Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the folk seem to agree!

Ethics in project management : some Aristotelian insights

Purpose My aim is to introduce, in the project management field, an Aristotelian ethics lens moving beyond the classical deontological and consequentialism approaches underlying the current ethical practices and codes of ethics and professional conducts. In doing so, I wish to pose the premises of a debate on the implications of a conscious ethical perspective for the structure and agency relationship within the project management field Design/methodology/approach Project management is a knowledge field on its own right. However the current perspectives applied to make sense and develop the field (modernism vs. postmodernism) leads to dichotomous thinking rather than recognizing the merits and contextual validity of both sides. I call for Aristotelian Ethics as a way of moving beyond this dichotomous thinking. I introduce briefly Aristotelian Ethics and its consequences in term of relation theory – practice, means and ends, facts and values, and finally politics (i.e. being part of a community of practitioners). Then I illustrate some consequences for the field taking PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct and APM Code of Professional Conduct as supports for discussion Findings I suggest a need for revisiting and/or redesigning the codes of ethics and professional conducts for project management according to an Aristotelian perspective, in order to move beyond the normative limitations of classical deontological (conflict between competing duties, exemplified by PMI Code) or consequentialism (focusing on the "right" outcome to the detriment of duties, exemplified by APM Code) approaches (both, in fact, leading to a disconnection means and ends, and facts and values). This implicates shifting our view from the question "what is my duty?" to the questions "why should I undertake my duty?" and "how ought I act in this situation?" Practical implications Raising Professional Bodies, Industry and Education institutions awareness and consciousness and leading them to rethink about codes of ethics and the implications for the way they conceive practice and research, bodies of knowledge, credentialing, education... Originality/value To the best of my knowledge, this kind of discussion has not yet been conducted within the project management field, and considering the implication of project management in our life and for the well being of the society, an ethical debate may present some value(s)

O argumento pragmático ou consequencialista de cunho econômico e a modulação temporal dos efeitos das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal em matéria tributária

A tese analisa a relação íntima que há entre o pragmatismo ou o conseqüencialismo e a modulação temporal dos efeitos das decisões judiciais. Nesta relação, interessa ressaltar o ponto de interseção que certamente sobressai em várias ocasiões: o argumento de cunho econômico. Tal tipo de argumento pode assumir especial relevo quando do exame da oportunidade e conveniência na tomada das decisões eminentemente políticas. No âmbito jurisdicional, no entanto, o argumento pragmático ou consequencialista de cunho econômico não deve prevalecer como fundamento das decisões judiciais, especialmente cuidando-se de matéria tributária. Os problemas que centralizam o estudo podem ser colocados através das seguintes indagações: é possível que o Supremo Tribunal Federal compute, no julgamento de certa matéria tributária, argumento como o eventual rombo de X bilhões de reais que a decisão contrária ao Fisco possa acarretar para os cofres públicos? A fundamentação de eventual decisão judicial calcada exclusiva ou predominantemente em tal argumento é legítima ou ilegítima? Que importância pode ter na tomada de decisão judicial? Quando aplicada, há parâmetros a serem seguidos? Quais? Demonstramos que a prevalência de tal argumento é inadequada na seara judicial, ou seja, deve ter peso reduzido ou periférico, servindo para corroborar ou reforçar os argumentos jurídicos que centralizam o debate submetido ao exame do Poder Judiciário de modo geral, e do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de maneira particular. Em busca de esclarecer quais os principais limites e possibilidades de tal argumento, especialmente relacionando-o à modulação temporal dos efeitos da decisão judicial, explicitamos algumas regras necessárias para a sua adequada utilização, sob pena de inconcebível subversão de variados princípios e direitos fundamentais assegurados em sede constitucional. No exame das questões submetidas à apreciação da Corte Suprema em matéria tributária, o seu parâmetro consiste na maior efetividade e concretude ao texto constitucional. A modulação temporal dos efeitos se aplica a uma decisão que, declarando a inconstitucionalidade do ato normativo, se afastaria ainda mais da vontade constitucional, caso fosse aplicado o tradicional efeito ex tunc (retroativo até o nascimento da lei). Nestas situações específicas e excepcionais se justifica aplicar a modulação, com vistas a dar maior concretude e emprestar maior eficácia à Constituição. A tese proposta, ao final, consiste na reunião das regras explicitadas no trabalho e em proposta legislativa.

Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory

This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.

In the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.

The second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.

The third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.

