Nonprofit Boards in Australia: A Distinctive Governance Appoach

This article reports the findings into patterns of governance on nonprofit boards in Australia. The research surveys 118 boards, upon which serve a total of 1405 directors. The findings indicate that nonprofit boards can mimic some aspects of a shareholder approach to governance. But nonprofit boards, in the main, indicate priorities and activities of a stakeholder approach to governance. The features of `isomorphism' that arise largely stem from legislative requirements in corporate governance. Generally, nonprofit directors are influenced by agenda and motivations that can be differentiated from the influences upon director activity in the corporate sector. The study indicates that nonprofit boards prize knowledge and loyalty to the sector when considering board composition. The survey suggests nonprofits ``compensate'' for the demands placed upon them about fiduciary duty and due diligence responsibilities with the diverse intellectual expertise of non-executive directors. Nonprofit boards possess greater diversity than boards in the corporate sector; they include more women as directors than corporate boards and they include a greater proportion of directors from minority groups. While strategic issues feature significantly as a task of the nonprofit board, they distinguish themselves from their corporate counterparts by engaging in operational management. The findings indicate that, in the main, directors on nonprofit boards deliberate and operate in ways distinctive from their corporate counterparts. Such findings offer a contribution to the reform of Corporations Law in other countries and the likely consequence on boards outside the corporate sector.

Injury bulletin 105 : skateboard injury

Summary of findings: QISU estimates that approximately 1,000 skateboard-associated injuries are seen at emergency departments each year in Queensland. 10-14 year old males are the most likely group to present to a QISU ED with a skateboard related injury. The peak time for skateboard injuries to occur is on the weekend and in the late afternoon. Only 19% of skateboard injuries occur at skate park facilities, with the remainder oc-curring in non-skate parks, on roads and footpaths. Risk factors associated with more severe injuries are, age less than 10 years and involvement in a motor vehicle crash The most common types of injuries are fractures and sprains of the upper limbs. Isolated head injuries represent approximately 5% of skateboarding injuries, but 60% of serious injuries requiring resuscitation. These injuries may be minimized or pre-vented with helmet use.

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

How boards strategise : a strategy as practice view

While board involvement in strategy is seen as increasingly important, our understanding of how boards fulfil this role is limited. This article draws on indepth qualitative research with directors and senior managers to develop a Strategy as Practice view on how boards "do" strategy. Two different but complementary strategising practices - Procedural Strategising and Interactive Strategising - are identified and elaborated in terms of their underlying micro-activities. The internal boardroom factors that affect the relative emphasis on these strategies practices - the strategic stance of the board, board power and perceive legitimacy of each practice - are also identified and discussed. These findings are then integrated into a typology of board strategising. A key implication of this paper is that boards need to consciously choose the nature and extent of their involvement in strategy.

How nonprofit boards monitor, judge and influence organisational performance

The law and popular opinion expect boards of directors will actively monitor their organisations. Further, public opinion is that boards should have a positive impact on organisational performance. However, the processes of board monitoring and judgment are poorly understood, and board influence on organisational performance needs to be better understood. This thesis responds to the repeated calls to open the ‘black box’ linking board practices and organisational performance by investigating the processual behaviours of boards. The work of four boards1 of micro and small-sized nonprofit organisations were studied for periods of at least one year, using a processual research approach, drawing on observations of board meetings, interviews with directors, and the documents of the boards. The research shows that director turnover, the difficulty recruiting and engaging directors, and the administration of reporting, had strong impacts upon board monitoring, judging and/or influence. In addition, board monitoring of organisational performance was adversely affected by directors’ limited awareness of their legal responsibilities and directors’ limited financial literacy. Directors on average found all sources of information about their organisation’s work useful. Board judgments about the financial aspects of organisational performance were regulated by the routines of financial reporting. However, there were no comparable routines facilitating judgments about non-financial performance, and such judgments tended to be limited to specific aspects of performance and were ad hoc, largely in response to new information or the repackaging of existing information in a new form. The thesis argues that Weick’s theory of sensemaking offers insight into the way boards went about the task of understanding organisational performance. Board influence on organisational performance was demonstrated in the areas of: compliance; instrumental influence through service and through discussion and decision-making; and by symbolic, legitimating and protective means. The degree of instrumental influence achieved by boards depended on director competency, access to networks of influence, and understandings of board roles, and by the agency demonstrated by directors. The thesis concludes that there is a crowding out effect whereby CEO competence and capability limits board influence. The thesis also suggests that there is a second ‘agency problem’, a problem of director volition. The research potentially has profound implications for the work of nonprofit boards. Rather than purporting to establish a general theory of board governance, the thesis embraces calls to build situation-specific mini-theories about board behaviour.

