Liquidity, governance and adverse selection in asset pricing

A plethora of recent literature on asset pricing provides plenty of empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity, governance and adverse selection of equity on pricing of assets together with more traditional factors such as market beta and the Fama-French factors. However, literature has usually stressed that these factors are priced individually. In this dissertation we argue that these factors may be related to each other, hence not only individual but also joint tests of their significance is called for. ^ In the three related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context of the finer three-digit SIC industry classification, joint importance of liquidity and governance factors as well as governance and adverse selection. Recent studies by Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl (2010) find that governance and liquidity premiums are dwindling in the last few years. One reason could be that liquidity is very unevenly distributed across industries. This could affect the interpretation of prior liquidity studies. Thus, in the first chapter we analyze the relation of industry clustering and liquidity risk following a finer industry classification suggested by Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009). In the second chapter, we examine the dwindling influence of the governance factor if taken simultaneously with liquidity. We argue that this happens since governance characteristics are potentially a proxy for information asymmetry that may be better captured by market liquidity of a company's shares. Hence, we jointly examine both the factors, namely, governance and liquidity - in a series of standard asset pricing tests. Our results reconfirm the importance of governance and liquidity in explaining stock returns thus independently corroborating the findings of Amihud (2002) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Moreover, governance is not subsumed by liquidity. Lastly, we analyze the relation of governance and adverse selection, and again corroborate previous findings of a priced governance factor. Furthermore, we ascertain the importance of microstructure measures in asset pricing by employing Huang and Stoll's (1997) method to extract an adverse selection variable and finding evidence for its explanatory power in four-factor regressions.^

Liquidity, Governance and Adverse Selection in Asset Pricing

A plethora of recent literature on asset pricing provides plenty of empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity, governance and adverse selection of equity on pricing of assets together with more traditional factors such as market beta and the Fama-French factors. However, literature has usually stressed that these factors are priced individually. In this dissertation we argue that these factors may be related to each other, hence not only individual but also joint tests of their significance is called for. In the three related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context of the finer three-digit SIC industry classification, joint importance of liquidity and governance factors as well as governance and adverse selection. Recent studies by Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl (2010) find that governance and liquidity premiums are dwindling in the last few years. One reason could be that liquidity is very unevenly distributed across industries. This could affect the interpretation of prior liquidity studies. Thus, in the first chapter we analyze the relation of industry clustering and liquidity risk following a finer industry classification suggested by Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009). In the second chapter, we examine the dwindling influence of the governance factor if taken simultaneously with liquidity. We argue that this happens since governance characteristics are potentially a proxy for information asymmetry that may be better captured by market liquidity of a company’s shares. Hence, we jointly examine both the factors, namely, governance and liquidity – in a series of standard asset pricing tests. Our results reconfirm the importance of governance and liquidity in explaining stock returns thus independently corroborating the findings of Amihud (2002) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Moreover, governance is not subsumed by liquidity. Lastly, we analyze the relation of governance and adverse selection, and again corroborate previous findings of a priced governance factor. Furthermore, we ascertain the importance of microstructure measures in asset pricing by employing Huang and Stoll’s (1997) method to extract an adverse selection variable and finding evidence for its explanatory power in four-factor regressions.

Biased selection within the social health insurance market in Colombia

Las regulaciones como primaje comunitario, paquetes estandarizados y afiliación abierta, orientadas a reducir el impacto de las fallas en los mercados de seguros, tienen un efecto limitado puesto que abren espacio a la selección sesgada. A partir de 1993, el sistema de seguridad social en salud en Colombia fue reformado hacia un enfoque de mercado con la expectativa de mejorar el desempeño de los monopolios preexistentes exponiéndolos a la competencia de nuevos entrantes. La hipótesis que se maneja en el trabajo es que las fallas de mercado pueden llevar a selección sesgada favoreciendo a los nuevos entrantes. Se analizaron dos encuestas de hogares utilizando el estado de salud auto reportado y la presencia de enfermedad crónica como indicadores prospectivos del riesgo de los afiliados. Se encuentra que hay selección sesgada, llevando a selección adversa entre los aseguradores preexistentes, y a selección favorable entre los nuevos entrantes. Este patrón se observa en 1997 y se incrementa en el 2003. Aunque las entidades preexistentes son entidades públicas, y su tamaño disminuyó sustancialmente entre estos años, se analizan sus implicaciones fiscales en términos de financiación adicional por parte del gobierno.