The Political Economy of Swift's Satires and other Prose Works

Jonathan Swift wrote perceptively about the emerging commercial society
in Britain in the early eighteenth century. His particular focus was on the
financial revolution and its implications for economic and political stability
as well as for shifts of power between the landed and commercial
classes. Following his return to Ireland Swift’s focus shifted to the developmental
problems of his native country. In several pamphlets he advocated
consumption of domestic products, challenged existing political
structures and made trenchant criticisms of absenteeism and other dysfunctional
aspects of the land tenure system. Swift’s politico-economic
concerns are fully reflected in his best known work, Gulliver’s Travels but
his most pointed criticism of the emerging commercial system is contained
in A Modest Proposal. Written in the form of an economic pamphlet, A
Modest Proposal is ostensibly designed to address the problem of poverty
in Ireland. In addition to its implicit criticism of economic policy in Ireland,
the pamphlet challenges the separation of economics and morality as
evidenced in the writings of William Petty and Bernard Mandeville. Swift
parodies Petty’s political arithmetic but it is suggested here that he also
had in his sights the consequentialist reasoning present in the work of
both authors but explicitly so in Mandeville.
Keywords: financial revolution, public debt, paper credit, rationality, political
arithmetic, consequentialism, Petty (William), Mandeville (Bernard)

L’aliénation, le conséquentialisme et les exigences de la morale

Parution originale sous le titre « Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality » dans Philosophy and Social Affairs, vol. 13, No. 2 (Printemps 1984), pp. 134-171. Traduit de l’anglais par Eric Guidon, révisé par Christine Tappolet. Nous aimerions remercier Peter Railton pour avoir relu cette traduction.

Equality and Value-holism

Dans cet article je considère un récent défi à l’égalitarisme développé par Michael Huemer. Le challenge de Huemer prend la forme d’un dilemme : les égalitaristes peuvent être soit atomistes soit holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur de l’égalité. S’ils sont atomistes, alors ils doivent acceptés que l’égalité n’ait pas de valeur intrinsèque ; s’ils sont holistes, alors leur point ce vue est inconsistant avec une intuitive mais très plausible forme de conséquentialisme. Je montre que ce dilemme ne doit pas perturber les égalitaristes. Ils peuvent être holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur et adhérer en même temps au conséqeuntialisme.

La responsabilité de protéger et l’intervention humanitaire : de la reconceptualisation de la souveraineté des États à l’individualisme normatif

La recrudescence des conflits internes dans le contexte post-guerre froide a permis de propulser à l’avant-plan la préoccupation pour les individus. Alors que la paix et la sécurité internationales ont historiquement constitué les piliers du système institutionnel international, une porte s’ouvrait pour rendre effectif un régime de protection des droits de l’homme par-delà les frontières. Pour les humanistes, l’intervention humanitaire représentait un mal nécessaire pour pallier aux souffrances humaines souvent causées par des divergences ethniques et religieuses. Pourtant, cette pratique est encore souvent perçue comme une forme de néo-colonialisme et entre en contradiction avec les plus hautes normes régissant les relations internationales, soit les principes de souveraineté des États et de non-intervention. La problématique du présent mémoire s’inscrit précisément dans cette polémique entre la préséance des droits de l’État et la prédilection pour les droits humains universels, deux fins antinomiques que la Commission internationales pour l’intervention et la souveraineté des États (CIISE) a tenté de concilier en élaborant son concept de responsabilité de protéger. Notre mémoire s’inscrit dans le champ de la science politique en études internationales mais s’articule surtout autour des notions et enjeux propres à la philosophie politique, plus précisément à l’éthique des relations internationales. Le travail se veut une réflexion critique et théorique des conclusions du rapport La responsabilité de protéger, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le critère de la juste cause et, dans une moindre mesure, celui d’autorité appropriée. Notre lecture des conditions de la CIISE à la justification morale du déclenchement d’une intervention humanitaire – critères issues de la doctrine de la guerre juste relativement au jus ad bellum – révèle une position mitoyenne entre une conception progressiste cosmopolitique et une vision conservatrice d’un ordre international composé d’États souverains. D’une part, la commission se dissocie du droit international en faisant valoir un devoir éthique d’outrepasser les frontières dans le but de mettre un terme aux violations massives des droits de l’homme et, d’autre part, elle craint les ingérences à outrance, comme en font foi l’établissement d’un seuil de la juste cause relativement élevé et la désignation d’une autorité multilatérale à titre de légitimateur de l’intervention. Ce travail dialectique vise premièrement à présenter et situer les recommandations de la CIISE dans la tradition de la guerre juste. Ensuite, il s’agit de relever les prémisses philosophiques tacites dans le rapport de la CIISE qui sous-tendent le choix de préserver une règle de non-intervention ferme de laquelle la dérogation n’est exigée qu’en des circonstances exceptionnelles. Nous identifions trois arguments allant en ce sens : la reconnaissance du relativisme moral et culturel; la nécessité de respecter l’autonomie et l’indépendance des communautés politiques en raison d’une conception communautarienne de la légitimité de l’État, des réquisits de la tolérance et des avantages d’une responsabilité assignée; enfin, l’appréhension d’un bouleversement de l’ordre international sur la base de postulats du réalisme classique. Pour finir, nous nuançons chacune de ces thèses en souscrivant à un mode de raisonnement cosmopolitique et conséquentialiste. Notre adhésion au discours individualiste normatif nous amène à inclure dans la juste cause de la CIISE les violations systématiques des droits individuels fondamentaux et à cautionner l’intervention conduite par une coalition ou un État individuel, pourvu qu’elle produise les effets bénéfiques désirés en termes humanitaires.

