Disclosure in insurance law : contemporary and historical economic considerations

This article examines the importance of accurate classification and identification of risk with particular reference to the problem of adverse selection. It is argued that, historically, this concern was the paramount consideration influencing standard form contract formation and disclosure laws. The scope of its relevance today however is less apparent in that contemporary insurance contracting is conducted in a vastly different environment from that which prevailed at the time Lloyd's was better known as a coffee house. Accordingly, the second part of this article looks at the contemporary framework of information disclosure and those dynamics within it designed to elicit information weighing on risk forecasting : specifically, (a) direct inquiry and testing requirements; (b) signaling - or incentive based structuring of insurance contractual and (c) bargaining in the shadow of the utmost good faith doctrine. Finally, certain conclusions arising out of contemporary and historical economic considerations underpinning disclosure in insurance law are outlined.