Disclosure in insurance law : contemporary and historical economic considerations

This article examines the importance of accurate classification and identification of risk with particular reference to the problem of adverse selection. It is argued that, historically, this concern was the paramount consideration influencing standard form contract formation and disclosure laws. The scope of its relevance today however is less apparent in that contemporary insurance contracting is conducted in a vastly different environment from that which prevailed at the time Lloyd's was better known as a coffee house. Accordingly, the second part of this article looks at the contemporary framework of information disclosure and those dynamics within it designed to elicit information weighing on risk forecasting : specifically, (a) direct inquiry and testing requirements; (b) signaling - or incentive based structuring of insurance contractual and (c) bargaining in the shadow of the utmost good faith doctrine. Finally, certain conclusions arising out of contemporary and historical economic considerations underpinning disclosure in insurance law are outlined.

The determinants of demand for private health insurance under Medicare

Since the introduction of Medicare in 1984, the proportion of the Australian population with private health insurance has declined considerably. Insurance for health care consumption is compulsory for the public health sector but optional for the private health sector. In this paper, we explore a number of important issues in the demand for private health insurance in Australia. The socio-economic variables which influence demand are examined using a binary logic model. A number of simulations are performed to highlight the influence and relative importance of various characteristics such as age, income, health status and geographical location on demand. A number of important policy issues in the private health insurance market are highlighted. First, evidence is provided of adverse selection in the private health insurance pool, second, the notion of the wealthy uninsured is refuted, and finally it is confirmed that there are significant interstate differences in the demand for private health insurance.

Are lemons really hot potatoes?

We model the hazard rate for car ownership spells. Our model allows us to distinguish among different types of adverse selection effects by observing the type of unobserved heterogeneity across owners of the same car. Our empirical results strongly suggest that there is a lemons effect because there is significant unobserved heterogeneity. However, they also suggest that the lemons effect is caused by the first owner rather than the manufacturer. Had the manufacturer created the lemon, the unobserved heterogeneity would be positively correlated over all owners of a given car. Instead we observe a negative correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity term for the first owner and the unobserved heterogeneity term for subsequent owners. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

El componente de selección adversa de la horquilla de precios cotizada: una revisión de los modelos de estimación

[ES] Una de las principales preocupaciones en el área de la microestructura del mercado ha sido la estimación de los componentes no observables de la horquilla de precios a partir de las series de datos que proporcionan los mercados financieros, despertando quizá un mayor interés el de selección adversa por la implicaciones que supone la existencia del mismo. Esto ha provocado el desarrollo de numerosos modelos empíricos que, basándose en las propiedades estadísticas de las series de precios, proporcionan dichas estimaciones. La mayor disponibilidad de datos existentes en los mercados ha permitido el desarrollo en los últimos años de modelos basados en técnicas estadísticas más complejas como son el método generalizado de momentos o la metodología VAR y cuya base de partida es la dinámica de la formación del precio, y, en concreto, cómo la información privada de las transacciones se recoge en los nuevos precios cotizados. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar este último grupo de trabajos, es decir, aquellos modelos de estimación de los componentes de la horquilla basados en la dinámica de la formación de precios que, además de permitir la estimación del componente de selección adversa en series temporales, suponen una herramienta fundamental para analizar el proceso de incorporación de la información a los precios cotizados en los distintos mercados.

Comportamiento de las empresas respecto a la formación contínua de sus directivos

Este trabajo ha sido previamente presentado en las XVII Jornadas Luso-Espanholas de Gestao Científica, celebradas en Evora (Portugal) en febrero de 2006.