Boards of directors' contribution to strategy : a literature review and research agenda

Research Question/Issue: Over the last four decades, research on the relationship between boards of directors and strategy has proliferated. Yet to date there is little theoretical and empirical agreement regarding the question of how boards of directors contribute to strategy. This review assesses the extant literature by highlighting emerging trends and identifying several avenues for future research. Research Findings/Results: Using a content-analysis of 150 articles published in 23 management journals up to 2007, we describe and analyze how research on boards of directors and strategy has evolved over time. We illustrate how topics, theories, settings, and sources of data interact and influence insights about board–strategy relationships during three specific periods. Theoretical Implications: Our study illustrates that research on boards of directors and strategy evolved from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and cognitive approaches. Our results encourage future studies to examine the impact of institutional and context-specific factors on the (expected) contribution of boards to strategy, and to apply alternative methods to fully capture the impact of board processes and dynamics on strategy making. Practical Implications: The increasing interest in boards of directors’ contribution to strategy echoes a movement towards more strategic involvement of boards of directors. However, best governance practices and the emphasis on board independence and control may hinder the board contribution to the strategic decision making. Our study invites investors and policy-makers to consider the requirements for an effective strategic task when they nominate board members and develop new regulations.

The effectiveness of supervisory boards : an exploratory study of challenges in Dutch boardrooms

Triggered by highly publicized corporate scandals, changing societal expectations and the collapse of financial markets, the roles of boards of directors have changed significantly in safeguarding the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders. Yet relatively little is known about contemporary challenges non-executive directors face and whether their boards are well-equipped for their new tasks. Based on self-assessment reports by supervisory boards, a survey and interviews with supervisory board members, this paper investigates the challenges non-executive directors face in the Netherlands, particularly after a decade of corporate governance reform. Non-executive directors’ inadequate role in scrutinizing executive directors’ performance, information asymmetries and dysfunctional working relationships between executive and non-executive directors are among the greatest challenges indicated by non-executive directors on Dutch supervisory boards. The paper discusses several implications for scholars and practitioners and provides a unique insight in boardroom dynamics (word count: 138).

Boards' contribution to strategy and innovation

Among the most disputed issues within the business arena and among academic scholars are which role boards of directors are expected to fulfill, and how they contribute to a company’s success and survival (Monks & Minow, 2008). Recent failures of large corporations worldwide has led corporate governance and strategic management scholars to call for increased board involvement in decision-making (Tricker, 2009) that has paralleled regulators’ requests for higher monitoring and punishments in the case of frauds and misbehaviors (Coffee, 2005)

Gender-diverse boards and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

Using a sample of 2,200 US listed firm year observations (2001-2007)this study shows a positive (negative) relation between female participation in corporate boards and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion), after controlling for earnings quality, corporate governance, audit quality, stock price informativeness and potential endogeneity. Our findings are important as they suggest that board diversity adds to the transparency and accuracy of financial reports such that earnings expectations are likely to be more accurate for these firms.

How two-tier boards can be more effective

Purpose: This study explores how non-executive directors address governance problems on Dutch two-tier boards. Within this board model, challenges might be particularly difficult to address due to the formal separation of management boards’ decision-management from supervisory boards’ decision-control roles. Design/methodology/approach: Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire among non-executive directors provide unique insights into three major challenges in the boardrooms of two-tier boards in the Netherlands. Findings: The study indicates that non-executive directors mainly experience challenges in three areas: the ability to ask management critical questions, information asymmetries between the management and supervisory boards and the management of the relationship between individual executive and non-executive directors. The qualitative in-depth analysis reveals the complexity of the contributing factors to problems in the boardroom and the range of process and social interventions non-executive directors use to address boardroom issues with management and the organization of the board. Practical implications: While policy makers have been largely occupied with the ‘right’ board composition, the results highlight the importance of adequately addressing operational challenges in the boardroom. The results emphasize the importance of a better understanding of board processes and the need of non-executive directors to carefully manage relationships in and around the boardroom. Originality/value: Whereas most studies have focussed on regulatory initiatives to improve the functioning of boards (e.g., the independence of the board), this study explores how non-executive directors attempt to enhance the effectiveness of boards on which they serve.

Are boards flying blind when it comes to enterprise technology governance?

Considering the sheer speed, complexity and ever changing risk in today’s technology saturated business environment, it’s hardly surprising that the call for digitally savvy directors is increasing. Emerging research suggests serious consequences for boards that continue to ignore or delegate enterprise-level technology governance.

The 'two strikes' rule on the remuneration report : threats and opportunities for boards

This article examines the fast moving debate on the law and policy surrounding shareholder voting on their companies’ remuneration report, at the AGM. Recently, Australia has moved from the ‘non-binding’ vote provided to shareholders, to the more prescriptive ‘two strikes rule’; that is, two negative shareholder resolutions after 1 July 2011 may result in a board re-election. While much commentary has focused on the potential threats— impacts on remuneration reports and the potential costs to the company — we discuss another potential consequence: an opportunity for board recruitment. At a time when companies are also expected to comment on their diversity policies, planning for a threatened ‘spill’ creates an opportunity for board composition planning and succession. The arguments presented are also placed in the context of the UK debate, where recent proposals advocate for wider stakeholder engagement and diversity in remuneration planning.