news, nonfiction mass media, policy, institutions, and law, and describe the limits of their debates. I find that this early 21st century post-feminist girl-power moment not only demands that girls live up to gendered sexual ideals but also insists that actively choosing to follow these norms is the only way to exercise sexual agency. This is the first study to date examining the relationship of conventional wisdom about digital media and teenage girls’ sexuality to both policy and mass media.