Initiatives for the improvement of continuous management training

[EN] Purpose. This work aims to present, from the company viewpoint, a structured account of management proposals and practices directed toward improving the intensity and effectiveness of continuous management training (CMT). Design/methodology/approach. The article takes as its main theoretical referents the Theory of Human Capital, the Resource-Based Vision and the contributions made via the new institutional economy with regard to the problems of information asymmetry between companies, employees and training providers and completes the proposals that derive from this theoretical approach. To do this, experience-based contributions are collected from a selection of company training and HR managers from twelve Basque companies characterised by their strong investment in management training. The methodology used was qualitative and obtained by different qualitative techniques: Focus Groups, Nominal Groups and the Delphi Method, which make up the so-called Hybrid Delphi. Findings and implications. The proposals are aimed at the main agents in training activity: training providers, associations and public agents engaged in management training and, particularly, companies themselves. The initiatives seek above all to increase training market transparency, to improve mutual commitments between companies and managers, and to link training and development with culture and strategic management, so that firms make optimal investment in management training. Originality/value. The methodology used is original, and the contributions are consistent with the theory, have a proven practical utility, and are presented in a hierarchy, which facilitates decision making.

An empirical examination of risk equalisation in a regulated community rated health insurance market

Despite universal access entitlements to the public healthcare system in Ireland, over half the population is covered by voluntary private health insurance. The market operates on the basis of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover. A set of minimum benefits also exists, and two risk equalisation schemes have been put in place but neither was implemented. These schemes have proved highly controversial. To date, the debate has primarily consisted of qualitative arguments. This study adds a quantitative element by analysing a number of pertinent issues. A model of a community rated insurance market is developed, which shows that community rating can only be maintained in a competitive market if all insurers in the market have the same risk profile as the market overall. This has relevance to the Irish market in the aftermath of a Supreme Court decision to set aside risk equalisation. Two reasons why insurers’ risk profiles might differ are adverse selection and risk selection. Evidence is found of the existence of both forms of selection in the Irish market. A move from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating in Australia had significant consequences for take-up rates and the age profile of the insured population. A similar move has been proposed in Ireland. It is found that, although this might improve the stability of community rating in the short term, it would not negate the need for risk equalisation. If community rating were to collapse then risk rating might result. A comparison of the Irish, Australian and UK health insurance markets suggests that community rating encourages higher take-up among older consumers than risk rating. Analysis of Irish hospital discharge figures suggests that this yields significant savings for the Irish public healthcare system. This thesis has implications for government policy towards private health insurance in Ireland.

The Impact of Extension and Ecosystem Services on Smallholders’ Credit Constraint.

On formal credit markets, access to formal credit and reasonable credit terms of smallholder farmers
in rural sub-Saharan Africa is limited due to adverse selection. Financial institutions operating in
rural areas often cannot distinguish between borrowers (farmers) that are creditworthy and those that
are not, thus, allocate limited resource to agriculture to reduce credit risk. In the presence of limited business quality signaling by smallholder farmers, financial institutions shall demand for collateral and/or offer unfavorable contract terms. Moreover, agricultural productivity of rural sub-Saharan
Africa, dominated by subsistence or small-scale farmers, is also negatively impacted by the adverse
effect of climate change. A strategy that may make the farming practices of smallholder farmer’s
climate resilient and profitable may also improve smallholder farmer's access to formal credit. This
study investigates to what extent participating in ecosystem and extension services (EES) programs
signals business quality of smallholders, thus granting them credit accessibility. We collected data
on 210 smallholder farmers in 2013, comprising farmers that receive payments for ecosystem
services (PES) and farm management training from the International Small Group Tree Planting
Program (TIST) Kenya to test the aforementioned theory empirically. We use game theory,
particularly a screening and sorting model, to illustrate the prospects for farmers with EES to access
formal credit and to improve their credit terms given that they receive PES and banking services
training. Furthermore, the PES’ long term duration (10 – 30 years) generates stable cash-flow which
may be perceived as collateral substitute. Results suggest that smallholder farmers in the TIST
program were less likely to be credit constraint compared to non-TIST farmers. Distance to market,
education, livestock and farm income are factors that determine access to credit from microfinance
institutions in rural Kenya. Amongst farmers that have obtained loans, those keeping business records
enjoy more favorable formal credit conditions. These farmers were observed to pay ca. 5 percent less
interest rate in microfinance charges. For TIST farmers, this type of farm management practices may
be attributed to the banking services and other training they receive within the program. While the
availability of classical collateral (farmlands) and PES may reduce interest rate, the latter was found
to be statistically insignificant. This research underlines the importance of an effective extension
services in rural areas of developing countries and the need to improve gains from conservation
agriculture and ensuing PES. The benefits associated with EES and PES may encompass agricultural
financing.

Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais en économie forestière. Les deux premiers s'intéressent à la fixation de la redevance optimale à laquelle fait face le propriétaire d'une ressource forestière dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le troisième analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. La gestion des ressources forestières implique souvent la délégation des droits de coupe par le propriétaire forestier à une entreprise exploitante. Cette délégation prend la forme d'un contrat de concession par lequel le propriétaire forestier octroie les droits d'exploitation aux compagnies forestières, en contrepartie d'une redevance (transfert monétaire). L'octroie des droits d'exploitation s'effectue généralement sous plusieurs modes, dont les plus répandus sont les appels d'offres publics et les contrats de gré à gré, où le propriétaire forestier et la firme exploitante spécifient entre autres la redevance dans les clauses d'exploitation de la forêt. Pour déterminer le mécanisme optimal (choix de la firme, âge de coupe et redevance), le propriétaire forestier a idéalement besoin de connaître les coûts de coupe et de reboisement. Or en réalité, les firmes sont mieux informées sur leurs coûts que le propriétaire forestier. Dans ce contexte d'information asymétrique, le mécanisme optimal doit donc prendre en considération des contraintes informationnelles. Les deux premiers essais caractérisent, sous ces conditions, l'âge de coupe optimal (la rotation optimale) et la redevance optimale. Le premier essai examine le contrat optimal quand le propriétaire forestier cède les droits de coupes à une firme par un accord de gré à gré ou par une procédure d'appel d'offre public au second prix. L'analyse du problème est menée premièrement dans un contexte statique, dans le sens que les coûts de coupe sont parfaitement corrélés dans le temps, puis dans un contexte dynamique, où les coûts sont indépendants dans le temps. L'examen en statique et en dynamique montre que la rotation optimale va satisfaire une version modifiée de la règle de Faustmann qui prévaudrait en information symétrique. Cette modification est nécessaire afin d'inciter la firme à révéler ses vrais coûts. Dans le cas statique, il en résulte que la rotation optimale est plus élevée en information asymétrique qu'en situation de pleine information. Nous montrons également comment le seuil maximal de coût de coupe peut être endogénéisé, afin de permettre au propriétaire d'accroître son profit espéré en s'assurant que les forêts non profitables ne seront pas exploitées. Nous comparons ensuite la redevance optimale en information asymétrique et symétrique. Les redevances forestières dans un arrangement de gré à gré étant généralement, en pratique, une fonction linéaire du volume de bois, nous dérivons le contrat optimal en imposant une telle forme de redevance et nous caractérisons la perte en terme de profit espéré qui résulte de l'utilisation de ce type de contrat plutôt que du contrat non linéaire plus général. Finalement, toujours dans le contexte statique, nous montrons à travers un mécanisme optimal d'enchère au second prix qu'en introduisant ainsi la compétition entre les firmes le propriétaire forestier augmente son profit espéré. Les résultats obtenus dans le contexte dynamique diffèrent pour la plupart de ceux obtenus dans le cas statique. Nous montrons que le contrat optimal prévoit alors que chaque type de firme, incluant celle ayant le coût le plus élevé, obtient une rente strictement positive, laquelle augmente dans le temps. Ceci est nécessaire pour obtenir la révélation à moindre coût à la période courante du véritable type de la firme. Comme implication, la rotation optimale s'accroît aussi dans le temps. Finalement, nous montrons qu'il y a distorsion en asymétrique d'information par rapport à l'optimum de pleine information même pour le coût le plus bas (la réalisation la plus favorable). La concurrence introduite dans le premier essai sous forme d'enchère au second prix suppose que chaque firme connaît exactement son propre coût de coupe. Dans le deuxième essai nous relâchons cette