The history of the rebellion and civil wars in England : to which is now added, An historical view of the affairs of Ireland /

Each volume issued in two parts.

The history of the rebellion and civil wars in England. To which is added, An historical view of the affairs of Ireland,

Includes index.

The history of the rebellion and civil wars in England /

The "Life" has a special t.p. dated 1842.

A narrative of the Indian and civil wars in Virginia,

Mode of access: Internet.

The civil wars of Granada;

Mode of access: Internet.

Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic and civil wars:

Mode of access: Internet.

Las guerras civiles; or, The civil wars of Granada, and the history of the factions of the Zegries and Abencerrages, two noble families of that city, to the final conquest by Ferdinand and Isabella;

No more published.

The history of the rebellion and civil wars in England : to which is added an historical view of the affairs of Ireland /

Mode of access: Internet.

The value of military oath in civil wars in Rome: The example of conflict 49-45 BC

During the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, the military oath which binds the soldier to his army is often openly violated. Yet despite this offense, commanders of armed struggle require recursively the oath to their men. Admittedly, this ritual act seems ineffective given the many desertions and mutinies identified, but military leaders use its symbolic and sacred meaning to legitimize one hand their ���anti-republican��� actions, on the other armies fighting in a context deemed impius.

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

International commodity prices, growth and the outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa

To learn more about the effect of economic conditions oncivil war, we examine whether Sub-Saharan civil wars aremore likely to start following downturns in the internationalprice of countries main export commodities. The data showa robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreakof civil wars. We also find that Sub-Saharan countries aremore likely to see civil wars following economic downturnsin their main OECD export destinations.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

Fighting against Malaria: Prevent wars while waiting for the "miraculous" vaccine

The World Health Organization estimates that 300 million clinical cases of malaria occur annually and observed that during the 80's and part of the 90's its incidence increased. In this paper we explore the influence of refugees from civil wars on the incidence of malaria in the refugee-receiving countries. Using civil wars as an instrumental variable we show that for each 1,000 refugees there are between 2,000 and 2,700 cases of malaria in the refugee receiving country. On average 13% of the cases of malaria reported by the WHO are caused by forced migration as a consequence of civil wars.

Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who ��ght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di��er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e��ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e��ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e��ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e��ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e��ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombia��s civil war.

The Devil���s Calculus: Mathematical Models of Civil War

In spite of the movement to turn political science into a real science, various mathematical methods that are now the staples of physics, biology, and even economics are thoroughly uncommon in political science, especially the study of civil war. This study seeks to apply such methods - specifically, ordinary differential equations (ODEs) - to model civil war based on what one might dub the capabilities school of thought, which roughly states that civil wars end only when one side���s ability to make war falls far enough to make peace truly attractive. I construct several different ODE-based models and then test them all to see which best predicts the instantaneous capabilities of both sides of the Sri Lankan civil war in the period from 1990 to 1994 given parameters and initial conditions. The model that the tests declare most accurate gives very accurate predictions of state military capabilities and reasonable short term predictions of cumulative deaths. Analysis of the model reveals the scale of the importance of rebel finances to the sustainability of insurgency, most notably that the number of troops required to put down the Tamil Tigers is reduced by nearly a full order of magnitude when Tiger foreign funding is stopped. The study thus demonstrates that accurate foresight may come of relatively simple dynamical models, and implies the great potential of advanced and currently unconventional non-statistical mathematical methods in political science.