Extensive Social Choice and the Measurement of Group Fitness in Biological Hierarchies

Extensive social choice theory is used to study the problem of measuring group fitness in a two-level biological hierarchy. Both fixed and variable group size are considered. Axioms are identified that imply that the group measure satisfies a form of consequentialism in which group fitness only depends on the viabilities and fecundities of the individuals at the lower level in the hierarchy. This kind of consequentialism can take account of the group fitness advantages of germ-soma specialization, which is not possible with an alternative social choice framework proposed by Okasha, but which is an essential feature of the index of group fitness for a multicellular organism introduced by Michod, Viossat, Solari, Hurand, and Nedelcu to analyze the unicellular-multicellular evolutionary transition. The new framework is also used to analyze the fitness decoupling between levels that takes place during an evolutionary transition.

Non-Consequentialist Utilitarianism

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The typic in Kant’s critique of practical reason : moral judgment and symbolic representation

Comment pouvons-nous représenter un principe moral universel de manière à le rendre applicable à des cas concrets ? Ce problème revêt une forme aiguë dans la philosophie morale d’Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804), tout particulièrement dans sa théorie du jugement moral, car il soutient que l’on doit appliquer la loi morale « suprasensible » à des actions dans le monde sensible afin de déterminer celles-ci comme moralement bonnes ou mauvaises. Kant aborde ce problème dans un chapitre de la Critique de la raison pratique (1788) intitulé « De la typique de la faculté de juger pratique pure » (KpV 5: 67-71). La première partie de la thèse vise à fournir un commentaire compréhensif et détaillé de ce texte important, mais trop peu étudié. Étant donné que la loi morale, en tant qu’Idée suprasensible de la raison, ne peut pas être appliquée directement à des actions dans l’intuition sensible, Kant a recours à une forme particulière de représentation indirecte et symbolique. Sa solution inédite consiste à fournir la faculté de juger avec un « type [Typus] », ou analogue formel, de la loi morale. Ce type est la loi de la causalité naturelle : en tant que loi, il sert d’étalon formel pour tester l’universalisabilité des maximes ; et, en tant que loi de la nature, il peut aussi s’appliquer à toute action dans l’expérience sensible. Dès lors, le jugement moral s’effectue par le biais d’une expérience de pensée dans laquelle on se demande si l’on peut vouloir que sa maxime devienne une loi universelle d’une nature contrefactuelle dont on ferait soi-même partie. Cette expérience de pensée fonctionne comme une « épreuve [Probe] » de la forme des maximes et, par ce moyen, du statut moral des actions. Kant soutient que tout un chacun, même « l’entendement le plus commun », emploie cette procédure pour l’appréciation morale. De plus, la typique prémunit contre deux menaces à l’éthique rationaliste de Kant, à savoir l’empirisme (c’est-à-dire le conséquentialisme) et le mysticisme. La seconde partie de la thèse se penche sur l’indication de Kant que la typique « ne sert que comme un symbole ». Un bon nombre de commentateurs ont voulu assimiler la typique à la notion d’« hypotypose symbolique » présentée dans le § 59 de la Critique de la faculté de juger (1790). La typique serait un processus de symbolisation esthétique consistant à présenter, de façon indirecte, la représentation abstraite de la loi morale sous la forme d’un symbole concret et intuitif. Dans un premier chapitre, cette interprétation est présentée et soumise à un examen critique qui cherche à montrer qu’elle est erronée et peu judicieuse. Dans le second chapitre, nous poursuivons une voie d’interprétation jusqu’ici ignorée, montrant que la typique a de plus grandes continuités avec la notion d’« anthropomorphisme symbolique », une procédure strictement analogique introduite auparavant dans les Prolégomènes (1783). Nous en concluons, d’une part, que la typique fut un moment décisif dans l’évolution de la théorie kantienne de la représentation symbolique et que, d’autre part, elle marque la réalisation, chez Kant, d’une conception proprement critique de la nature et de la morale comme deux sphères distinctes, dont la médiation s’opère par le biais des concepts de loi et de conformité à la loi (Gesetzmässigkeit). En un mot, la typique s’avère l’instrument par excellence du « rationalisme de la faculté de juger ».