hypothèse. En réalité, ni le propriétaire forestier ni les firmes ne connaissent avec précision les coûts de coupe. Chaque firme observe de manière privée un signal sur son coût. Par exemple chaque firme est autorisée à visiter un lot pour avoir une estimation (signal) de son coût de coupe. Cependant cette évaluation est approximative. Ainsi, le coût de chaque firme va dépendre des estimations (signaux) d'autres firmes participantes. Nous sommes en présence d'un mécanisme à valeurs interdépendantes. Dans ce contexte, la valeur d'une allocation dépend des signaux de toutes les firmes. Le mécanisme optimal (attribution des droits d'exploitation, redevance et âge de coupe) est exploré. Nous déterminons les conditions sous lesquelles le mécanisme optimal peut être implémenté par une enchère au second prix et dérivons la rotation optimale et le prix de réserve dans le contexte de ce type d'enchère. Le troisième essai de la thèse analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. L'un des principaux arguments qui milite en faveur du recours au recyclage est que cela entraînerait une réduction de la coupe de bois, épargnant ainsi des arbres. L'objectif est donc d'aboutir à un nombre d'arbres plus important qu'en l'absence de recyclage. L'idée d'accroître le stock d'arbre tient au fait que les forêts génèrent des externalités: elles créent un flux de services récréatifs, freinent l'érosion des sols et des rives des cours d'eau et absorbent du dioxyde de carbone présent dans l'atmosphère. Étant donné la présence d'externalités, l'équilibre des marchés résulterait en un nombre d'arbre insuffisant, justifiant donc la mise en oeuvre de politiques visant à l'accroître. Le but de ce troisième essai est de voir dans quelle mesure la promotion du recyclage est un instrument approprié pour atteindre un tel objectif. En d'autres mots, comment le recyclage affecte-t-il à long terme la surface de terre en forêt et l'âge de coupe? Nous étudions cette question en spécifiant un modèle dynamique d'allocation d'un terrain donné, par un propriétaire forestier privé, entre la forêt et une utilisation alternative du terrain, comme l'agriculture. Une fois les arbres coupés, il décide d'une nouvelle allocation du terrain. Il le fait indéfiniment comme dans le cadre du modèle de Faustmann. Le bois coupé est transformé en produit final qui est en partie recyclé comme substitut du bois original. Ainsi, les outputs passés affectent le prix courant. Nous montrons que, paradoxalement, un accroissement du taux de recyclage réduira à long terme la surface forestière et donc diminuera le nombre d'arbres plantés. Par contre l'âge de coupe optimal va s'accroître. L'effet net sur le volume de bois offert sur le marché est ambigu. Le principal message cependant est qu'à long terme le recyclage va résulter en une surface en forêt plus petite et non plus grande. Donc, si le but est d'accroître la surface en forêt, il pourrait être préférable de faire appel à d'autres types d'instruments de politique que celui d'encourager le recyclage.

L’impact des principes éthiques sur le marché d’assurance en présence de tests génétiques

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Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

El Outsourcing en la dinámica de sistemas hacia mercados extranjeros

Este trabajo recopila literatura académica relevante sobre estrategias de entrada y metodologías para la toma de decisión sobre la contratación de servicios de Outsourcing para el caso de empresas que planean expandirse hacia mercados extranjeros. La manera en que una empresa planifica su entrada a un mercado extranjero, y realiza la consideración y evaluación de información relevante y el diseño de la estrategia, determina el éxito o no de la misma. De otro lado, las metodologías consideradas se concentran en el nivel estratégico de la pirámide organizacional. Se parte de métodos simples para llegar a aquellos basados en la Teoría de Decisión Multicriterio, tanto individuales como híbridos. Finalmente, se presenta la Dinámica de Sistemas como herramienta valiosa en el proceso, por cuanto puede combinarse con métodos multicriterio.