O dever constitucional de eficiência administrativa na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal

O dever constitucional de eficiência administrativa consiste em norma reitora da atividade regulatória e das demais funções estatais. Este trabalho tem o objetivo de investigar seus sentidos, os tipos de norma em que se classifica e as estruturas argumentativas para a sua aplicação. Entende-se, por sentidos, os critérios usados para se considerar que uma conduta ou medida cumpre ou viola o dever de eficiência, incluindo consideração da relação entre meios para o exercício da atividade administrativa e resultados dessa atividade. Parte-se de diagnóstico de indefinição conceitual, na literatura jurídica brasileira, acerca desse dever constitucional, para investigar a existência de subsídios, na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal, que viabilizem elaboração de conceito. Desse modo, verifica-se, na literatura, multiplicidade de definições. Além disso, o aspecto da análise custo-benefício, referido tanto na literatura sobre economicidade quanto nos textos sobre análise econômica do direito, sugere que o assunto também possa ser abordado de modo a correlacioná-lo ao conceito econômico de eficiência de Kaldor-Hicks ou de maximização da riqueza. Na jurisprudência, foi encontrada grande quantidade de sentidos de eficiência, a indicar que o STF pode não ter um posicionamento claro, senão em relação à concepção do dever constitucional de eficiência como um todo, pelo menos em relação a aspectos do conceito, a implicar a necessidade de elaboração, pelo tribunal, casuisticamente, de critérios para considerar que determinada conduta ou medida cumpre ou viola esse dever constitucional. Verificou-se, ainda, a ocorrência de aparentes divergências entre os ministros não apenas com relação à solução concreta de um caso, mas com relação à definição, em um mesmo caso, do sentido do dever de eficiência. Não se pode afirmar, no entanto, com segurança, que a concepção do dever de eficiência em um acórdão seja determinante, no STF, para a orientação dos votos. Ainda assim, um mesmo caso pode ter soluções distintas a depender do sentido de eficiência que se adote. Ademais, os acórdãos que parecem proceder a análise custo-benefício não se parecem referir a conceitos ou a critérios de eficiência econômica para fundamentar essa análise. Esses acórdãos também raramente fazem referência a dados empíricos. Quanto aos tipos de norma às estruturas argumentativas para aplicação, a literatura faz referência a teorias incompatíveis que dificultam compreender de maneira inequívoca como ocorre essa aplicação. O STF, a seu turno, faz uso de pelo menos 3 (três) estruturas argumentativas para aplicar o dever de eficiência: o consequencialismo, a análise custo-benefício e a ponderação de normas. O uso concomitante da análise custo-benefício e da ponderação de normas, contudo, enseja confusão entre o dever de eficiência e a máxima da proporcionalidade. Nesse contexto, a proposta conceitual busca tornar claros os sentidos, os tipos de norma e os modos de aplicação do dever constitucional de eficiência, mediante adoção de referencial teórico único que seja compatível com os achados de jurisprudência. Sendo assim, propõe-se a classificação do dever de eficiência como sobreprincípio e do dever de economicidade como postulado, com referência às concepções teóricas de Humberto Ávila, buscando-se evitar incorrer nos problemas diagnosticados na doutrina e na jurisprudência.

Reaching for a Calculator or a Mirror? Why the EU Joins International Human Rights Treaties. EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2013

Why does the European Union (EU) join international human rights treaties? This paper develops motivational profiles pertaining either to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ or a ‘logic of consequentialism’ in order to answer this question. It compares the EU’s motivations for its recent accession to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) with those dominating the EU’s nonaccession to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). Based on this cross-case analysis, I argue that the EU’s accession decisions are best viewed as cost-benefit calculations and explained by the strength of opposition and the desire to spread its norms. The EU is only marginally concerned with efforts to construct an ‘appropriate role’, although its accession considerations are positively influenced by (varying degrees) of an internalized commitment to human rights. The paper aims at deepening the understanding of the EU’s motivations in the paradigmatic hard case of accession to international human rights treaties not least to evaluate the EU’s ‘exceptional nature’, facilitate its predictability for stake-holders and contribute to political and ethical debates surrounding future rites of passage as a global actor.